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INTRODUCTION 
"There is no greater inequality 
than equal treatment of unequals."! 
1021 
Current estimates indicate that at least six out of every hun-
dred persons of the population of the United States have some 
form of mental disorder.2 Since law acts upon human individuals, 
it must recognize the capabilities and limitations of those indi-
viduals. Consequently mental illness is important and influential 
in the development of legal rules. Perhaps this is indicated by 
recently developed interest of the legal profession in problems of 
law as related to mental illness,3 and by the inclusion for the first 
time of a special topic, "Mental Health," in the Sixth Decennial 
Digest.4 
Certain legally consequential actions, such as making a will 
or a gift, are more "mental" in their essential characteristics than 
others, such as negligent acts. Contracts, viewed basically as agree-
ments, are among these actions which are more "mental" in na-
ture. It is to be expected, then, that the law of contracts is affected 
in many important ways by mental illness5 of any of the parties. 
1 'MENGER, DAS BUGERLICHE RECHT UND DIE BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN, 4th ed., 30 (1908), 
as ,translated and quoted in Green, "Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental 
Incompetency," 38 Mica. L. REv. 1189 at 1221 (1940). 
2 E.g., Felix and Kramer, "Extent of the Problem of Mental Disorders," 286 ANNALS 
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PoLmCAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 5 at 8 (March 1953); Glover, 
"Mental Health, Everybody's Business," Punuc AFFAIRS PAMPHLET 196, at p. 23 (May 
1953). Of these 9,000,000 persons, it is estimated that on any given day approximately 
525,000 are in prolonged-care mental hospitals. 
3 See, e.g., Ross, "Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy," 
p. 945 supra; "The Mentally Disabled and the Law," a comprehensive report on the 
rights of the mentally ill undergoing preparation by the American Bar Foundation; 
Symposium, "Psychiatry and the Law," 29 TEMP. L.Q. 233 (1956). 
4 "Mental Health," SIXTH DECENNIAL DIGEST, vol. 21, p. 1152. 
Ii "Mental illness," as used in this study, means any form of mental disorder, devia-
tion or defect, including mental deficiency or feeblemindedness, psychoses, including the 
senile psychoses, and the psychoneuroses. A list of medical or psychological terms sug-
gested for lawyers is included in note 161 infra. The following are some of the other 
terms which are frequently used throughout this study: 
Mentally ill person: that person, a party to ,the contract or contractual relationship 
in issue, who has or has had mental illness that may affect the relationship. This term 
is also used to designate a person merely alleged to be mentally ill, and a person who 
anay have subsequently been cured of his mental illness. This person is also referred to 
as the ill person, or where his mental illness meets certain criteria, ,the incompetent 
person. 
Healthy person: that person, a party to a transaction, as above, who does not have, 
is not alleged to have, or has not ihad mental -illness. He is the party other than the 
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For this reason the editors of the Michigan Law Review have 
chosen to study these effects in detail, and to present the results 
of this study with the threefold purpose of analyzing and discuss-
ing the relevant rules of law and their underlying justification, 
suggesting some evaluations of these rules in light of modern 
science, and aiding the practicing attorney in his preparation of 
a case or transaction in which mental illness of a contracting party 
is involved. 6 
Mental illness at a particular stage of a contract (such as the 
agreement stage or the performance stage) can have varying effects 
throughout the remaining course of the contract. The traditional 
and most important problem relative to mental illness and the 
contract is the situation created when mental illness exists at the 
time of agreement (the problem of contractual capacity). One prin-
cipal result of mental illness at this time may be the avoidance of 
the contract by the mentally ill person. Since case law in this area 
is extensive, the major portion of the study is concerned with this 
problem (parts II, III and IV) and the effects of such incapacity 
throughout the remaining course of the contract. Mental illness 
occurring after agreement and at the time of performance of a 
party to a contract can also have important effects on the re-
mainder of the contract, and these effects are discussed in part V. 
Finally, there can be a number of other effects caused by mental 
illness which occur after agreement but do not directly affect per-
formance. These are discussed in part VI. 
Various strands of other branches of law interweave into the 
subject of this study in a manner that makes a thorough considera-
tion difficult if not impossible without deviating somewhat into 
these other areas. Particularly is this true of the law of fraud and 
undue influence, to which reference will often be made. Never-
mentally ill person in a ,bilateral situation. He is also referred -to as the competent 
individual. 
Successors or representatives: those persons who claim through or under either of 
,the parties to a contractual transaction, including but not limited to heirs, personal 
representatives, guardians, purchasers, assignees or donees. 
The term "power of avoidance" is defined in note 27 infra, and the terms "void" 
and "voidable" are used in the special sense described in Part IV-A-2. 
6As an aid to the practicing attorney, an outline of the types of evidence utilized 
to prove or disprove contractual incapacity is included in •the appendix. Also included 
is a checklist of items which should be considered in order to minimize the risk of later 
avoidance of a ,transaction -with a person suspected to be mentally ill. A list of statutory 
provisions on this topic also appears in the appendix. 
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theless, and despite the artificiality, an endeavor has been made to 
limit the subject to contract law as affected by mental illness. 
I. PERSPECTIVES, POSTULATES AND POLICIES 
A. Perspectives 
Even before Justinian, Roman lawyers recognized that, "An 
insane person cannot contract any business whatever, because he 
does not understand what he is doing."7 Similar references can be 
found in the Corpus Juris Civilis8 and by later jurists such as 
Grotius.° Canon law also recognized the effect of mental illness 
on law, and refers to state law for decision as to enforceability of 
promises.10 Early English common law held that since contracts 
were based on a meeting of the minds in agreement (the subjective 
view of contract law), there could be no such agreement if one of 
these minds was incapable of understanding.11 Later English law 
developments prevented a person who had regained sanity from 
avoiding a contract on the basis of incapacity at the time of agree-
ment, although his representatives or successors were allowed to 
avoid on this ground.12 The reason given for this surprising re-
sult was that a person should not be allowed to "stultify himself" 
by a plea of incapacity.13 By 1690, however, courts had again re-
turned to the position of allowing a contract agreed to by an in-
competent person to be avoided,14 and in 1849 an English court 
even indicated that incapacity might be a defense in a contract 
action if it were proved that the plaintiff knew or should have 
known of the other party's disability.15 
In the civil law systems articles 104 and 105 of the German 
Civil Code provide that declarations of will (the basis of con-
7PrCKETI', MENTAL AFFLICTION AND CHURCH LAW 13 (1952). 
8 SHERMAN AND ROBINSON, ROMAN READINGS IN ROMAN LAW 125 (1933). 
o Cook, "Mental Deficiency and the English Law of Contract," 21 CoL. L. R.Ev. 424 
at 425 (1921). 
10 PICKEIT, MENTAL AFFLICTION AND CHURCH LAw 199 (1952); AUGUSTINE, A COM• 
MENTARY ON THE NEW CODE OF CANON LAW, 3d ed., Canon 1529, p. 590 (1931). 
11 Cook, "Mental Deficiency and the English Law of Contract," 21 CoL. L. R.Ev. 424 
at 425 and 428 (1921). 
12 Beverley's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 123b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (1603). The court took the 
statement of the law from Coke on Littleton. 
13 Cook, "Mental Deficiency and the English Law of Contract," 21 CoL. L. R.Ev. 424 
at 429 (1921). 
14 Thompson v. Leach, 3 Mod. Rep. 301, 87 Eng. Rep. 199 (1690). 
15 Molton v. Camroux, 2 Exch. 487, 154 Eng. Rep. 584 (1849). 
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tract)16 by persons "suffering from an impairment of the mental 
faculties precluding a free determination of the will" are void. 
Article 1124, read with articles 502 and 503, of the French Civil 
Code indicates that mental illness can prevent a person from mak-
ing a valid contract or, in some cases, can result in avoidance of a 
previous contract. Similar effects of mental illness on contract 
law can be found in Scandinavian law,17 Islamic law (and the 
Egyptian Civil Code of 1948),18 and Russian law.19 
It is probable that every major legal system today recognizes 
the profound influence that mental illness of a party can have 
on a contract. This suggests the likelihood that the relationship 
between mental illness and contract law is one "of the principles, 
notions, and distinctions which are common to systems of law."20 
B. Postulates 
Any study of this kind involves many postulates, most of which 
are so common to Anglo-American law that they need not be ex-
pressed. Among the less common postulates underlying this study, 
however, are two which must be explained because they may not 
be readily accepted by the reader. 
The first of these is implicit in the analysis and organization 
of the subject matter, as explained in the Introduction. The effect 
of mental illness on contract law is studied by assuming that 
mental illness occurs at one stage of the contract, and then ex-
amining the effects of that mental illness on the rest of the con-
tract as if no further mental illness were involved. In other words, 
for purposes of this study it is assumed that all parties to the con-
tract are mentally healthy up to a certain chronological point in 
the contract or contract formation, then mental illness of one party 
occurs at that point of the relationship, and immediately there-
after the illness ends and all parties are healthy again through-
out the remainder of the contract relationship. This "tum-on, 
tum-off" quality of mental illness can actually be manifested21 
16 German Civil Code of 1896. See also article 145 et seq. 
17 ARNHOLM, ALMINNELIG AVTALERE'IT 213-225 (Oslo, 1949). 
18 KHADDURI AND LmESNY, LAw IN THE MIDDLE EAsT 196 (1955). See also articles 1 
and 45 of the Egyptian Civil Code of July 16, 1948. 
19 Code Civil de la Russie Sovietique, art. 8 (1923). See LES CODES DE LA RuSSIE 
SOVIETIQUE, Traduit par Jules Patouillet (Paris, 1925). 
20 Austin, "On the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence:•· LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, 
2d ed., vol. 3, p. 351 (London, 1863). 
21 Wmra, THE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY 299-302 (1948). 
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and, for purposes of this study, an assumption that all mental ill-
ness can occur in this manner is justified for two reasons. First, 
even a gradually increasing or decreasing mental illness may meet 
a specific test for a legal consequence (such as a test for contractual 
incapacity that results in the consequence of avoidance)22 at a point 
which can occur at any single time during the course of a contract. 
Thus, for the consequence of avoidance, mental illness must sat-
isfy the test for contractual incapacity at only one time, the time 
of agreement. Second, even if mental illness exists throughout a 
period of time, sufficient evidence may exist only at one point 
within that period in order to satisfy a trier of fact that legal con-
sequences should attach. 
A second postulate that must be explained is that generally 
decisions concerning the effects of incapacity to convey land are 
applicable in contract situations. This postulate is supported by 
eminent secondary authority and some cases,23 but it does not hold 
true when the conveyance of land is not made in an arms-length 
transaction. Thus decisions involving conveyance of land as a gift 
or in a testamentary manner (reserving a life estate), may not be 
applicable to a contract case.24 Deed cases involving arms-length 
transactions have been utilized in this study, but the nature of 
such cases has been specifically designated in the footnotes. 
C. Policies 
Basically, the law of contracts as affected by mental illness is the 
battleground for two conflicting policies or interests.25 The first 
of these is the policy of upholding the security of transactions, 
or reasonable expectancies of contracts. The other is the policy 
of protecting mentally weak individuals from the consequences 
22 See Part II infra. 
23 See 2 BLACK, 'RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., 736 (1929); 1 WHARTON AND 
STILLE, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., 12 (1905); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., 738 
(1936); Green, "The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills," 
21 TEX. L. REv. 554 at 557 (1943). This and four other related articles have been re-
printed in MENTAL INCOMPETENCY To MAKE A CONTRACT OR WILL (1944). Christian v. 
Waialua Agr. Co., (9th Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 603 at 611, revd. on other grounds 305 U.S. 
91 (1938); Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind. 236 at 245, 150 N.E. 361 (1925). 
24 See notes 83 and 84 infra, Part II-C. 
25 See the thorough analysis of policies involved in contractual capacity problems 
in Green, "Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency," 38 MICH. L. 
REv. 1189 (1940), also reprinted in MENTAL INCOMPETENCY To MAKE A CONTRACT OR WILL 
(1944). 
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of their own acts and the acts of others. There are, of course, 
other factors such as fault of one party or unjust enrichment 
which introduce additional considerations. But most of the 
troublesome situations of mental illness and contract law turn on a 
clash of the two basic policies. For instance, where the competent 
or healthy party knows of the illness or incompetence of the other 
party, the policy of securing reasonable expectations no longer 
weighs so heavily. Likewise where a mentally incompetent person 
obtains only necessaries by his contract, the policy of protecting 
the incompetent is not as critical in importance. Derivative prin-
ciples and variations on these two policies also exist, as where a 
mentally ill person is dead, the power of his heir to avoid a con-
tract may be based on protection of the incompetent's family, 
instead of the incompetent himself. Even here it could be argued, 
however, that allowing the incompetent's successor or represent-
ative in interest to avoid puts other healthy parties on notice to 
take care in contracting with the mentally infirm, thus thrusting 
part of the burden of protection of incompetents on the healthy 
party to a contract. 
The policy of protecting a mentally ill person is also demon-
strated by the influence on a court that mental illness can have 
in contract situations where fraud or undue influence is alleged. 
The interaction of mental illness and these related principles is 
an important but separate topic.26 A study of that interaction may 
suggest the possibility that mental illness is one basis on which a 
court can rest its desire to control an unfair bargain. 
II. THE TESTS OF MENTAL INCAPACITY To CONTRACT 
Mental illness occurring at the time of agreement or contract 
formation is the starting point of this study. Such mental illness 
of a party to a contract may have various effects, but perhaps the 
most drastic of these is the creation of a power of avoidance27 in 
26 See, e.g., Green, "Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mental Incompetency," 43 CoL. 
L. R.Ev. 176 (1943), also reprinted in MENTAL INCOMPETENCY To MAKE A CONTRACT OR WILL 
(1944). See Part IV-A, infra. 
27 If a court can find that one party •to a contract did not have capacity to contract 
at the time of the agreement, it will, as Part IV will indicate, allow the party or his 
successor or representative to "avoid" the contract. Throughout this study the term 
"power of avoidance" has been used to indicate •the ability of one party to "get out" of 
the contract in some manner, if he wishes. Cf. Corbin, "Legal Analysis and Terminology," 
29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919). 
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the ill party or his successors. Since slight or mild mental illness 
would not seem to warrant the protection granted a party through 
a power of avoidance, however, some criterion must be satisfied 
before such protection is granted. This criterion is termed "in-
capacity to contract," and will be the subject of this part and part 
III (evidence). The question here presented, then, is what degree 
and what sort of mental illness in a party during the agreement 
stage will have the legal effect of creating a power of avoidance. 
In reality it may be impossible to formulate a single test or set 
of tests which if met will in all cases induce a court to attach the 
power of avoidance to a contract relationship. The only real test 
may be that quantum and quality of proof that will lead a court 
in any given case to invoke the policy of protecting the mentally 
ill person or his family through permitting him to avoid his con-
tract. The extent of this quantum will be influenced by factors 
not strictly connected with the mental condition of that person, 
such as hints of unfairness, fraud, or undue influence.28 Neverthe-
less the courts and statutes do speak of "tests" for mental incapa-
city. It is the purpose of this portion of the study to examine those 
tests, as developed by the judiciary, as stated in legislation, and as 
weighed against findings of science in the mid-twentieth century. 
A. Tests for a Power of Avoidance 
I. The "Understanding" Test. The judicial test for a power 
of avoidance most often encountered in the decisions involving 
mental capacity to contract concerns the party's ability to under-
stand. As stated by one leading writer, "The proper inquiry is 
whether he is capable of understanding and appreciating the na-
ture and effect of the one particular act or transaction which is 
challenged."29 Although courts almost universally state this test 
in terms of understanding, the precise phraseology varies from a 
rather simple, "did he know what he was doing and the nature of 
the act done"30 to the more lengthy "was he mentally competent 
to deal with the subject before him with a full understanding of 
his rights ... whether he actually understood the nature, purpose 
28 See Part IV-A and Part III-B, infra. 
29 2 BLACK, R.EsCISSION AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., §262, p. 737 (1929). 
so Plainse v. Engle, 262 Wis. 506 at 511, 56 N.W. (2d) 89, 57 N.W. (2d) 586 (1952); 
Boorman v. Northwestern Mutual Relief Assn., 90 Wis. 144 at 148, 62 N.W. 924 (1895). 
1028 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [Vol. 57 
and effect of what he did."31 The decisions reveal a series of varia-
tions on this theme and it is doubtful that there is any legal sig-
nificance in the omission or addition of certain words or phrases.32 
Perhaps, as a leading commentator has suggested, these variations 
reflect the insignificance of a stated test to the court's actual process 
of allowing avoidance of a contract where the decision is 
prompted, among other factors, by an inarticulate standard of the 
normality or abnormality of the transaction.33 
The courts do, however, express an almost universal interest in 
a party's ability to understand. Proof of a mental illness or defi-
ciency alone is not sufficient to warrant a finding of incapacity 
under this test. The judicial test actually includes two require-
ments-a mental illness and an impairment of the understanding 
by that mental illness. "Mere infirmity of mind or body, not 
amounting to an incapacity to understand the nature and conse-
quence of the act done" is not sufficient to fulfill the test.34 
Since the ability to understand seems to be the key to this 
judicial test, a judicial definition of the term "understanding" 
would prove helpful. The courts have usually failed to provide 
any such definition. One court did elaborate, and said: 
"We are dealing with 'understanding' and not with mere 
'consciousness.' 'Understanding' ... suggests the concept of 
a mind with the faculty of applying its powers of reason to 
the elements it comprehends, to the end that a judgment 
or conclusion may be formed.'' 35 
31 Drum v. Bummer, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 453, 175 P. (2d) 879 (1946). 
32 Hardee v. Hardee, (Ala. 1956) 93 S. (2d) 127; Hanks v. McNeil Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 
168 P. (2d) 256 (1946); Tecklenberg v. Washington Gas and Elec. Co., 40 Wash. (2d) 
141, 241 P. (2d) 1172 (1952); Parrish v. Peoples, 214 Minn. 589, 9 N.W. (2d) 225 (1943); 
Leick v. Pozniak, 135 N.J. Eq. 67, 37 A. (2d) 302 (1944); In re Estate of Crawford, 176 
Kan. 537, 271 P. (2d) 240 (1954); Allen v. Kelso, (Mo. 1954) 266 S.W. (2d) 696; Kaleb v. 
Modem Woodmen, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P. (2d) 605 (1937); Summer v. Boyd, 208 Ga. 207, 
66 S.E. (2d) 51 (1951); Drum v. Bummer, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 453, 175 P. (2d) 879 (1946); 
Rogers v. Central Land Investment Co., 149 Minn. 347, 183 N.W. 963 (1921); Cathcart 
v. Stewart, 144 S.C. 252, 142 S.E. 498 (1927); Evans v. First Nat. Bank of Stillwater, 193 
Okla. 665, 146 P. (2d) 111 (1944); In re Wann's Estate, 176 Pa. Super. 498, 108 A. (2d} 
820 (1954); Martin v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 593 (1947); Oswald v. 
Seidler, 136 N.J. Eq. 443, 42 A. (2d) 216 (1945); Cole v. Waite, 151 Tex. 175, 246 S.W. (2d) 
849 (1952); Conners v. Eble, (Ky. 1954) 269 S.W. (2d) 716; Cook v. Hagen, 301 Ky. 346, 
192 S.W. (2d) 97 (1946); Daugherty v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E. (2d) 599 
(1944); Sjulin v. Clifton Furniture Co., 241 Iowa 761, 41 N.W. (2d) 721 (1950). 
33 Green, "Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency," 6 Mo. L. R.Ev. 141 (1941); Green, 
"Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise," 53 YALE L.J. 271 
(1944). 
34 In re Nightingale's Estate, 182 S.C. 527 at 542, 189 S.E. 890 (1936). 
35 Fisher v. Gorman, 65 S.D. 453 at 459, 274 N.W. 866 (1937). 
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Thus it seems that the law intends to protect a person who is 
without the ability to apply some sort of reasoning power, a power 
to balance future contingencies against present interests so that the 
decision or judgment to contract or not to contract may be made. 
Such a person certainly is in an unequal bargaining position in 
contract negotiations. 
How can a court measure or determine the ability to "under-
stand?" Although early English theories of mental capacity may 
have been influenced by the dualist ideas of separation of mind 
and body, 36 and although this may explain the seemingly subjec-
tive phraseology of the "understanding" test, it would nevertheless 
seem that proof in the court room would at that time have had to 
be directed to the overt manifestations of a person's state of mind, 
i.e., his behavior. Modern psychiatry rejects the dualistic concept 
of mind and body, taking the view that: 
"Body and mind are inextricably fused into a personal unity 
and are therefore no longer viewed as separate and distinct 
elements, but merely as different aspects of a living organism 
of which mind is the subjective phase of its existence and 
relationships. "37 
The mind expresses itself in the behavior or response of the or-
ganism to stimuli. Psychiatry and psychology, as studies of the 
mind, take an objective, behavioristic approach by basing their 
knowledge on the individual's behavior. Whether because of mod-
ern scientific ideas, the development of more objective viewpoints 
in contract law generally, or merely the lack of a real alternative, 
the courts today do seem to be basing their determination of con-
tractual incapacity on the behavior of the individual. This is illus-
trated by the fact that the behavior of the individual at the 
time of the transaction seems to carry more weight with the courts 
than testimony of experts as to contractual capacity.38 
Although the tests of contractual capacity seem to have been 
judicially developed, six states have enacted statutory provisions 
of a type similar to the following: 
311 See Green, "Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency.'' 38 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 1189 (1940) and Green, "Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency," 6 Mo. 
L. R.Ev. 141 (1941) for a discussion of -the effect of philosophical dualism on the early law. 
37 NOYES, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, lid ed., 1 (1948). 
38 See Part m-B, infra. 
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"A person entirely without understanding has no power to 
make a contract of any kind. 
"A contract of a person of unsound mind, but not entirely 
without understanding before adjudication is subject to 
rescission.' '39 
Although these statutes are concerned with understanding, they do 
not state as clear a test of what is required for contractual in-
capacity as do the judicial tests. It appears, however, with regard 
to judicial applications of these statutes, that they are generally 
interpreted to be identical with the old "understanding" test. 
Thus the Idaho court has held that in order to have rescission of 
a contract, proof that the party did not have the mental capacity to 
understand the purpose and effect of the con.tract is required.40 
2. The "Insane Delusion" Test. As the "understanding" test 
seems to apply only to mental illness and deficiency which results 
in some impairment of the judgment or the reasoning process, the 
courts have on some occasions gone beyond that test and form-
ulated an additional criterion, the so-called "insane delusion" 
test.41 
An insane delusion has been defined as a 
"fixed belief in the mind of the patient of the existence of a 
fact which has no objective existence, but is purely the fig-
ment of his imagination, and which is so extravagant that 
no sane person would believe it under the circumstances of 
the case, the belief, nevertheless, being so unchangeable that 
the patient is incapable of being permanently disabused by 
argument or proof."42 
The cases present vivid examples of transactions motivated by 
such delusions, e.g., a maker of a promissory note labored under 
the delusion that unless he made the note he would be killed or 
39 Idaho Code Ann. (1948) §§32-106 and 32-107; Cal. Civ. Code Ann. (Deering, 1949) 
§§38 and 39; Mont. Rev. Code (1947) §§64-110 and 64-111; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§14-0101 
and 14-0102; S.D. Code (1939) §§30-0801 and 30-0802; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1956) tit. 15, §§11 
and 22. 
40 Ratliff v. Baltzer's Admin., 13 Idaho 152, 89 P. 71 (1907); similar construction in 
Mullin v. First Guaranty State Bank, 113 Okla. 84, 239 P. 161 (1925); Fischer v. Gorman, 
65 S.D. 453, 274 N.W. 866 (1937); Fleming v. Consolidated M.S. Co., 74 Mont. 245, 240 
P. 376 (1925); Jacks v. Estee, 139 Cal. 507, 73 P. 247 (1903). 
41 See, generally, Green, "Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency," 6 Mo. L. REv. 
141 at 151-152 (1941). 
42 2 BLACK, illEsCISSION AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., §266, p. 748 (1929). 
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imprisoned,43 or, a husband believed his wife was having illicit 
relations ·with another man and deeded his property to a son.44 
Some courts have recognized the need to protect parties who 
enter into transactions because of insane delusions, typically stat-
ing the test to be "whether that insane delusion, if a person has 
it, is a moving cause to some act which would not have been done 
except for that delusion .... "45 
As has been suggested, it may be that the understanding test 
is broad enough to encompass the insane delusion situation.46 
Thus a Colorado court, referring to an earlier Illinois decision, 
stated the legal test of incapacity to include the situation where 
". . . the subject matter of the contract is so connected with an 
insane delusion as to render the afflicted party incapable of under-
standing the nature and effect of the agreement or of acting ra-
tionally in the transaction."47 However, the court did add to the 
understanding test the idea of ability to act rationally in the 
transaction. 
It does not seem necessary or advisable to require proof of 
compliance ·with the "understanding" test in the insane delusion 
case, since authority suggests a more meaningful test-did the 
insane delusion motivate the contract. It is medically conceivable 
for a person to be capable of understanding the nature and effect 
of a particular contract, and yet be motivated by a false belief 
caused by mental illness. It would seem as necessary to protect 
such an individual as it is necessary to protect a person who cannot 
understand. 
3. Ability To Control Actions. Thus far, this discussion has 
dealt with the two tests of contractual incapacity which have most 
often been stated by the courts. At least three decisions have indi-
cated a modification of these tests by suggesting an added cri-
terion-the ability of "acting rationally in the particular transac-
tion. "48 Or as stated by another court, the test of contractual in-
43 Ellars v. Mossbarger, 9 Ill. App. 122 (1881). 
44 Eubanks v. Eubanks, 360 Ill. 101, 195 N.E. 521 (1935) (deed). 
45 Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217, 52 N.E. 75 (1898); Green, "Judicial Tests of Mental 
Incompetency," 6 Mo. L. REv. 141 at 152 (1941). 
46 See Green, "Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency,'' 6 Mo. L. REv. 141 at 152 
(1941); GUITMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 334 (1952). 
47 Hanks v. McNeil Corp., 114 Colo. 578 at 585, 168 P. (2d) 256 (1946). 
48 Poole v. Hudson, 46 Del. (7 Terr.) 339, 83 A. (2d) 703 (1951), which stated in 
somewhat similar fashion the test discussed in Warwick v. Addicks, 35 Del. (5 W.W. Harr.) 
43, 157 A. 205 (1931); Hanks v. McNeil Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P. (2d) 256 (1946). 
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capacity is whether the person is "incapable of understanding and 
acting with discretion in such business.''49 
The cases which state this added criterion seem to be con-
sidering situations where a lack of sufficient understanding for 
contractual capacity is involved, and not situations of uncontrolled 
or irresponsible behavior where the party might possess under-
standing sufficient to justify a finding of capacity under the under-
standing test. Thus, the ability to control one's behavior as a 
criterion for avoidance of a contract or a test of contractual in-
capacity, is at best supported only by the dicta above. Though the 
inability to control overt manifestations leading to contract would 
seem to place a person in as unequal a bargaining position as 
he who cannot understand his action, an authoritative judicial 
statement to this effect has not been found. The validity from a 
scientific viewpoint of protecting such an individual ·will be 
considered below. 
4. Insufficient Factors. The examination of the tests of con-
tractual incapacity can perhaps be brought more sharply into 
focus by reference to what can be called "insufficient factors" -
factors which, in themselves, do not indicate incapacity. Thus 
none of the following alone is sufficient for a trier of fact to 
reach a conclusion that "incapacity" existed: senile dementia,50 
old age, 51 the influence of opiates, 52 disease, 58 physical distress and 
pain,54 intoxication,55 poor business judgment, eccentricity and 
irritability,56 an improvident contract,57 and in some cases 
commitment.58 
49 Howells State Bank v. Novotny, (8th Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 32 at 35. Emphasis added. 
50 Kaleb v. Modem Woodmen, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P. (2d) 605 (1937); Holman v. Stock-
ton Savings and Loan Bank, 49 Cal. App. (2d) 500, 122 P. (2d) 120 (1942). 
61 Cleland v. Peters, (W.D. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 769; Pontes, Gdn. T. Cruz v. 
Pontes, 40 Hawaii 620 (1954); English v. Porter, 109 Ill. 285 (1884); Daugherty v. 
Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E. (2d) 599 (1944); Cook v. Hagen, 301 Ky. 346, 192 
S.W. (2d) 97 (1946); Rose v. Rose, 298 Ky. 404, 182 S.W. (2d) 977 (1944); Hiett v. Shull, 
36 W. Va. 563, 15 S.E. 146 (1892). 
52 Poole v. Hudson, 46 Del. (7 Terr.) 339, 83 A. (2d) 703 (1951). 
58 English v. Porter, 109 Ill. 285 (1884). 
54 Mead v. Gilbert, 170 Md. 592, 185 A. 668 (1936). 
55 Seminara v. Grisman, 137 N.J. Eq. 307, 44 A. (2d) 492 (1945) (but if intoxication 
is so complete as to render a party incapable of understanding, then it may give a power 
of avoidance). 
56 Page v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 12 Wash. (2d) 101, 120 P. (2d) 527 (1942). 
57Rogers v. Central Land Investment, 149 Minn. 347, 183 N.W. 963 (1921). 
58 Estate of Schalla, 2 Wis. (2d) 38, 86 N.W. (2d) 5 (1957). 
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B. The Findings of Science 
The "understanding" test of contractual capacity has remained 
the same, at least in its verbal formulation, since 1895,59 and almost 
the same since the seventeenth century.60 On the other hand, the 
science of the mind and mental behavior has largely developed in 
the past half-century. Although this is not the place to present a 
complete picture of the sciences of mental illness,61 nevertheless it 
is interesting and valuable to note some of the comparisons and 
contrasts between the various tests for mental contractual capacity 
and the approach of present-day science. 
Mental illnesses, including psychoses, neuroses, and deficiencies, 
may have various causes, either organic or non-organic, and a 
number of manifestations or symptoms. It is these manifestations 
or symptoms that are the concern of the law of contractual capacity, 
because the interest involved is the protection of a mentally ill 
person from those symptoms which may put him in an unequal 
bargaining position or render him unable to appreciate or control 
his actions. 
An impairment of judgment is recognized by science as a symp-
tom or manifestation of several forms of mental illness. Illnesses 
caused by an organic destruction of brain tissue result in what is 
referred to as dementia-a progressive loss of intellectual capacity 
which involves, among other effects, an impairment of judgment.62 
The senile psychoses kno,vn as senile dementia, which is character-
ized by cerebral atrophy or actual organic destruction of the brain 
cells progressively result in such judgment impairment in bus-
iness affairs that one psychiatrist has noted that a guardian is 
usually necessary for people so affected. 63 Further examples of 
such judgment impairment due to organic causes are found in the 
psychoses connected with syphilitic meningo-encephalitis, gen-
59 See CLEVENGER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY OR FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 242 
(1898). 
60 Thompson v. Leach, 3 Mod. Rep. 301, 87 Eng. Rep. 199 (1690). 
61 An attorney will find GU1TMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 
(1952), and Coon, "Psychiatry for the Lawyer," 31 CoRN. L.Q. 327 (1946) to be helpful. 
An excellent text is NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed. (1958). Fay, 
"The Practical Role of Psychiatry in the Effective Practice of Law," 29 TEMP. L.Q. 327 
at 329 (1956), contains an extensive reading list for the attorney. 
62 NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CL~NICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 128 (1958); Coon, "Psy-
chiatry for Lawyers," 31 CORN. L.Q. 327 at 356 (1946); OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST 
AND THE LAW 28 (1953). 
63 NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., c. XVIII, 287-294 (1958); 
see especially 294. 
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erally known as paresis, 64 and the psychoses connected with cere-
bral arteriosclerosis.65 
Defects in judgment are also found to be manifested in mental 
deficiency which is caused by brain damage either before birth, or 
during infancy or adolescence.66 Since mental deficiency manifests 
itself at birth or early in the development of an individual,67 and 
since by definition a mentally deficient person cannot take care 
of himself, 68 it is unlikely that he would ever amass any property 
or engage in business affairs. Consequently this type of mental 
illness probably is rarely encountered in the contract situation. 
On the other hand the dementia type of mental illness progres-
sively affects individuals who at one time probably possessed nor-
mal competency and who were possibly engaged in business when 
they became afflicted. These individuals are much more likely to 
be encountered in a contract situation, especially during the per-
iod when the illness is progressing. 
Judgment impairment, however, is only one of the many and 
varied symptoms and manifestations of mental illness. For those 
types of mental illness characterized by such impairment, the 
"understanding" test seems to be an effective criterion for invok-
ing the protective policy of the law. 
A second manifestation of mental illness appears to have been 
recognized by the courts in the less frequently invoked "insane 
delusion" test. Delusions are symptoms of many different forms 
of mental illness also, including psychoses due to organic brain 
damage69 and schizophrenia.70 Delusions represent part of a pa-
tient's withdrawal from reality due to his inability to cope with it. 
Although such delusions are highly colored by the emotional needs 
and desires of the individual,71 they are very real to him and his 
behavior will be governed and affected by them to the extent that 
64 Id., chapter XIV, 238-256; see especially 243. 
65 Id., chapter XVI, 262-267. 
66 Id., chapter XXII, 324-340; see especially 324; OVERHOLSER, THE PsYCHIATRisr AND 
THE LAW 26 (1953). 
67 NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 324 (1958). 
68 Jervis, "The Mental Deficiencies," 286 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 26 (March 1953). 
69 OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRISf AND THE LAW 28 (1953); Coon, "Psychiatry for the 
Lawyer," 31 CoRN. L.Q. 327 at 359 (1946). 
70 Coon, "Psychiatry for ithe Lawyer," 31 CORN. L.Q. 327 at 344 (1946); OVERHOLSER, 
THE PSYCHIATRisr AND THE LAW 32 (1953); NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 
5th ed., 397 (1958). 
71 OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRisr AND THE LAW 32 (1953). 
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he lives in a semi-dream world. Since delusions are a substitute of 
phantasy for reality it is unlikely that making of contracts (a rather 
real activity) will be included in this semi-dream world.72 Never-
theless, as previously indicated, insane delusions can motivate con-
tractual action. To this extent the "insane delusion" test seems 
to be a valid criterion for invoking legal protection. 
A third manifestation of mental illness which is relevant to 
contractual capacity problems is exemplified by the manic phase 
of the so-called manic-depressive psychosis. This phase is mani-
fested by an attitude of extreme exhilaration, eagerness, and 
energetic activity, known as hypermania to the scientist. During 
this period, the hypermaniac may spend money extravagantly and 
pawn his belongings to carry out ambitious schemes, of which he 
abounds. He may also undertake business ventures which he has 
no ability to carry out, and which soon fail or are abandoned.73 
The scientist does not consider this psychosis as a disturbance or 
impairment of any psychological faculty such as the judgment 
process or intellectual capacity, but rather as a reaction in response 
to inner conflicts with which the individual is unable to cope.74 
This manic reaction can be thought of, however, as a disturbance 
of the stream of thought. Although the manic may communicate 
a flood of ideas and thoughts, he really evades thinking.75 He can-
not maintain concentration on any specific idea so that his illogical 
utterances will appear to be the expression of an impaired judg-
ment. In this sense, the manic reaction should be protected by the 
understanding test for incapacity as it is ordinarily stated. The 
insane delusion test does not seem to apply to the manic reaction 
since delusions are not conspicuous symptoms and if they do 
exist, they are not systematized. 76 Perhaps the soundest criterion 
for the protection of the hypermaniac can be found in that modifi-
cation of the understanding test which includes the ability to act 
rationally in a particular transaction. 77 The psychiatrist would 
agree that the hypermaniac does not act rationally in his ventures. 
72See Coon, "Psychiatry for the Lawyer," 31 CoRN. L.Q. 327 at 351 (1946), where 
schizophrenia (characterized by delusions) is considered more of a sociological or criminal 
law problem than a contractual problem. 
73 NOYES AND KoLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 355 (1958); Coon, "Psy-
chiatry for the Lawyer," 31 CORN. L.Q. 327 at 331 (1946). 
74 NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 356 (1958). 
111 Id. at 357. 
76 Id. at 358. 
77 See notes 48 and 49 supra. 
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From this brief, scientifically-oriented analysis it appears that 
mental illness can place a contracting party in a position of in-
equality by working one of two general effects upon him: (1) his 
intellectual abilities can be so affected that his judgment is im-
paired; (2) the overt act of entering into the agreement, as differ-
entiated from the purely mental process involved in deciding 
whether to enter, may be a reaction to the stress and conflict of the 
person's needs, instincts and desires. The psychiatrist considers all 
behavior as motivated by the psychological needs of the person.78 
The mentally ill person may attempt to satisfy his needs by direct 
action-the making of a contract; or the person may attempt to sat-
isfy his needs by symbolic activity, such as the delusion which in 
turn may motivate the making of a contract. Consequently it 
would seem that a complete test for contractual incapacity should 
provide protection for those persons whose contracts are merely 
uncontrolled reactions to their mental illness, as well as for those 
who could not understand the nature and consequences of their 
actions. This suggests that courts might use the understanding test, 
the insane delusion test, and a further test to cover uncontrolled 
actions all as a set of alternative tests for creating a power of 
avoidance. . 
It is true that any broadening of the test of contractual in-
capacity would mean additional conflict with the policy of the 
sanctity of contract and the concept of the enforceable promise. 
If the protection policy of the law is to have real meaning, how-
ever, the law cannot ignore any mentally ill person who is ren-
dered unequal and incapacitated by his illness and who deserves 
protection from the consequences of his acts. 
There is an interesting parallel between the ideas here devel-
oped and the recent developments in the criminal test of responsi-
bility. The criminal law test was originally the "ability to dis-
tinguish right from wrong,"79 but has in some recent cases been 
modified to absolve responsibility if the crime was a "product of 
mental disease or defect. "80 The similarity exists in the extension 
in the criminal area from an "understanding" test to a test or 
tests which embrace more than one manifestation of mental illness 
(e.g., defect in ability to decide). 
78NoYES AND KoLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 3d ed., 9 (1948). 
79 The rule of M'Naghten's Case, 10 CI. & Fin. 200, 8 'Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
so Durham v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 862 at 875. 
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C. Other Mental Tests in the Law 
The above discussion has concerned only the criteria or tests 
of mental illness occurring at or during formation of a contract 
which stimulate the courts to provide the ill party or his represent-
ative or successors with a power of avoidance. There are, however, 
other tests for other legal effects of mental illness, including other 
effects in the law of contracts. For instance, the test of mental 
"disability" necessary to permit discharge under a personal serv-
ice contract is different from that of contractual capacity.81 
Outside the area of contracts there are various other mental 
tests for legal consequences. The tests for criminal responsibility 
have already been mentioned. The test for testamentary capacity, 
as another example, has been stated to be whether the testator has 
the ability to understand the nature and extent of his estate, those 
persons who have a natural claim upon his bounty, and what 
disposition he is making of his estate. 82 Courts indicate that this 
test differs from that of contractual capacity,88 and that it takes 
less mental capacity to make a will than it does to make a con-
tract. Likewise courts have indicated that less mental ability is 
required to make a valid gift than to make a contract.84 Although 
the capacity to execute a deed is generally considered to be identi-
cal with the capacity required to contract,85 courts have indicated 
that to deed a gift only gift capacity may be needed,86 and to deed 
land reserving a life interest only testamentary capacity may be 
needed.87 The test of mental incapacity required for a court to 
appoint a guardian also differs from the contractual capacity test. 88 
In this situation the court must consider a general capacity to con-
duct business that may occur in the future, as opposed to consider-
ing a particular past transaction (where the court must take into 
account the policy of security of transactions and the claims of the 
81 See Part V, infra. 
82 ATKINSON, WILLS, 2d ed., 232 (1953). 
88 In re Holloway's Estate, 195 Cal. 7II, 235 P. 1012 (1925); Whitehead v. Malcom, 
161 Ga. 55, 129 S.E. 769 (1925); Sutherland State Bank v. Furgason, 192 Iowa 1295, 186 
N.W. 200 (1922). See Green, "Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency," 6 Mo. L. REv. 141 
at 152 (1941), for a more exhaustive treatment of testamentary capacity. 
84 McCutcheon v. Bichon, 267 Ky. 694, 103 S.W. (2d) 176 (1937). 
85 See note 23 supra. 
86 McCutcheon v. Bichon, 267 Ky. 694, 103 S.W. (2d) 176 (1937). 
87 Sharkey v. Sisson, 310 ru. 98, 141 N.E. 427 (1923) (deed). 
88 In re Easton, 214 Md. 176, 133 A. (2d) 441 (1957); In re Valentine's Guardianship, 
4 Utah (2d) 355, 294 P. (2d) 696 (1956); Charley v. Norvell, 97 Okla. II4, 221 P. 255 (1924). 
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healthy party). This is strikingly illustrated by a recent Florida 
decision in which the court refused to allow a person to avoid a 
previous contract, but proceeded to declare her incompetent and 
appointed a guardian for her.89 
The significance of these distinctions to the attorney is that 
he must be prepared to litigate his cases or plan the transactions 
of his clients in the judicially-expressed terms of the particular 
test applicable to the situation before him. 
III. PROOF OF CONTRACTUAL INCAPACITY 
Important as the "test" for contractual incapacity may be as 
a conceptual or verbal prerequisite for the creation of a power of 
avoidance, the real prerequisite is that quantum of proof which 
a court will hold to be sufficient to satisfy the applicable test. In 
other words, what proof of incapacity must the mentally ill person 
present to be able to avoid the contract? 
In order to evaluate his case effectively or plan a transaction,90 
an attorney must consider: (1) who has the ultimate burden of 
persuasion in a trial; (2) what evidence of mental illness or other 
factors will influence the court to attach unusual effects to the 
course of the contract; and (3) who has the burden of producing 
such evidence (as distinguished from the ultimate burden of per-
suasion) at various stages of a trial. 
A. The Burden of Persuasion 
Whether it be in an action by the mentally ill person to avoid 
(e.g., to rescind),91 or in an action on the contract by the healthy 
party,92 courts have universally assigned the burden of ultimate 
persuasion (as well as the burden of pleading)93 on the issue of 
contractual capacity to that person who asserts the incapacity of 
89 Donnelly v. Mann, (Fla. 1953) 68 S. (2d) 584. 
90 See outline and checklist of evidence in Appendix. infra. 
91 Hermanson v. Seppala, 272 Mass. 197, 172 N.E. 87 (1930); Sjulin v. Clifton Furni-
ture Co., 241 Iowa 761, 41 N.W. (2d) 721 (1950) (deed); Albertson v. Schmidt, 128 Cal. 
App. 343, 17 P. (2d) 158 (1932) (deed). 
92 See, e.g., Fielder and Brown v. Jennings, 131 S.C. 26, 126 S.E. 448 (1924); Jones v. 
Winstead, 186 N.C. 536, 170 S.E. 89 (1923). 
98 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Welch, 239 Ala. 453, 195 S. 554 (1940); Albertson v. 
Schmidt, 128 Cal. App. 343, 17 P. (2d) 158 (1932) (deed); Jones v. Winstead, 186 N.C. 
536, 170 S.E. 89 (1923). 
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a party to the contract.94 To satisfy this burden, most courts have 
said that the party alleging incapacity must persuade by a "pre-
ponderance"95 or a "fair preponderance"96 of the evidence, while 
others have used different verbal formulae such as "sufficient and 
satisfactory"97 or "clear and convincing."98 
B. Nature of the Evidence 
The attorney must consider the nature, admissibility and 
relative importance of the different kinds of evidence that may be 
used to satisfy the burden of persuasion, that is, to convince the 
trier of fact. Since almost any conceivable fact is considered rele-
vant on the issue of capacity, 99 admissibilty usually poses little 
problem, and will be discussed only when affected by some other 
rule of evidence. An accurate assessment of the relative impor-
tance of various kinds of evidence is perhaps impossible, but some 
of the broad principles drawn from the cases will be mentioned. 
Further development of the relative importance of evidence will 
be found in subdivision C, below, where the various presumptions 
and burdens of producing evidence are discussed. 
The nature of evidence of contractual incapacity can be 
roughly classified into five basic categories: evidence of facts sur-
rounding the transaction in issue, evidence of a person's general 
business ability, effect of adjudications, evidence of the mental and 
physical condition of an individual, lay or expert opinion 
evidence. 
Two important factors cut through the discussion of these 
categories of evidence. The first, the effect of science on proof of 
mental incapacity, will be mentioned throughout, but will also 
be particularly discussed in section 5 below. The second factor is 
the influence of the actions or relationship of the healthy party to 
94 Sjulin v. Clifton Furniture Co., 241 Iowa 761, 41 N.W. (2d) 721 (1950) (deed); 
Albertson v. Schmidt, 128 Cal. App. 343, 17 P. (2d) 158 (1932) (deed). But see Greenwood 
v. Greenwood, (E.D. Pa. 1956) 145 F. Supp. 653; Alexier v. Matzke, 151 Mich. 36, 115 
N.W. 251 (1908). 
95 Jones v. Jones, 137 N.Y. 610, 33 N.E. 479 (1893) (dictum); Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. 
v. Brown, 160 Mich. 437, 125 N.W. 400 (1910), where the court held that the burden 
was not satisfied by showing the mentally ill person to be irritable and despondent. 
96 Hemphill v. Holford, 88 Mich. 293, 50 N.W. 300 (1891). 
97 Jarrett v. Jarrett, 11 W. Va. 584 (1877). 
98 See, e.g., Rath's Committee v. Smith, 180 Ky. 326, 202 S.W. 501 (1918). See also 
Ray, "Burden of Proof and Presumptions," 13 Troe. L. REv. 33 (1934). 
99 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §228 (1940). 
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the contract, that is, indications of fraud, undue influence, breach 
of confidential relationship, inadequacy of consideration, or se-
crecy. These factors can have a strong effect in leading a trier of 
fact to find mental incapacity in a transaction.100 
l. Facts Surrounding the Transaction in Issue. Since the de-
termination to be made by the trier of fact is whether there is 
capacity to form the contract under scrutiny, rather than the more 
general determination of a party's "sanity,'' courts focus attention 
on the circumstances of the disputed transaction. It has been stated 
that ". . . things a person does and says at or about the time he 
enters into a contract are the best indicia of his mental capacity 
to make the same .... "101 From a judicial standpoint, mental ill-
ness is important only if it affects the person's capacity to contract 
under the relevant test of the jurisdiction (usually "under-
standing").102 
The facts surrounding the transaction in issue which courts 
have treated as important include the activity of the mentally ill 
person in promoting the contract, such as placing advertisements, 
corresponding, fixing prices and payment dates, and related acts.103 
An ·explanation of the transaction to the ill person is considered 
significant, especially if it is by his own attorney.104 The validity 
of this position may be questioned, however, in light of the 
difficulty of understanding legal terminology and the human 
reluctance to admit inability to understand some business matters. 
Courts are reluctant to consider explanations by an opposing at-
torney as proof of capacity.105 Explanations by disinterested third 
100 See discussion in Part IV-A-3, infra. 
101 Jimenez v. O'Brien, 117 Utah 82 at 95, 213 P. (2d) 337 (1949). 
102 See discussion in §4 of this subdivision. 
103 Johnson v. Mayfield, 163 Neb. 872, 81 N.W. (2d) 308 (1957) (deed); Jones v. Mead, 
111 Okla. 16, 237 P. 445 (1925) (deed). 
104 See, e.g., Henkel v. Alexander, 198 Md. 311, 83 A. (2d) 866 (1951) (deed); Boro• 
vansky v. Para, 306 Ill. App. 60, 28 N.E. (2d) 174 (1940) (deed); Patterson v. Snider, 305 
Pa. 272, 157 A. 612 (1931); Dyke v. Howe, 244 Mich. 129, 221 N.W. 127 (1928) (deed); 
Sharkey v. Sisson, 310 Ill. 98, 141 N.'E. 427 (1923) (deed); Wdllemin v. Dunn, 93 Ill. 511 
{1879) (deed). But in Bowman v. Illinois Central R. Co., 11 Ill. (2d) 186, 142 N.E. (2d) 
104 (1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 837 (1957), the court ignored the explanations of an attorney 
who !had inadequately and incompletely represented his client. The attorney settled for 
$15,000 for which the client signed a release, but another attorney successfully contested 
the issue of the plaintiff's incapacity to sign ·the release and obtained a judgment of 
$200,000. 
105 Legler v. Legler, 187 Ore. 273, 211 P. (2d) 233 (1949) (deed-confidential relation• 
ship breached and secrecy present); Griffin v. Mays, 183 Okla. 350, 82 P. (2d) 836 (1936) 
(deed-secrecy and perhaps fraud present). 
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parties, such as notaries,106 relatives,1°7 or a legal secretary,1°8 have 
occasionally been utilized and probably have as much probative 
value as an attorney's explanation.109 
The opinions of lay persons present at the transaction as to a 
person's mental ability are often relied on heavily by the courts.110 
Almost as significant is a statement by the mentally ill person made 
shortly before or after execution of the agreement, 111 or a nota-
tion on the document itself112 indicating his intent or satisfaction 
with the transaction. 
If the transaction is completed in the privacy of the mentally 
ill person's room113 or if he is too weak to sign the document and 
must have assistance,114 additional evidence of his incapacity to 
contract is provided. 
If an execution or revocation of a will has been made nearly 
simultaneous with the making of the contract, evidence of capacity 
to make or revoke the will may be evidence of capacity to contract. 
At least one case argues that a party may not, in such a case, argue 
capacity in one instance and incapacity in the other.115 Another 
overlap between the capacity tests for contracts and wills occurs 
when a will, made at a time when capacity is unchallenged, pro-
106 Kelley v. Davis, 216 Ark. 828, 227 S.W. (2d) 637 (1950) (deed). 
101 Schmidt v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., (5th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 551 (sister 
and brother-in-law). 
108 Hardee v. Hardee, 265 Ala. 669, 93 S. (2d) 127 (1957) (deed). 
109 The factor of independent advice is •highly persuasive to the courts. See discus-
sion and additional cases in Green, "Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed 
Major Premise," 53 YALE L.J. 271 at 293 (1944). 
110 See, e.g., Johnson v. Lane, 369 Ill. 135, 15 N.E. (2d) 710 (1938) (deed-scrivener 
and notary); Kasbohm v. Miller, 366 Ill. 484, 9 N.E. (2d) 216 (1937) (deed-attorney and 
notary public); Deanes v. Tomlinson, (Miss. 1951) 54 S. (2d) 474 (deed-deputy chancery 
clerk and tax assessor). But see Thomas v. Dumas, 207 Ga. 161, 60 S.E. (2d) 356 (1950), 
where the court placed no emphasis on ·the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the 
effect that the grantor appeared competent. However, there was also evidence that the 
grantee had notice of the incompetency at the time of the conveyance. See also §5 of this 
subdivision. 
111 Dyke v. Howe, 244 Mich. 129, 221 N.W. 127 (1928) (deed); Deanes v. Tomlinson, 
(Miss. 1951) 54 S. (2d) 474. 
112 Timm v. Schneider, 203 Minn. 1, 279 N.W. 754 (1938). 
113 Payne v. Payne, 12 Cal. App. 251, 107 P. 148 (1910) (deed). 
114 Griffin v. Mays, 183 Okla. 350, 82 P. (2d) 836 (1936) (deed). 
llli Deanes v. Tomlinson, (Miss. 1951) 54 S. (2d) 474. In Schenck v. Going, (4th Cir. 
1956) 237 F. (2d) 251, the court compared the capacity of the grantor in the will and 
deed despite a itime interval of 21 months ,between the instruments. These decisions 
seem of doubtful validity in light of the discussion in Part II-C, supra, where the 
differences ,between various tests for incapacity are discussed. 
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vides an indication that a later contract is merely fulfilling the ill 
person's estate plans.116 
Of considerable importance in every case is the wisdom of the 
transaction. Logically an improvident agreement should not 
necessarily relate to ability to understand the nature and conse-
quences of the transaction, 117 but courts may on occasion say that 
no person who could understand the contract would execute such 
a bargain.ll8 
2. Evidence of General Business Ability. Although facts sur-
rounding the transaction in issue are usually most important in 
establishing mental incapacity, if these are unavailable or incon-
clusive, courts will turn to evidence of the general business ability 
of the mentally ill person. In so doing, however, many courts fail 
to consider any qualitative or quantitative differences between 
the instant and previous transactions. They apparently assume 
that if a person adequately handles minor tasks he is competent to 
transact complicated matters. Thus mention is made of such fac-
tors as being a good homemaker,119 doing jury and church work,120 
or collecting rentals121 as indicating ability to understand a con-
tract. Other courts consider only prior transactions similar in com-
plexity to the contract in issue,122 or the volume of recent business 
handled by the mentally ill person.123 
Sometimes the improvidence of a prior transaction is con-
sidered. It appears that whenever the previous dealings considered 
116 Legler v. Legler, 187 Ore. 273, 211 P. (2d) 233 (1949) (deed) (dictum). See also 
cases in 82 A.L,R. 963, 973 (1933). 
117 "But ... the making of an improvident contract is not sufficient in itself to 
show lack of capacity to make contracts. If ,this were so, the number of incompetents 
would be legion." Rogers v. Central Land & Investment Co., 149 Minn. 347 at 352, 183 
N.W. 961 (1921). See also Jorgenson v. Winter, 69 Wash. 573, 125 P. 957 (1912). It has 
been said that a bad bargain may be understandable under ,the circumstances. Waggoner 
v. Atkins, 204 Ark. 264, 162 S.W. (2d) 55 (1942) (deed). 
118 "The greater the improvidence [of the transaction] ,the nearer is the approach 
to incapacity. If alone indecisive, it may be taken into account with other evidence." 
Oullette v. Ledoux, 92 N.H. 302 at 306, 30 A. (2d) 73 (1943) (deed). See also Campbell 
v. Lux, 146 Ark. 397, 225 S.W. 653 (1920) (deed). 
119 Bradburn v. McIntosh, (10th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 925; Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 
Ind. 231 (1865) (deed). See also Klein v. Kent, (Mich. 1959) 95 N.W. (2d) 864, where the 
court mentioned that the grantor did her own grocery shopping, attended church reg-
ularly, and paid iher own doctor bills as evidence of capacity to execute a land contract. 
120 Pledger v. Birkhead, 156 Ark. 443, 246 S.W. 510 (1923) (deed). 
121 In .Meister v. Finley, 208 Ore. 223, 300 P. (2d) 778 (1956), evidence of this character 
was regarded as sufficient to uphold a will but not a deed. 
122 Kelley v. Davis, 216 Ark. 828, 227 S.W. (2d) 637 (1950) (deed); Callis v. Thomas, 
154 Md. 229, 140 A. 59 (1927) (deed); Titcomb v. Vantyle, 84 Ill. 371 (1877) (deed). 
123 Chamberlain v. Frank, 103 Neb. 442, 172 N.W. 354 (1919) (deed). 
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had been prudent in the eyes of the court, the instrument in issue 
has been upheld; but where the prior dealings had been deemed 
improvident, avoidance was allowed.124 This factor by itself is not 
conclusive but rather indicates that a court will carefully scrutinize 
the evidence in the present case where previous transactions dis-
close characteristics of incapacity. 
3. Effect of Adjudications. Evidence of the outcome of prior or 
subsequent adjudications of various types can have profound and 
often determinative effect upon the question of contractual in-
capacity. The determinative effects of such adjudications are dis-
cussed in subdivision C, below, with other presumptions. Even 
when an adjudication does not have presumptive or determinative 
effect, however, it can have evidentiary value for the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion. It is this latter value that is now to be discussed. 
(a) Adjudication of incompetency. Rendered in a formal pro-
ceeding instituted to appoint a guardian to control the estate, an 
adjudication of this type declares the mentally ill person unable 
to manage his property. With regard to admissibility of such 
adjudications in later suits involving contractual incapacity, there 
is a three-way division of authority. Some courts regard the record 
as irrelevant, 125 while many will treat it as relevant.126 Other courts 
have taken an intermediate position and will admit evidence of 
the adjudication where it is accompanied by evidence showing 
that substantially the same mental condition existed at the time of 
the contract as existed at the time of ad judication.127 In some 
cases, particularly those where adjudications are given a presump-
tive or decisive effect by statute, the effect of an adjudication of 
incompetency may be to render subsequent contracts "void,"128 
at least until there is a later adjudication of competency. Other 
124 Layne v. Layne, 277 Ky. 295, 126 S.W. (2d) 416 (1939) (deed-imprudent). The 
person properly handled previous business transactions in the following cases: Kelley 
v. Davis, 216 Ark. 828, 227 S.W. (2d) 637 (1950) (deed); Rogers v. Central Land &: Invest-
ment Co., 149 -Minn. 347, 183 N.W. 961 (1921); Crosby v. Dorward, 248 Ill. 471, 94 N.'E. 
78 (1911) (deed); Saffer v. Mast, 223 Ill. 108, 79 N.E. 32 (1906) (deed). 
125 Black v. Boyer, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 21 S.W. (2d) 1094; Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 
Mo. 179, 40 S.W. 760 (1897); Nichols v. Pool, 47 N.C. 23 (1854). 
126Acree's Committee v. Blalock, 211 Ky. 450,277 S.W. 464 (1925); Nichol v. Thomas, 
53 Ind. 42 (1876) (deed). 
127 Small v. Champeny, 102 Wis. 61, 78 N.W. 407 (1899); Schindler v. Parzoo, 52 
Ore. 452, 97 P. 755 (1908). 
128 A "void" contract has certain possible effects that differ from a "voidable" contract. 
This •will be discussed in Part IV-A-2, infra, and the Appendix. In •both the void and the 
voidable situation, the mentally ill person and his successors are said, in this study, to 
have a "power of avoidance." 
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cases provide that the effect is merely to render the contract 
"voidable. "129 
(b) Adjudications of "insanity." An adjudication resulting 
from a summary proceeding declaring that a person is to be placed 
in a hospital or institution for the mentally ill is generally con-
sidered less significant than an adjudication of incompetency. If 
the adjudication of "insanity" resulting from such proceeding oc-
curred prior to the contract transaction, some courts will admit it 
as relevant.130 A few statutes declare the subsequently made con-
tract to be "void," while others merely declare it "voidable."131 
Where the adjudication of insanity follows the making of the con-
tract, the courts have divided on admissibility.132 
(c) Adjudication of incapacity for a different agreement. There 
is little law defining the evidentiary significance of an adjudication 
that a party lacked capacity to contract for a different transaction 
than the one in issue. It has been held, however, that such an 
adjudication will raise a presumption of continuing incapacity.133 
Therefore it would seem that such an adjudication would also 
have evidentiary value in cases where it may not have presumptive 
effect. 
(d) Other adjudications. It is conceivable that the following 
adjudications may also be important, provided that any hearsay 
objection may be overcome: that a person is competent or in-
competent to be a witness, act as trustee or executor under a will, 
receive criminal sentence or punishment, or execute a will. The 
importance attached to such adjudications will probably depend 
upon the degree of relationship between the particular adjudica-
tion and the issue of incapacity in the instant case. 
4. Physical and Mental Condition. Evidence concerning old 
age and physical disabilities does not usually directly concern the 
person's ability to understand the terms of the contract and thus 
apparently has little probative value.134 Such evidence, however, 
129 See discussion in Part IV-A-2, and note 226 infra. 
130 See 5 WIGMORE, '.EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1671(5) (1940). 
131 See Pal'ts IV-A, D, and E, infra, and Appendix. 
132See on inadmissibility: Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276 (1893) (dictum). 
On admissibility: Wathens v. Skaggs, 161 Ky. 600, 171 S.W. 193 (1914) (deed) (dictum); 
Avery v. Avery, 42 Cal. App. 100, 183 P. 453 (1919). 
133 Davis v. Davis, 24 S.D. 474, 124 N.W. 715 (1910) (deed). 
134 '.E.g., Calveard v. Reynolds, 281 Ky. 518, 136 S.W. (2d) 542 (1940) (deed); Miller 
v. Jeffrey, 129 Ore. 674, 278 P. 946 (1929) (deed); Bradley v. Bradley, 185 Iowa 1272, 171 
N.W. 729 (1919) (deed). 
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often is emphasized in the presence of fraud, undue influence, 
breach of fiduciary duty, inadequacy of consideration or secrecy.135 
Unless directly affecting the transaction in issue or the indi-
vidual's business judgment, psychoneurotic and psychotic dis-
orders are insufficient to prove incapacity.136 Additional evidence 
indicating a lack of "understanding" is necessary.137 
Because it is present in many contractual incapacity cases, 
senile dementia deserves special attention. As a progressive de-
terioration of cortical areas of the brain, it causes a severe diminu-
tion of mental faculties.138 Courts are reluctant to find contractual 
incapacity on a diagnosis of senility without the presence of ad-
ditional factors (for example, testimony of business associates).139 
In many situations it is difficult to distinguish senility from the 
reduced intellectual vigor usually found in old age. 14° Further-
more, senility might affect mental ability in areas other than 
business judgment. Although it may not be desirable unreason-
ably to hinder persons from entering into contracts with older 
persons, perhaps this policy should relate to the effect to be given 
contracts made with incompetents rather than with the establish-
ment of proof of contractual incapacity. 
Although insignificant without other factors, evidence of minor 
mental disturbances or weaknesses, 141 eccentricities, illiteracy, al-
coholism, and the use of drugs may become important if inter-
related with fraud, undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, 
or inadequacy of consideration.142 
135 See further discussion in Part IV-A-2, infra. 
136 Kelley v. Davis, 216 Ark. 828, 227 S.W. (2d) 637 (1950) (deed). This is due basically 
to the judicial test being expressed in terms of understanding the transaction in issue, 
not the mental stability of the ill party. 
137 See, e.g., McEvoy v. Tucker, 115 Ark. 430, 171 S.W. 888 (1914) (deed), testimony 
of co-workers and supervisor. But Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, (Ohio App. 1956) 139 N.E. (2d) 
84, seemed to require only slight additional evidence, though the court's reasoning is 
somewhat unclear. 
138 NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 289, 290, 293 (1958); 
EWALT, STRECKER AND EBAUGH, PRAcnCAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 8th ed., 148-149 (1957). 
139 See cases in note 137 supra. 
140 NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 289 (1958). 
141 See Part II-A-4, infra. 
142 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Sassen, 123 Iowa 421, 99 N.W. 124 (1904) (illiteracy); Waggoner 
v. Atkins, 204 Ark. 264, 162 S.W. (2d) 55 (1942) (deed-alcohol and drugs); Saliba v. James, 
143 Fla. 404, 196 S. 832 (1940) (alcohol-deed). In Nelson v. Nelson, 136 Kan. 1, 12 P. (2d) 
800 (1932), ,the court never referred to business ability but mentioned the fact that the 
mentally ill person came into a xoom of strangers wearing only a nightgown and during 
probate proceedings was more interested in eating an ice-cream cone than in listening to 
the proceedings. 
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As yet rarely utilized in contract cases are mental examinations 
by a physician or psychiatrist, conducted on the same day as the 
execution of the agreement.143 If specifically undertaken to deter-
mine a person's· business understanding (rather than merely his 
general mental ability) such an examination could be of great 
value to a court. The drawback, however, is that such an examin-
ation might in itself suggest to a court the existence of incapacity 
in an individual. It might also, as a practical matter, be difficult or 
inappropriate to suggest or persuade an individual to undergo 
such an examination, since it seems to imply doubt as to his 
competency. 
5. Opinion Testimony. Courts often consider both lay and 
expert opinion testimony as to a person's "sanity." Such lay opin-
ion is admissible as an exception to the rule prohibiting opin-
ions, 144 but the value of lay opinions depends on the particular 
importance of the facts from which the opinion is formulated. 
Thus the weight of an opinion of incapacity diminishes if the 
witness has never transacted business with the mentally ill per-
son, 145 or if he had merely engaged in "normal transactions" with 
the mentally ill person.146 The actions of the spouse of the men-
tally ill person are important as an indication of her opinion. If 
a husband submits to the control of his wife, this might denote 
incapacity.147 Conversely, it could be argued that if she unites with 
him in the deed, there is an indication that she thought he 
was competent.148 
Expert testimony ( opinion of a psychiatrist, psychologist, or 
143 Hagan v. Lambert, (R.I. 1931) 152 A. 740 (deed), and Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 
128 Mich. 110, 87 N.W. 81 (1901) (deed), are the only decisions placing stress upon a 
prior medical examination. The question usually arises in determining testamentary 
capacity. A recent will case, In re Wagner's 'Estate, 75 Ariz. 135, 252 P. (2d) 789 (1953), 
placed more emphasis upon opinions of competency by numerous business acquaintances 
and friends than on an examination hy two psychiatrists shortly before execution of the 
will. Probably many contractual capacity cases would suffer the same fate in view of the 
general aversion ,to expert tsetimony. 
144 7 WIG:MORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§1933, 1937, 1938 (1940). For the requisite founda-
tion for lay opinions, see cases in 40 A.L.R. (2d) 15, 141-150 (1955). 
145 Bordner v. Kelso, 293 Ill. 175, 127 N.E. 337 (1920) (deed). 
146 Crosby v. Donvard, 248 Ill. 471, 94 N.E. 78 (1911) (deed); Wade v. Northup, 70 
Ore. 569, 140 P. 451 (1914). 
147iR.ing v. Lawless, 190 Ill. 520, 60 N.E. 881 (1901) (deed). 
148See implication in Evers v. Webb, 186 Iowa 1172, 173 N.W. 264 (1919) (deed). 
Both this case and Ring v. Lawless, 190 Ill. 520, 60 N.E. 881 (1901) (deed), could possibly 
involve ihearsay problems of non-assertive conduct. See Wright v. Doe Dem Tatham, 
7 Ad. & El. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837). 
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physician) is admissible through the use of several procedures: 
the hypothetical question; a case history of the mentally ill per-
son's background and disorders; and an opinion based upon per-
sonal examination of the mentally ill party by the testifying ex-
pert.149 Many courts dislike use of hypothetical questions, 150 and 
case histories usually present hearsay problems.151 Further disdain 
of expert testimony by some courts has been due to the inadequacy 
of many personal examinations of the mentally ill person, 152 espe-
cially as they are often oriented more toward an overall picture of 
the person's mental condition than to his capacity to contract. 
Although expert opinion may frequently be of immeasurable 
value, greater emphasis today is usually placed upon testimony of 
persons present at the execution of the contract or testimony of 
business associates or friends. The reasons for this attitude prob-
ably include the fact that the test for incapacity (usually "under-
standing") is focused on the mentality of the ill person during the 
transaction; the belief that incompetency is a matter of common 
sense within the knowledge of ordinary people;153 the feeling of 
some courts that experts are hired partisans and not objective 
witnesses; and finally the fact that many personal examinations are 
conducted a long period after occurrence of the transaction 
in issue.154 
Despite these objections it is safe to conclude that the trend 
is to place more emphasis upon expert testimony.155 This trend 
should prevail as attorneys and judges continue to recognize the 
enormous prevalence of mental illness in the nation, overcome 
their aversion to psychiatrists,156 and learn of the advances (as well 
149 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§672-686 (1940). See the discussion in GUTIMACHER. 
AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 215, 221, 224 (1952). 
150 Evers v. Webb, 186 Iowa 1172, 173 N.W. 264 (1919) (deed). 
151See cases cited in 175 AL.R. 274, 276, 282, 286 (1948). 
152 Jimenez v. O'Brien, 117 Utah 82, 213 P. (2d) 337 (1949); Sharkey v. Sisson, 310 
Ill. 98, 141 N.E. 427 (1923) (deed). 
153 Kasbohm v. Miller, 366 Ill. 484, 9 N.E. (2d) 216 (1937) (deed); Sharkey v. Sisson, 
310 Ill. 98, 141 N.E. 427 (1923) (deed). See discussion in OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST 
AND THE LAW 110-111 (1953). 
154 Henkel v. Alexander, 198 Md. 311, 83 A. (2d) 866 (1951) (deed); Clark v. Leonard, 
(Mo. 1950) 232 S.W. (2d) 474 (deed). 
155 Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, (Ohio App. 1956) 139 N.E. (2d) 84; Thomas v. Dumas, 
207 Ga. 161, 60 S.E. (2d) 356 (1950); Smith v. Smith, 254 Ala. 404, 48 S. (2d) 546 (1950) 
(petition of inquisition, but interesting dictum); Herzog v. iR.oss, 358 Mo. 177, 213 S.W. 
(2d) 921 (1948) (deed); Kaplan v. Copeland, 183 Va. 589, 32 S.E. (2d) 678 (1945); Mc-
Cutcheon v. Bichon, 267 Ky. 694, 103 S.W. (2d) 76 (1937) (deed) (dictum). 
156A poll of 4,000 residents of Louisville, Kentucky, reported in Maisel, "When 
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as the limitations) of psychiatry. There are still qualifications, 
however, on the weight to be placed upon expert testimony.157 
For example, the opinions of experts, even when unanimous, are 
not conclusive on the judge or jury.158 Also, the person alleging 
incapacity undoubtedly should provide additional testimony per-
taining to the alleged incompetent's business conduct, or opinions 
of observers at the time the contract was executed.159 
In order to be of more assistance to the trier of fact in cases 
of this type, medical experts should direct their examination 
toward the capacity test ( e.g., "understanding") rather than to a 
general conclusion of the person's mental stability.160 On the other 
hand, courts might aid in the communication process with experts 
by utilizing the terminology adopted by the American Psychiatric 
Association.161 
Expert opinion would seem to have varying utility, depending 
Would You Consult a Psychiatrist," 127 CoLUER's, May 12, 1951, p. 13, showed that only 
in tlle fogal profession was there a relatively large measure of distrust of psychiatry. This 
became especially evident in asking whether experts are unable to agree if the illness 
of a person is sufficient to commit him to an institution. The general public believed it 
was more true ,than -false by a margin of 5-3, attorneys by 4-1. 
157 Undoubtedly the weight is influenced by the experience and skill of the expert. 
Herzog v. 'Ross, 358 Mo. 177, 213 S.W. (2d) 921 (1948) (deed). But see the argument in 
GUITMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND nm LAW 210 (1952), for allowing general 
practitioners (MiD.s) to testify as experts on psychiatric questions. 
158Smith v. Smith, 254 Ala. 404, 48 S. (2d) 546 (1950) (inquisition); In re Wagner's 
Estate, 75 Ariz. 135, 252 P. (2d) 789 (1953) (will). 
159 Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, (Ohio App. 1956) 139 N.E. (2d) 84; Kaplan v. Copeland, 
183 Va. 589, 32 S.E. (2d) 678 (1945). 
160 But many courts state that opinions cannot -be stated in terms of legal con-
clusions, i.e., "capacity." See 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1958 (1940). 
161 These terms are listed in NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 
164-168 (1958). Some of the more important or significant of these terms are set out 
below as a guide or means of orientation to the attorney or court which does not have 
such reference readily available. The American Psychiatric Association classifies mental 
disorders into three broad categories: 
I. "Disorders Caused :by or Associated with Impairment of Brain Tissue Function." 
Among the "Acute Brain Disorders" placed in this category are the acute brain syndromes 
associated with infection, drug, poison or alcoholic association and trauma. Chronic 
brain syndromes associated with central nervous system syphillis, other intracranial in-
fections, mongolism, prenatal maternal infectious diseases, trauma, alcohol, cerebral 
arteriosclerosis, senile brain disease and disturbance of growth or metabolism are listed 
under the subheading of "Chronic Brain Disorders." 
II. "Mental Deficiency." In this category are listed the mental deficiencies, familial, 
hereditary or ,undetermined cause, of mild, moderate or severe degree. 
ill. "Disorders of Psychogenic Origin or Without Clearly Defined Clinical Cause or 
Structural Ohange in the Brain." Among these disorders, often ,termed "functional," or 
"affilctive," are listed the involitional psychotic reaction, the manic and depressive reac-
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on which of the three basic categories of mental illness is in-
volved. In the first category, disorders caused by or associated with 
impairment of brain tissue, expert testimony could offer valuable 
assistance. Only physicians could determine the extent of physical 
deterioration of the brain. However, the expert diagnosis as to 
the effect upon contractual capacity would not alone be determina-
tive. Since the rate of degeneration is often difficult to measure and 
the intellectual deterioration could be localized in non-business 
judgment areas, there is latitude for lay evidence as to the trans-
action and general business ability. 
The second group of mental disorders relates to mental de-
ficiency, measured by the IQ standard.162 Again expert opinion is 
of utmost importance, for measurement of intelligence generally 
furnishes an adequate guide for evaluation of a person's under-
standing of the nature of the contract in question. However, the 
measurement should be related to adult business experience, as 
an individual with the intelligence of a twelve-year-old certainly 
cannot from a contractual standpoint be treated as being that age. 
His adult business dealings should be considered. Equity courts 
have historically protected persons of limited mental ability where 
additional factors such as fraud or undue influence exist.163 But 
they should be able to examine the intellectual ability of the per-
son without reference to those additional circumstances. 
The third class of mental illness, which includes psychoses, 
psychoneuroses, and character disorders, developes ·without known 
structural change in the brain.164 Expert opinion would be invalu-
able with regard to the psychoses in determining the degree of di-
vorcement from reality, or the extent of the delusional system of 
the person. Lay testimony could also assist here, because of the 
tions, the various schizophrenic reactions, ,the paranoid reactions, the various psychoneu-
rotic disorders, the personality disorders and ,the transient situational personality disorders. 
A standard text, such as NoYES AND KOLB, should be consulted for complete defini-
tions and explanations of these terms. The Psychiatric Glossary for Lawyers in DAVIDSON, 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 315 (1952), contains short, concise and helpful definitions of fre-
quently used psychiatric terms. 
162 Terms generally used are idiot (IQ of 0-20); imbecile (20-50); moron (50-70); 
borderline (70-90). See EWALT, STRECKER, AND '.EBAUGH, PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 
8th ed., 156 (1957); NOYES AND KoLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 330 (1958). 
163 See discussion in Part IV-A-3, infra. 
164 NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 166 (1958); STRECKER, 
BASIC PSYCHIATRY 40 (1952). 
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unpredictable factors in a particular case. Psychoneuroses and 
character disorders, being customarily localized (i.e., hysteria, 
anxiety, obsession-compulsion), present limited opportunities for 
expert testimony. 
By focusing on the psychiatric aspects of mental illness, courts 
could increasingly utilize expert testimony evaluating those dis-
orders which significantly affect contractual capacity. There would 
still remain considerable latitude as to the value of lay opinions. 
In contract cases expert testimony is not subject to the difficulties 
present in other fields, as for instance in testamentary cases where 
the expert is ordinarily unable to examine the center of con-
troversy. Undoubtedly a disadvantage of expert opinion, however, 
is the inevitable likelihood of disagreement among experts in 
this area. 
6. Conclusions. It is possible to state only generally that some 
evidentiary factors are more significant than others. To a degree 
this is due to the presentation of evidence as an integrated picture 
rather than in isolation but decisions have also intertwined reas-
ons for holding persons to contracts, principles of fairness and 
justice, and the actual facts and opinions establishing incapacity or 
capacity. While probably providing a just result in most cases, it 
is unfortunate that judicial flexibility has developed at the ex-
pense of clarity in the standards and policies being applied by the 
courts. It would seem more desirable to separate the policies and 
standards of mental capacity from those involving other factors 
such as fraud or unfairness. This would enable the courts more 
accurately and rationally to appraise the policies and standards 
actually applied. If the mental capacity test itself does not provide 
the protection needed in a given contract situation, then the court 
could proceed to considerations of other policies involving fraud 
or unfairness. 
C. Burdens and Presumptions 
It seems doubtful that any precise rules of proof of contractual 
incapacity can be established. Courts are too often impressed by 
circumstances not logically bearing on the issue of mental ability, 
and closely balanced evidence on that issue itself will provide 
room for discretion by the trier of fact. Nevertheless, as an aid to 
evaluating the relative weight and importance of certain types of 
evidence, it should be helpful to study certain specific effects of 
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that evidence in a trial on the issue of incapacity. Instead of view-
ing the evidence as a whole and its relation to the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion, this subdivision will review decisions as to 
three other possible effects of evidence: (1) the effect of satisfying 
the burden of initially producing evidence so as to prevent ad-
verse rulings on motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, 165 (2) the 
effect of imposing upon the other side the burden of producing 
contrary evidence without which a court will direct a verdict 
against that other side, and (3) the conclusive effect of certain 
kinds of evidence, from which a verdict will be rendered despite 
any contrary evidence that may be produced. 
I. Satisfying the Initial Burden of Producing Evidence. As in 
the case of the burden of persuasion, the burden of initially pro-
ducing evidence on the issue of contractual capacity always falls 
on the party alleging incapacity.166 Generally only a small quan-
tum of evidence is required to satisfy this burden.167 However, evi-
dence of the following non-adjudicatory facts (facts other than 
evidence of the outcome of adjudications) may be held insufficient 
to satisfy this initial burden: evidence showing only a weakness 
of the body,168 such as occasional headaches;169 evidence of mental 
distress, such as depression, discouragement, worry, irritability, 170 
and suicide;171 evidence of a weakness of the mind,172 such as ec-
165 The burden of producing evidence is the duty of offering satisfactory evidence 
of a particular fact in issue on pain of an adverse ruling on •that issue by ·the judge if 
such evidence is not produced. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §306 (1954); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 
3d ed., §2487 (1940). 
166Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Bonner, 126 S.C. 284, 119 S.E. 826 (1923); Jones v. 
Winstead, 186 N.C. 536, 120 S.E. 89 (1923). Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. King, 93 F. (2d) 
347 (1937) (suicide under insurance policy); Roche v. Nason, 185 N.Y. 128, 77 N.E. 1007 
(1906) (will); Cropp v. Cropp, 88 Va. 753, 14 S.E. 592 (1892) (deed); Banker v. Banker, 
63 N.Y. 409, affd. 4 Hun 259 (1875) (marriage). 
167 Peters v. Peters, 376 Ill. 237, 33 N.'E. (2d) 425 (1941) (will); Mangum v. Brown, 
200 N.C. 296, 156 S.E. 535 (1930) (release); McCoRMICK, 'EVIDENCE §306 (1954); 9 WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2494 (1940). 
168 Eakin v. Hawkins, 52 W. Va. 124, 43 S.E. 211 (1902) (deed); Weed v. Mutual 
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 70 N.Y. 561 (1877) (life insurance); In re Sarah Collins, 18 N.J. Eq. 
253 (1867) (adjudication proceedings). 
169 Weed v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 70 N.Y. 561 (1877) (life insurance). 
170 New York Life Ins. Co. v. King, (8th Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 347 (life insurance). 
171 Matter of Anderson, 149 N.Y.S. (2d) 109, 3 Misc. 869 (1956) (change of beneficiary); 
Boney v. Smallwood, 202 Ga. 411, 43 S.E. (2d) 271 (1947) (change of beneficiary); New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. King, (8th Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 347 (life insurance); Supreme Council 
of Royal Arcanum v. Wishart, (3d Cir. 1912) 192 F. 453 (life insurance); Roche v. Nason, 
185 N.Y. 128, 77 N.E. 1007 (1906) (will). 
172 Sjulin v. Clifton Furniture Co., 241 Iowa 761, 41 N.W. (2d) 721 (1950). Cf. 
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centric behavior,173 forgetfulness,174 old age,175 extreme old age,176 
or evidence of a hereditary trait for mental illness in the family 
of the mentally ill person.177 
Evidence of prior temporary incapacity (and probably subse-
quent temporary incapacity will be treated the same way) has been 
considered inadequate to satisfy the initial burden.178 If such tem-
porary incapacity were close enough in time to the transaction in 
question, it would seem that a contrary result might be warranted. 
Mere admission to a mental institution for care,179 or appointment 
of a guardian,180 without a formal adjudication of incompetency 
or insanity, will generally also be inadequate without more, al-
though the frequency of such admissions may be significant if 
statutes do not forbid its consideration.181 
Some courts have even indicated that evidence of a prior ad-
judication of insanity,182 or subsequent adjudication of incompet-
ency,183 may not fulfill the initial burden. These holdings are 
probably based on a theory that such evidence does not reflect on 
the more precise question of contractual capacity. 
Johnson v. Mayfield, 163 Neb. 872, 181 N.W. (2d) 308 (1957) (deed); Travis v. Travis, 
81 Fla. 309, 87 S. 762 (1921) (deed); Eakin v. Hawkins, 52 W. Va. 124, 43 S.E. 211 (1902) 
(deed); Trimbo v. Trimbo, 47 Minn. 389, 50 N.W. 350 (1891) (deed); In re Sarah Collins, 18 
N.J. Eq. 253 (1867) (adjudication proceedings). 
173:Masius v. Wilson, 213 Md. 259, 131 A. (2d) 484 (1956) (deed); Roche v. Nason, 
185 N.Y. 128, 77 N.E. 1007 (1906) (will); Ea:kin v. Hawkins, 52 W. Va. 124, 43 S.E. 211 
(1902) (deed). 
174 Masius v. Wilson, 213 Md. 259, 131 A. (2d) 484 (1956) (deed); Taylor v. Pegram, 
151 Ill. 106 at 119, 37 N.E. 837 (1894) (will). 
175 Wathens v. Skaggs, 161 Ky. 600, 171 S.W. 193 (1914) (deed). 
176 In re Sarah Collins, 18 N.J. Eq. 253 (1867) (adjudication proceedings). Cf. Johnson 
v. Mayfield, 163 Neb. 872, 181 N.W. (2d) 308 (1957) (deed). 
177 Howells State Bank v. Novotny, (8th Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 32 (change of beneficiary). 
178Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Bonner, 126 S.C. 284, 119 S.E. 826 (1923). Cf. Equitable 
Life Assur. Soc. v. Welch, 239 Ala. 453, 195 S. 554 (1940) (life insurance policy); Hall v. 
Britton, 216 Ala. 265, 113 S. 238 (1927) (mortgage deed); Johnson v. Fondren, 204 Ala. 
656, 87 S. 94 (1920) (deed); Richardson v. Smart, 152 Mo. 623, 54 S.W. 542 (1899) (gift); 
Stewart v. Flint, 59 Vt. 144 (1886) (deed). 
179 Poole v. Newark, 40 Del. 163, 8 A. (2d) 10 (1939) (withdrawal of bank deposit); 
Fletcher v. Miller, 185 Wash. 299, 52 P. (2d) 304 (1936) (lease); Hallahan v. Rempe, 120 
N.Y.S. 901, 66 Misc. 27 (1910) (deed); Cropp v. Cropp, 88 Va. 753, 14 S.E. 592 (1892) (deed). 
180 Poole v. Newark, 40 Del. 163, 8 A. (2d) 10 (1939) (withdrawal of bank deposit); 
Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 804, 191 S.E. 497 (1937) (guardianship). 
181 Wright v. Jackson, 59 Wis. 569, 18 N.W. 486 (1884) (deed); Wis. Stat. (1957) §319.31. 
182Knox v. Haug, 48 Minn. 58, 50 N.W. 934 (1892) (deed). Contra, see note 134 supra. 
183 Lilly v. Waggoner, Conservator, 27 Ill. 395 (1862) (deed). See Morris Fertilizer 
Co. v. Bonner, 126 S.C. 284, 119 S.'E. 826 (1923). 
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2. Presumptions and Shifting Burdens. Another effect that evi-
dence can have, at least theoretically, is to shift the burden of pro-
ducing evidence to the other party on pain of a directed verdict 
against him if he is unable to produce contrary evidence. This 
effect has often been manifested in the form of a "presumption," 
that is, the evidence submitted "raises a presumption" of inca-
pacity which the other party must overcome.184 When the oppos-
ing party produces evidence, the cycle may again be repeated-the 
contrary evidence first satisfying the burden of production recently 
imposed (so that in a jury trial the case can go to the jury), or 
being sufficient to re-shift the burden back to the beginning party. 
These three steps will be briefly discussed. 
(a) Evidence that may shift the burden of producing evidence 
to the party upholding capacity. While substantial proof of in-
capacity at the time of agreement may have the effect of shifting 
the burden to the party upholding competence, 185 evidence that 
the mentally ill person was permanently and continuously in-
competent prior to the time of the transaction may also have this 
effect.186 The problem of showing such permanence and continu-
ance may be a difficult one. Furthermore, the court will be in-
fluenced by the proximity in time of the condition proved, allow-
ing less weight to a condition which existed a considerable length 
of time in advance of the transaction.187 Some conditions which 
may be temporary, if occurring immediately before the transac-
tion, may be termed "permanent" by the court,188 indicating its 
belief in the probative value of that evidence for proving incapa-
city at the transaction time itself. 
A condition of prior incompetency may be established simply 
by use of ordinary evidence, such as lay testimony of the mentally 
184 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §308 (1954). 
185 Cf. Wright v. Jackson, 59 Wis. 569, 18 N.W. 486 (1884) (deed); 9 W1GMORE, 
EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2495 (1940). 
186 Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Bonner, 126 S.C. 284, 119 S.E. 826 (1923). Cf. Fletcher 
v. Miller, 185 Wash. 299, 52 P. (2d) 304 (1936) (lease); Hall v. Britton, 216 Ala. 265, 113 
S. 238 (1927) (mortgage deed); Hudson v. Hudson, 144 N.C. 449, 57 S.E. 162 (1907) (deed); 
Stewart v. Flint, 59 Vt. 144 (1886) (deed); Trish v. Newell, 62 Ill. 196 (1871) (will); Corbit 
v. Smith, 7 Iowa 60 (1858) (deed); Hix v. Whittemore, 45 Mass. 545 (1842) (service of 
process). 
187Turner v. Rusk, 53 Md. 65 (1879) (deed); Trish v. Newell, 62 Ill. 196 (1871) 
(will). Cf. Roberts v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 93 Wash. 274, 160 P. 965 (1916) (release). 
188Hermanson v. Seppala, 272 Mass. 197, 172 N.E. 87 (1930) (deed). Cf. Richardson 
v. Smart, 152 Mo. 623, 54 S.W. 542 (1899) (gift). 
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ill person's condition. There are at least two other ways of prov-
ing prior incompetency. The first is to use expert testimony to 
show that the mentally ill person was affiicted with a type of men-
tal defect or disturbance which could and did render its victim 
permanently and continuously incompetent.189 This approach may 
be particularly helpful where the individual had in some other 
connection undergone psychiatric examination prior to the 
transaction. 
Another way to prove prior incompetency so as to shift the 
burden of producing evidence is through use of evidence of prior 
adjudications. Adjudications of incompetency will generally be 
treated as raising a rebuttable presumption of incapacity at the 
time of the later agreement, 190 regardless of the time-period be-
tween the adjudication and th~ agreement191 or any actual dis-
continuance of the guardianship.192 An adjudication of "insanity" 
will raise a similar presumption in some courts,193 although.others 
hold to the contrary.194 It has been held that a judgment of in-
capacity at the time of a prior transaction will also raise a pre-
sumption of continuing incapacity to contract.195 
The validity of giving adjudications of insanity this presump-
189 The following affiictions may be held to have this effect: senile dementia, First 
Nat. Bank v. Sarvey, 198 Iowa 1067, 198 N.W. 496 (1924) (note); Greenwood v. Green-
wood, (E.D. Pa. 1956) 145 F. Supp. 653 (deed); paresis, In re Kehler, (2d Cir. 1908) 159 
F. 55, cert. den. 212 U.S. 573 (1908) (bankruptcy iproceeding). Cf. Stewart v. Flint, 59 Vt. 
144 (1886) (deed); severe epilepsy, Corbit v. Smith, 7 Iowa 60 (1858) (deed); paresis, 
Pritchett v. Plater, 144 Tenn. 406, 232 S.W. 961 (1920). Cf. Valiente & Co. v. Succession 
of Fuentes, (1st Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 78; manic depressive psychosis, Turley v. Turley, 
374 m. 571, 30 N.E. (2d) 64 (1940) (mortgage); schizophrenia, Davidson v. Piper, 221 
Iowa 171, 265 N.W. 107 (1936) (deed); lhebophrenic schizophrenia, Parkinson v. Mills, 
172 Miss. 784, 159 S. 651 (1935) (marriage); deafness and dumbness from birth, Potts v. 
House, 6 Ga. 324 (1849) (will); Perrine's Case, 41 N.J. Eq. 409, 5 A. 579 (1886) (adjudica-
tion proceeding). Contra: Succession of Herbert, 33 La. Ann. 1099 (1881) (adjudication 
proceedings); deaf, dumb, and blindness from birth, Brown v. Brown, 3 Conn. 299 (1820) 
(deed). 
190iMedical College v. Maynard, 236 N.C. 506, 73 S.E. (2d) 315 (1952); Small v. 
Champeny, 102 Wis. 61, 78 N.W. 407 (1899) (dictum); Feild v. Koonce, 178 Ark. 862, 
12 S.W. (2d) 772 (1929). 
191 Medical College v. Maynard, 236 N .C. 506, 73 S.E. (2d) 315 (1952); Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Cornelius, 226 Ala. 452, 147 S. 632 (1933); Jones v. Schaffner, 193 Iowa 1262, 188 
N.W. 787 (1922) (deed). But see Jones v. Winstead, 186 N.C. 536, 170 S.E. 89 (1923). 
192 Medical College v. Maynard, 236 N .C. 506, 73 S.E. (2d) 315 (1952). 
193 Martello v. Cagliostro, 202 N.Y.S. 703, 122 Misc. 482 (1924) (deed); Summer v. 
Boyd, 208 Ga. 207, 66 S.E. (2d) 51 (1951). 
194 Leggate v. Clark, 111 Mass. 308 (1873) (deed). See also cases in 7 A.L.R. 568, 590 
(1920), supplemented in 68 AL.R. 1309, 1316 (1930). 
195Davis v. Davis, 24 S.D. 474, 124 N.W. 715 (1910) (deed). 
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tive effect is questionable in light of the fact that the test for that 
adjudication may differ considerably from the test for inca-
pacity.196 In the cases of adjudication of incompetency to manage 
property, however, where the test will be similar to that for in-
capacity, 197 such effect may be justified since it merely imposes a 
burden on the other party to bring forth evidence. 
The discussion above concerns evidence of prior permanent in-
competency. Courts have been generally unwilling to give a pre-
sumptive or shifting-burden effect to evidence of subsequent in-
competency.198 Since accurate knowledge as to the prior course 
of a mental illness seems difficult to deduce from knowledge at a 
later period, 199 this unwillingness is probably justified. On the 
other hand, it would seem that certain mental diseases develop 
slowly enough, or are so permanent, as to lead to a conclusion that 
they existed within certain periods prior to the time of examina-
tion.200 Thus a court would be justified in giving the same effect 
to evidence of this type obtained by the subsequent examination 
as it does to certain evidence of prior incompetency. 
A "reach-back" effect has been recognized in the case of cer-
tain adjudications subsequent to the agreement in issue. Adjudi-
cations that find a condition of incompetency to manage prop-
196 Moneta v. Hoinacki, 394 Ill. 47, 67 N.E. (2d) 204 (1946) (deed); Waters v. Waters, 
201 Iowa 586, 207 N.W. 598 (1926) (will). 
1971n re Lamont's Estate, 95 Utah 219, 79 P. (2d) 649 (1938) (guardianship proceed-
ings); In re Johnson's Estate, 286 Mich. 213, 281 N.W. 597 (1938) (guardianship proceed-
ings). See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §§71-1-7, 71-1-3. Cf. Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §703.1. 
For a discussion of the test of capacity, see Part II, supra. 
198 For cases indicating •that a prior presumption will not be raised by non-adjudica-
tory evidence, see Von Meyer v. Varcoe, 106 Misc. 426, 175 N.Y.S. 862 (1919) (deed); Trish 
v. Newell, 62 Ill. 196 (1871) (will); Corbit v. Smith, 7 Iowa 60 (1858) (deed). Cf. Sommer-
ville v. Greenhood, 65 Mont. 101, 210 P. 1048 (1922) (transfer of stock); Roberts v. 
Pacific Tel. and Tel., 93 Wash. 274, 160 P. 965 (1916) (release); Qdom v. State, 174 Ala. 
4, 56 S. 913 (1911) (criminal). For cases indicating that the presumption will not be 
raised by adjudicatory evidence, see Shell, Guardian, v. Sheets, Guardian, 202 Ark. 708, 
152 S.W. (2d) 301 (1941); Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Bonner, 126 S.C. 284, 119 S.C. 826 (1923). 
Cf. Huffaker v. Brammer, 193 Ky. 267, 235 S.W. 727 (1921) (deed); Andrews v. Andrew's 
Committee, 120 Ky. 718, 87 S.W. 1080, 90 S.W. 581 (1920) (divorce); Avery v. Avery, 42 
Cal. App. 100, 183 P. 453 (1919) (deed); Swanstrom v. Day, 46 Misc. 311, 93 N.Y.S. 192, 
affd. 101 App. Div. 609 mem., 92 N.Y.S. 1147 mem. (1905) (deed). But see Davidson v. 
Piper, 221 Iowa 171, 265 N.W. 107 (1936), where the court pointed out the incompetence 
shown to exist subsequent ,to the conveyance; Jones v. Schaffner, 193 Iowa 1262, 188 N.W. 
787 (1933) (deed), where the court recognized a minority view. 
199 This proposition seems to be assumed by psychologists and psychiatrists, and is 
supported ,by their descriptions of the unpredictable nature of many mental illnesses. 
See NoYES, MODERN CuN1c:AL PSYCHIATRY, 3d ed., cc. 8-28 (1948). 
200 See note 189 supra, especially Davidson v. Piper. 
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erty~ 201 or irtsanity202 during a prior stated period, have been held 
to raise a presumption of incapacity to contra:ct during the 
prescribed period. 
(b) Satisfying a burden that has been shifted to a party alleging 
capacity, This poses the same problem, in reverse, as the satisfac-
tion of the µiitial burden of proof, and is basically a matter of 
weighing the evidence. Courts have indicated that evidence of 
lucid intervals not closely proximate in time to the transaction 
will not satisfy the burden, however.203 
· (c) Shifting the burden back to the party alleging incapacity. 
Evidence which may be strong enough not only to satisfy a burden 
of producing ·evidence imposed on those alleging capacity, but to 
re-shift this same burden back to the opposition, includes: evi-
dence showing that the court terminated or knowingly permitted 
the termination of the guardianship of the ill person;204 and evi-
dence ·that this person ·had been discharged from a mental insti-
tution as cured205 or improved.206 Adjudication·s of sanity2°7 and 
201Richie v. Shephard, 143 N.Y.S. 19, 158 App. Div. 192 (1913). See also In re 
Kehler, (2d Cir. 1908) 159 F. 55, cert. den. 212 U.S. 573; Mieczkowski v. Mieczkowski, 
141 N.J. Eq. 367, 57 A. (2d) 517 (1948), a 28-year !l.'each-back provision; Yauger v. Skinner, 
14 N.J. 'Eq. 389 (1862), where :by way of dictum a broad interpretation was given to the 
language of a one-year "reach,back" provision to include a period one year and 14 days 
prior to the adjudication. An adjudication of incompetence rendered subsequent to the 
contract which lacks a "reachsback" provision is generally denied ,the effect of raising 
a -presumption of prior incapacity. Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Bonner, 126 S.C. 284, 119 
S.E. 826 (1923); Shell v. Sheets, 202 Ark. 708, 152 S.W. (2d) 301 (1941); Swanstrom v. 
Day, 46 Misc. 311, 93 N.Y.S. 192, affd. 101 App. Div. 609, 92 N.Y.S. 1147 (1905) (deed). 
See also cases in note 198 supra. 
202 Mulholland v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 309 Pa. 590, 164 A. 597 (1933). Where 
admissible, courts generally refuse to give evidence of a subsequent adjudication of 
insanity a presumptive effect unless it contains a "reach-back" provision. Avery v. Avery, 
42 Cal. App. 100, 183 P. 453 (1919). 
203 Pike v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642, 16 S. 689 (1894) (deed); Picke~ts v. Jolliff, 62 Miss. 
440 (1884) (mortgage); Turner v. Rusk, 53 Md. 65 (1879) (deed). Cf. note 178 supra. 
204 Doris v. McFarland, 113 Conn. 594, 156 A. 52 (1931). Cf. Miller v. Rutledge, 82 
Va. 863, 1 S.E. 202 (1887). But see Martello v. Cagliostro, 202 N.Y.S. 703, 122 Misc. 306 
(1924) (dower release). For cases dealing with the significance of a practical termination 
of the guardianship, see Thorpe v. Hanscom, 64 Minn. 201, 66 N.W. 1 (1896) (deed); 
Elston v. Jasper, 45 Tex. 409 (1876) (settlement). 
205 Doris v. McFarland, 113 Conn. 594, 156 A. 52 (1931). But see Lindberg v. Mutual 
Nat. Bank, 318 Ill. App. 195, 47 N.E. (2d) 551 (1943), •where the court did not indicate 
that the discharge was of any particular significance; Feild v. Koonce, 178 Ark. 862, 12 
S.W. (2d) 772 (1929). 
206 Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Lewis, 199 Ark. 120, 132 S.W. (2d) 488 (1939) 
(mortgage). 
207Roberts v. Washington Trust Co., 313 Pa. 584, 170 A. 291 (1934), cert. den. 292 
U.S. 608 (1934), reh. den. 292 U.S. 613 (1934) (deed); Guardianship of Farr, 169 Wis. 451, 
171 N.W. 951 (1919) (guardianship proceeding); Cathcart v. Mathews, 105 S.C. 329, 89 
S.E. 1021 (1916) (adverse possession). 
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competenc:y2°8 (in many states) and perhaps judgments of com-
petency to make a specific contract209 will have this result. 
3. Conclusive Evidence. In a few situations the courts will hold 
that certain evidence conclusively establishes the incapacity of a 
party to a contract. These situations involve statutes which pre-
scribe this effect, usually for adjudications. It should be noted 
that adjudications of insanity or incompetency to manage prop-
erty have diverse results prescribed for them by statutes. Some 
statutes, to prevent interference with the guardian's discharge of 
his duties in managing the ward's estate, make one or both of 
these adjudica,tions conclusive evidence of incapacity until the 
guardianship ceases.210 Other statutes make such adjudications 
conclusive evidence of incapacity until a subsequent adjudication 
of competency, regardless of whether a guardian exists or not.211 
The purpose of this type of statute seems to be to give more pro-
tection to the mentally ill person, and to make it clear to all per-
sons what the result of transactions with the ill person will be. A 
few statutes make adjudications of insanity conclusive of incapa-
city only during that time when the person is confined, thus pro-
tecting healthy parties who contract without notice of the 
ad judication.212 
In the absence of statutes, no evidence will be held conclusively 
to establish a condition of incapacity (or capacity). Although many 
courts have stated that an adjudication of incompetenc:y218 or 
insanity214 is conclusive evidence of incapacity at the time of the 
208 This result would seem ito follow in light of the presumptive effect given ad-
judications of sanity which are normally less significant than adjudications of com-
petence. See note 207 supra. But see Johnson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 217 N.C. 139, 7 S.E. 
(2d) 475 (1940) (disability insurance policy and release); Emery v. Hoyt, 46 m. 258 (1867) 
(note). 
200 Cf. Davis v. :Davis, 24 S.D. 474, 124 N.W. 715 (1910) (deed). 
210Martello v. Cagliostro, 202 N.Y.S. 703, 122 Misc. 482 (1924) (deed): Thorpe v. 
Hanscom, 64 Minn. 201, 61 N.W. 1 (1896); Topeka Water-Supply Co. v. H.C. iRoot, 56 
Kan. 187, 42 P. 715 (1895); 'Elston v. Jasper, 45 Tex. 409 (1876). See also Summer v. 
Boyd, 208 Ga. 207, 66 S.E. (2d) 51 (1951). 
211 Jackson v. Van Dresser, 188 Tenn. 384, 219 S.W. (2d) 896 (1949): Kay v. Kay, 53 
Ariz. 336, 89 P., (2d) 496 (1939). 
212 Davenport v. Jenkins' Committee, 214 Ky. 716, 283 S.W. 1044 (1926). 
213 Turpin's Admr. v. Stringer, 228 Ky. 32, 14 S.W. 794 (1929). Cf. Toepffer v. 
Toepffer, 151 Kan. 924, 101 P. (2d) 904 (1940) (divorce); Pritchett v. Plater & Co., 144 
Tenn. 406, 232 S.W. 961 (1920). Contra: Johnson v. Johnson, 214 Minn. 462, 8 N.W. (2d) 
620 (1943); Mott v. Mott, 49 N.J. Eq. 192, 22 A. 997 (1891) (deed). 
214 In re Estate of Strohmeier, 164 Kan. 675, 192 P. (2d) 181 (1948); Akin v. Akin, 163 
Ga. 18, 135 S.E. 402 (1926) (suit for alimony). Contra: United States v. Halliday, 116 
F. (2d) 812, revd. on other grounds 315 U.S. 94 (1941) (disability insurance). 
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adjudication, no case has been found which so bound the party 
claiming capacity.215 These courts m~y merely be saying that under 
the doctrine of res judicata, an adjudication of incompetency or 
insanity conclusively decides the condition of the mentally ill per-
son only between the parties to the litigation.216 
JV. EFFECTS OF MENTAL ILLNESS OCCURRING AT THE 
AGREEMENT STAGE OF THE CONTRACT 
Mental incapacity at the time of agreement will allow the 
mentally ill person to escape any obligations of a purely executory 
contract. But suppose the contract is partly executed? Are there 
additional prerequisites to the power of avoidance other than 
proof of incapacity? Can the power be lost? And if the power of 
avoidance is not desired, or cannot be obtained on the basis of 
the mental illness alone, what other effects on the contract can 
mental illness during agreement have? These and other questions 
are considered in this part. 
It is with regard to the effects of mental illness on the con-
tract that the conflicting arguments surrounding such illness be-
come especially apparent. The policy of protecting the mentally 
ill person competes with the policy of ensuring reasonable ex-
pectations where, under objective views of contract analysis, the 
manifestation of agreement by a person would tend to be suffi-
cient to hold him to the contract.217 In addition, however, there 
are other policy conflicts in the effects of mental illness; for in-
stance, those which concern difficult problems of unraveling the 
contract relationship once a court decides to allow a party to avoid 
the contract.218 
The various rules governing avoidance of a contract due to 
fraud or the infancy of a party are closely analogous to those 
governing avoidance due to mental illness.219 While these rules 
may thus be fruitful sources of argument for the attorney in men-
215 For the contrary position, see Cathcar-t v. Mathews, 105 S.C. 329, 89 S.E. 1021 
(1916) (adverse possession). 
210 Medical College of Virginia v. Mayard, 236 N.C. 506, 73 S.E. (2d) 315 (1952). Cf. 
Sutton v. Sutton, 222 N.C. 274, 22 S.E. (2d) 533 (1942). See also Pope v. Bolin, 224 Ala. 
322, 140 S. 382 (1932) (adjudication proceeding). 
217 Compare with analysis of policy in Part I.C, supra. 
218 See subdivision F, infra. 
219 This policy is analogous to that of protecting infants. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 
rev. ed., §§226-238 (1936). 
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tal incapacity cases, they are not discussed in this study. Cases con-
cerning avoidance of conveyances in arms-length transactions are 
used to establish conclusions when contract cases are unavailable, 
since courts usually consider the rules to be the same in both 
situations.220 
Although the most important effect of mental illness during 
agreement is the creation of a power of avoidance, the other effects 
of such illness will be discussed first. This is because some of the 
problems of these other effects underlie or intertwine the remain-
ing problems of the power of avoidance. Except for subdivision A, 
which discusses these other effects, this part assumes that the men-
tal illness of a party during agreement is sufficient to satisfy one of 
the tests of incapacity and that this sufficiency can be proved. The 
next four subdivisions after A will discuss: who can avoid, against 
whom, the methods of avoidance, and the ways of losing the power 
of avoidance. The final two subdivisions concern the unraveling of 
the contractual relationship when the contract is to be avoided. 
A. The Illegal, "Void," or Fraudulent Contract 
As stated, mental illness during the agreement stage may have 
effects on the contractual relation other than a power of avoidance 
based on mental incapacity. 
One of these effects may have just the opposite result from a 
power of avoidance, allowing a mentally ill party to enforce a 
contract which otherwise would be unenforceable (the illegal 
contract). A second effect, that of rendering the contractual rela-
tionship totally void ab initio exists in reality only as a logical 
possibility, but it serves to introduce the distinction between the 
"void" and the "voidable" contract which is quite important in 
the mental illness setting. The third effect to be discussed is the 
utilization of mental illness as a "plus factor" in creating a power 
of avoidance where the mental illness alone is not sufficient to 
create that power. 
I. The Illegal Contract. Mental illness of a party may relieve 
him from the harshness of the law in dealing with contracts ren-
dered illegal by the law of the appropriate jurisdiction. The gen-
eral rule is that such contracts cannot be enforced by either party, 
220 See Green, "The Operative Effect of Men-tal Incompetency on Agreements and 
Wills," 21 TEX. L. REv. 554 at 557 (1943); I WII.LisrON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §249 (1936). 
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by way of specific performance or damages, and that no restitu-
tion for benefits conferred under the contract will be given.221 
This rule is subject to various exceptions, however. One exception 
permits restitutionary remedies when the parties are not in pari 
delicto,222 and should provide a remedy for one who, because of 
mental illness, was unaware of the illegality. Such a party would 
be without fault, while the healthy party may have known of the 
illegality or at least have had the capacity to investigate. Moreover, 
if the mentally ill party is thus justifiably ignorant of the illegality, 
he may also be entitled to damages for the nonperformance of 
the healthy party.223 
The test of mental illness in this context should probably be 
whether the party was capable of understanding that the contract 
was or might be illegal. Even if this standard is not met, the mental 
illness may contribute to a finding of fraud, duress, undue influ-
ence, or mistake, themselves separate grounds for permitting resti-
tution or damages under the illegal contract.224 
2. The "Void" Contract. In the period when a contract was 
considered to be wholly based on a subjective meeting of the 
minds, it was easy to think in terms of a contract made with a men-
tally incompetent person being totally "void," since the minds 
did not and could not have met. Even at that time, however, and 
certainly in later times of more objective contract theories, there 
seemed to be no such thing as a "void" contract relationship, in 
the sense that a nullity or no legal relationship at all arose from 
the manifested acts of contracting with a mentally incompetent 
person.225 It appears that the healthy party could at least be held 
to the contract, and that third parties could not attack it as void. 
Nevertheless the courts have in the past spoken, and continue 
today to speak, of a distinction between "void" and "voidable" 
contracts. Agreements made with incompetent persons in certain 
221 See generally 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, cc. 79-90 (1951); 6 WILLisrON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. 
ed., cc. 49-52 (1938). 
222 See 6 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1537 (1951); 2 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §604 (1932). 
223 Cf. 6 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1538 (1951); 2 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §599 (1932). 
These sections do not deal specifically with mental illness. 
224 The works cited in notes 221, 222, and 223 supra discuss generally tlle remedies 
under an illegal contract entered into as a result of such elements as fraud or undue 
influence. 
225 The term "void" ihas been criticized as failing to indicate that "a number of 
legal relations !have been created." 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §7 (1950). See also l WILLisroN, 
SALES, rev. ed., §29 (1948). 
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specific situations result in "void" rather than "voidable" con-
tracts, and certain effects of the "void" contract differ from the 
normal effects of the "voidable" contract. This distinction has 
already been encountered in this study in part III-B, where ad-
judicatory evidence was discussed. A brief summary of some of 
the aspects of this distinction may help to clarify a very confusing 
area of law. 
Today a contract with a mentally ill person is usually merely 
"voidable" through subsequent agreement or court action.226 
The contract may be termed "void," however, in many jurisdic-
tions when there has been an adjudication of incompetency with 
a guardian of the estate of the mentally ill person appointed prior 
to the contract, and in some jurisdictions when there has been a 
commitment of the mentally ill person to a mental hospital.227 
This departure from the general rule is justified by the purposes 
served by guardianship proceedings, namely, giving constructive 
notice of the mental illness to all and permitting the guardian to 
act effectively for the ward without the ward's interference.228 
But the departure is questionable when applied to other proceed-
ings, although the "void" effect is often specified by statute.229 
Statutes in a few jurisdictions declare as "void" contracts entered 
into by certain mentally ill persons before any adjudication of 
incompetency.280 • 
I 
Quite often the fact that a contract is "void" instead of "void-
able" will make little difference in result. In either instance the 
power of avoidance may be lost by ratification, undue delay, or 
estoppel.231 The same parties may be allowed to exercise the power 
in both situations.232 
Historically, the primary difference between "void" and "void-
226 See generally Green, "The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agree-
ments and Wills," 21 TEx. L. REV. 554 (1943). 
221 Id. at 576-580. 
228 See Green, "Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency," 38 
MICH. L. REV. 1189 at 1213 (1940), agreeing that the fact of adjudication is sufficient 
protection to the public. 
229 Statutes declaring contracts "void" after guardianship proceedings and/or com-
mitment are compiled in the Appendix. 
230 Alabama statutes declare all contracts of mentally ill persons "void," and a few 
western states declare contracts "void" when the mentally ill party is "entirely without 
understanding." See Appendix. 
231 See subdivision E infra. 
232 See subdivision B infra. 
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able" contracts was that the former could be avoided in a court 
of law, while an action in equity was necessary to avoid a "void-
able" contract. This distinction is being obliterated by modem 
procedural reform.233 Nevertheless some differences still remain. 
For instance if a contract is termed "void" it may be avoided even 
against a subsequent bona fide purchas.er from the healthy party 
(where the contract involved transfer of property). If merely 
"voidable," the contract might not be subject to avoidance as 
against such a person.234 In some jurisdictions the "void" contract 
may be avoided without restoring the other party to· his status 
quo, while avoidance of a "voidable" contract would require 
such restoration.235 
3. Mental Illness as a Plus Factor. Fraud, duress, and undue in-
fluence are generally considered to be distinct grounds for avoid-
ance of a contract, and need not involve a showing of mental ill-
ness.236 However, a mentally ill party may be more likely than 
the average person to believe misrepresentations made to him or 
succumb to outside influence, even if his illness is not severe 
enough to permit avoidance on the ground of mental incapacity 
alone.237 Consequently a court seems justified in allowing mental 
weakness to supplement those other grounds in creating a power 
of avoidance.238 If a composite approach is permitted, a showing of 
mental weakness, together with facts falling short of fraud, duress, 
or undue influence will often permit avoidance in situations where 
the evidence will not sustain avoidance on any single ground.239 
Likewise, mental weakness will often cause misunderstanding 
of the terms of the contract by the mentally ill person, possibly 
resulting in avoidance on the ground of mistake.240 If the mistake 
233 See subdivision D infra. 
234 See subdivision C infra. 
235 See subdivision F infra. 
236 See generally 5 Wn.usroN, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., c. 45 (fraud and misrepresentation) 
and c. 47 (duress and undue influence) (1937). 
237 See Green, "Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency," 43 CoL. L. REv. 
176 (1943). See also Green, "Proof of Mental Incompetency and ithe Unexpressed Major 
Premise," 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944), comparing the types of evidence sustaining avoidance 
on the various grounds. 
23SE.g., Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind. 236, 150 N.E. 361 (1926) (deed). See Virtue, "Restitu-
tion from the Mentally Infirm," 26 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 291 at 294-300 (1951), and cases 
cited therein. 
239 See Green, "Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency," 43 CoL. L. REv. 
176 at 195 (1943), advocating avoidance on composite grounds. 
240 See generally 3 CORBIN, CONTRAcrs, cc. 27-29 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. 
ed., c. 46 (1937). 
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is unilateral, as will normally be the case, rescission is usually the 
appropriate remedy.241 If the healthy party knew that the mentally 
ill party misunderstood the contract terms, however, the mentally 
ill party may also be able to obtain reformation of the contract.242 
It is evident that mental weakness will often be a major factor 
in permitting avoidance on grounds of fraud, duress, undue in-
fluence, mistake and the like. To the extent that the judicial tests 
of incapacity243 set a requirement too high for the protection of 
all mentally ill, and to the extent that sufficient evidence244 cannot 
be produced to prove incapacity, these alternate grounds present 
needed additional protection for the ill party. 
B. Who Gan Avoid 
Turning now to the most important effect of mental illness 
during agreement-avoidance-it is assumed that one of the parties 
to the contract lacked the capacity to contract under the relevant 
test for the jurisdiction concerned and that sufficient proof of this 
fact is available. If this lack of capacity gives rise to a power of 
avoidance,245 who can exercise it? 
I. The Healthy Party and His Successors. Decided cases gen-
erally hold that the healthy party and those claiming through him 
cannot exercise the power of avoidance.246 Since the law has 
created the power of avoidance only for the protection of the 
mentally ill party, in the usual case it is sufficient that he alone 
can avoid or ratify.247 Avoidance by the healthy party would 
destroy the mentally ill party's option to ratify.248 
This rule may work hardship on the healthy party, for he will 
241 Cf. 3 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §614 (1951). Existence of the mistake may also result in 
refusal of specific performance to ,the other party. Cf. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §612 (1951). 
These sections do not deal specifically with mental illness. 
242 Cf. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §608 (gift), §610 (knowledge of other party) (1951) (not 
dealing specifically with mental illness). 2 CON1"RACTS REsTATEMENT §505 (1932) limits 
reformation for unilateral mistake to ,the case where the other party not only knows 
that a mistake has been made but knows what was intended by the mistaken party. 
243 :Discussed in part II, supra. 
244 Discussed in part III, supra. 
245 See note 27 supra as to the meaning of "power of avoidance." 
246E.g., Fannin v. Conn, 311 Ky. 690, 225 S.W. (2d) 102 (1949) (deed); McClure 
Realty and Investment Co. v. '.Eubanks, 151 Ga. 763, 108 S.E. 204 (1921) (lease). 
247Palmer v. Lititz Mutual Ins. Co., (W.D. S.C. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 857; Reynolds 
v. Earley, 241 N.C. 521, 85 S:E. (2d) 904 (1955) (lease and purchase option). 
248 Georgia Power Co. v. Roper, 201 Ga. 760, 41 S.E. (2d) 226 (1947) (tort release). 
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often be uncertain whether a power of avoidance exists (i.e., 
whether the other party is mentally ill to the requisite degree) 
and, if so, whether it will be exercised. The problem becomes 
acute when land titles are involved, and there is authority that a 
healthy purchaser under a land contract may avoid the contract if 
there is a mentally ill person in the vendor's chain of title.249 
What protection is generally afforded the healthy party rests on 
the doctrines of laches, estoppel, and implied ratification by the 
mentally ill party,250 and in the requirement that on avoidance 
by the mentally ill party, the healthy party be placed in 
statu quo.251 
2. The Mentally Ill Party and His Successors. There are 
roughly at least three classes of persons who may exercise the 
power of avoidance. The first of these classes, those persons w4o 
are asserting the interests of the mentally ill party himself,252 in-
cludes the mentally ill party after recovery from the mental 
illness.253 If he has been adjudicated incompetent, his guardian or 
committee is the proper party to assert the power of avoidance.254 
If there has been no adjudication, or if there is no guardian or 
committee, his power may be asserted by his next friend, guardian 
ad litem, or other special representative.255 
The second class of persons who may avoid the contract is 
composed of those persons asserting interests descended from the 
mentally ill party at his death. This class includes the appropriate 
heirs, executors, or administrators who will receive the benefits 
249 Rattner v. Kleiman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 36 S.W. (2d) 249 (implied warranty of 
capacity of vendor); Coombs v. Witte, 104 N.J.L. 519, 140 A. 408 (1928) (deed); Brokaw 
v. Duffy, 165 N.Y. 391, 59 N.E. 196 (1901) (deed). 
250 See discussion in subdivision E, infra. 
251 See discussion in subdivision F, infra. Relief may also be provided by a de-
claratory judgment action, discussed in subdivision D, infra. 
252 These parties are listed in 1 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrs, rev. ed., §253 (1936); 5 TIF-
FANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §1371 (1939). 
253 In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 3 App. Div. (2d) 590, 162 N.Y.S. (2d) 984 (1957) 
(deed), ¢he mentally ill party was permitted to sue without a showing of recovery, the 
court stating that a guardian ad litem could be appointed later if one were necessary. 
254E.g., Marten v. Wagner, 198 Okla. 273, 178 P. (2d) 618 (1947) (deed). The guardian 
must be the guardian of the estate of ,the mentally ill party, not of his person only: 
Scheuer v. Atlantic Milling Sales Corp., (App. Div. 1921) 187 N.Y.S. 497 (securities). His 
right to represent the mentally ill party will normally exclude others from acting: Kilbe 
v. Myrick, 12 Fla. 419 (1868) (deed). 
255 E.g., Wynne v. Fisher, 156 Ga. 656, 119 S.E. 605 (1923) (deed-next friend); 
Jenifer v. Kincaid, 191 Md. 120, 59 A. (2d) 765 (1947) (deed-special trustee); Gulf 
Production Co. v. Colquitt, (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 25 S.W. (2d) 989 (deed-receiver in 
prior divorce action). 
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of avoidance.256 It does not include potenticil heirs (where the 
mentally ill party is still alive),257 nor those who at his death take 
no interest in the specific property involved in the contract.258 
The third class of persons who may avoid the contract is com-
posed of those persons asserting interests derived from the men-
tally ill party during his lifetime. These interests are usually 
property interests, not just contract interests, but are discussed 
here because the power of avoidance fills one of its designated 
purposes by permitting restoration of property passing under the 
contract to the mentally ill party and those claiming under him. 
The most frequently encountered example is the case where the 
mentally ill party sells property to one party, and then later sells 
the same property to another party. If the vendor had not recov-
ered from his mental illness before the second sale, the second 
purchaser will have no greater power to avoid the first sale than 
will the first purchaser to avoid the second sale, both sale con-
tracts being equally avoidable. Thus neither sale can be avoided 
by either healthy party on the ground of the mental illness of the 
common vendor,259 and determination of title would be by other 
rules of law. 
If the vendor had recovered from his mental illness before the 
second sale, the first sale may be avoided.260 Two possible analyses 
are available, either that the second sale acts as an avoidance of 
the first by the mentally ill party himself,261 or that the power of 
avoidance passed by sale to the second purchaser, who may then 
avoid the first sale.262 _ A purchaser in this sense is one claiming 
256 See 3 BLACK, REscrssroN AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., §551 (1929). See also I A.L.R. 
1517 (1919) (executors and administrators); 2 A.L.R. 431 at 437 (1919), 33 A.L.R. 51 at 52 
(1924) (heirs). 
257 E.g., Sellman v. Sellman, 63 Md. 520 (1885) (deed); Baldwin v. Golde, 88 Hun 
(N.Y.) 115, 34 N.Y.S. 587 (1895f (deed). See McMillan v. lDeering & Co., 139 Ind. 70, 38 
N.'E. 398 (1894) (deed), where, before the death of the mentally ill life tenant, plaintiff-
holders of a remainder interest were unable to avoid a deed of the remainder by the 
life tenant, who had been given power to convey the fee. 
25BE.g., Campbell v. Kuhn, 45 Mich. 513, 8 N.W. 523 (1881) (ad.n:1inistrator unable 
to avoid deed as the realty would descend directly to the heirs); Langley v. Langley, 45 
Ark 392 (1885) (deed-widow without dower rights in the realty involved). 
259 Accord, Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Barnard, 43 Mich. 379, 5 N.W. 411 (1880) 
(creditor v. grantee under prior deed). 
260 Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Mar.) 236 (1829) (mortgage); Clay 
v. Hammond, 199 Ill. 370, 65 N.'E. 352 (1902) (deed). See 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d 
ed., §1371 (1939). 
261 Suggested in 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §1371 (1939). 
262 Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Mar.) 236 (1829) (mortgage). The 
parties were the second purchaser and the heirs of the mentally ill party, and the court 
observed that ,the equities favored the purchaser. 
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the property involved263 through the mentally ill party,264 not 
one claiming it through a common grantor, as with successive life 
estates and remainders.265 As the mentally ill party has parted with 
his interest in the property to the second purchaser, this is not a 
matter of protecting him, but of protecting the second purchaser. 
Therefore it would seem that the power of avoidance (along with 
the duty to make restitution, if any) should pass to the purchaser 
if the parties to the second sale so intend;266 for the first purchaser, 
against whom avoidance is to be had, is in no worse position 
whether his purchase is avoided by the mentally ill party, his 
heirs, or his assignees. 
Another common example of one asserting such derivative 
rights is the creditor of the mentally ill party who seeks to avoid 
the latter's sale or gift in order to subject the property transferred 
to the payment of the debt. A recent decision has permitted a gen-
eral creditor to assert the power of avoidance, holding the action 
to be for the benefit of the estate of the deceased mentally ill 
debtor, similar to a corporate shareholder's derivative suit for the 
benefit of the corporation.267 Several cases have permitted avoid-
ance by general creditors268 and judgment creditors,269 while one 
jurisdiction has refused the action and remitted the creditor to 
263 In Vogel v. Zuercher, (I'ex. Civ. App. 1911) 135 S.W. 737, the lessee of a mentally 
ill party was not permitted to attack his grantor's subsequent deed of the reversion, 
presumably because he could show no interest in the reversion. 
264Fannin v. Conn, 311 Ky. 690, 225 S.W. (2d) 102 (1949) (attack not permitted by 
person •who conveyed land to the mentally ill party); 'McClure Realty &: Investment Co. 
v. Eubanks, 151 Ga. 763, 108 S.E. 204 (1921) (attack on lease not permitted by one who 
held the interest of the mentally ill person by court decree but could not show that he 
held it through her). 
265 McMillan v. Deering &: Co., 139 Ind. 70, 38 N.E. 398 (1894) (plaintiff holders of 
remainder interest unable to avoid deed of remainder -by mentally ill life tenant having 
power to convey fee). Contra, Willoughby v. Trevisonno, 202 Md. 442, 97 A. (2d) 307 
(1953), where on the same facts the attack was allowed on •the ground that a remedy was 
necessary immediately, rather than after the death of <the life tenant, so that the grantee 
could not sell to a bona fide purchaser. 
266 This intention should ,be measured iby the price and other terms of sale. The 
vendor should ,then be estopped from asserting the power of avoidance in derogation of 
the sale. 
267 Chandler v. Welborn, 156 Tex. 312, 294 S.W. (2d) 801 (1956) (deed). The holding 
was limited to •the case of a deceased debtor leaving insufficient assets to satisfy his 
creditors, when the property sought by the creditor would be subject to his claim if 
owned by the debtor, and when the heirs and personal representative are adversely 
interested and attempt to uphold the transfer. 
268 Riley v. Carter, 76 Md. 581, 25 A. 667 (1893), where the deed attacked was an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors that was in the debtor's interest, so that he was 
unlikely to avoid it himself. . 
269 Sampson v. Pierce, (Mo. App. 1930) 33 S.W. (2d) 1039 (creditors' right to avoid 
deed not challenged by the grantee). 
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his attack of the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.21° Federal 
law does not assist, as the Bankruptcy Act follows state law on this 
question.271 In most cases the transfer can also be attacked as a 
fraudulent conveyance, and the attack based on the mental illness 
of the debtor-transferor may be unnecessary. And since the policy 
favoring protection of the mentally ill and his family, upon which 
the right of avoidance is based, is not served by giving this right 
to one whose interests will usually be adverse to the protected 
party and his estate, extension of the creditor's rights to include 
the power of avoidance appears unsound in principle and unwise 
in its duplication of existing rights. While it may be that a remedy 
is needed,272 refinement of the law of fraudulent conveyances 
seems more appropriate. 
3. Joint Interests. Complications arise when the contract 
rights of the mentally ill party are held jointly with a healthy 
party. If the mentally ill party chooses to avoid the contract, the 
healthy co-party should also be released unless the interests are 
actually severable. If the mentally ill party does not avoid, the 
same considerations for denying a power of avoidance to the 
healthy party in a two-party contract are applicable to the healthy 
co-party, and he should not be permitted to avoid the contract.273 
4. "Void" Contracts. 'Although the term "void" might imply 
that a contract could be successfully attacked by anyone ( e.g., by a 
creditor), the better view would seem to be that only those who 
can avoid a "voidable" contract should be allowed to avoid a 
"void" contract. This is sufficient to protect the mentally ill per-
son, and is supported by dictum in one case.274 
270 Brumbaugh v. Richcreek, 127 Ind. 240, 26 N.E. 664 (1891) (deed-judgment cred-
itor); Rollet v. Heiman, 120 Ind. 511, 22 N.E. 666 (1889) (deed-judgment creditor). See 
I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §253 (1936). 3 BLACK, R.EsCISSION AND CANCELLATION, 2d 
ed., §550 (1929), suggests that the judgment creditor, ,but not the general creditor, can 
assert the right of avoidance. 
27152 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §llO(e). See 4 COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTCY, 14th ed., §§70.78, 70.90 (1942). The trustee may attempt to avoid the bankrupt's 
deed as a fraudulent conveyance: 52 Stat. 875, 878, as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §§107(d), 
llO(e). 
212 See Chandler v. Welborn, 156 Tex. 312 at 319, 294 S.W. (2d) 801 (1956) (deed); 
Riley v. Carter, 76 Md. 581 at 598, 25 A. 667 (1893) (deed). 
273 The reluctance of courts to find incompetency in these cases is discussed in Virtue, 
"Restitution from the Mentally Infirm," 26 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 132 at 152 (1951). Prob-
lems also arise in connection with the sale of a homestead when one spouse is mentally 
ill, and statutes often provide for sale by court order. See 45 A.L.R. 395 at 432 (1926), 
155 A.L.R. 306 (1945). 
274See San Francisco Credit Clearing House v. MacDonald, 18 Cal. App. 212, 122 P. 
964 (1912) (promissory note). 
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C. Against Whom Can Avoidance Be Asserted? 
The next question concerning the power of avoidance is: 
against whom may it be asserted? Since, as indicated above, the 
healthy party can rarely avoid, this section deals with avoidance 
by the mentally ill party and his various successors in interest as 
against the healthy party and his successors. The possible scope 
of the power of avoidance ranges from avoidance against the origi-
nal healthy party to avoidance against his most remote assignee, 
with the contract either still executory or in some degree 
performed. · 
If the contract is still executory, or if no property interests 
have passed to the healthy party, the mentally ill party can avoid 
against all remote assignees.275 If property interests have passed 
to the healthy party, however, and are now in the hands of a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice of the mental illness, the 
power of avoidance often may not be exercisable against such 
purchaser. If the contract were "voidable" on grounds other than 
mental illness, such as fraud in the inducement and undue influ-
ence, the bona fide purchaser would take free of the power of 
avoidance.276 When the power of avoidance is based on mental 
illness, however, the strong policy of protecting the mentally ill 
party from the consequences of his irrational acts obscures the 
picture, and has often been permitted to override the conflicting 
policy of protecting the security of transactions and of property 
interests created by them.277 Since the power of avoidance is given 
to conserve the property of the mentally ill, a refusal of avoidance 
when the property is held by a bona fide purchaser dilutes the 
protection. This is because the contract consideration, or money 
damage remedies, may be inadequate due to an increase in the 
value of the property, insolvency of other possible defendants, or 
the irreplaceable nature of the property. 
An initial factor to consider is the remoteness of the bona fide 
purchaser from the original healthy party. Since it places an oner-
ous burden on a remote purchaser to compel him to litigate the 
question of the competency of vendors far removed in his chain 
275 S.ee 1 CoNTRAcrs REsrATEMENT §167 (1932) (not dealing specifically with mental 
illness). 
276 See 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §1531 (1937); 2 CoNTRAcrs REsrATEMENT 
§476, comment e (1932). 
277 These policies are discussed in part 1-C, supra. 
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of title, one quite remote should be held to take free of the power 
of avoidance, particularly if much time has passed.278 
Remoteness will not of itself avail the purchaser who is but 
two steps removed from the mentally ill party, as in the more fre-
quent case where X contracts with the mentally ill party under 
circumstances in which the contract can be avoided as against X 
and X then sells to the one against whom avoidance is sought. 
If X's vendee is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of 
the mental illness, the policies favoring security of transactions 
and protection of the mentally ill strongly conflict. One line of 
authority protects the bona fide purchaser if his purchase from X 
were under such circumstances ( e.g., without knowledge of the 
illness) that if X were the ill party, X could not obtain avoid-
ance.279 This view seems to depend on the proposition that the 
bona fides of the purchaser protects the mentally ill party. Since 
the purchaser had no direct dealings with the mentally ill party, 
however, this proposition would seem incorrect.280 A different line 
of authority permits the mentally ill person to avoid the contract 
even against the subsequent bona fide purchaser from X. This 
view objects to X defeating the power of avoidance by merely 
selling to a bona fide purchaser.281 
Since, as has been pointed out, neither the mentally ill party 
nor the subsequent bona fide purchaser will be completely un-
protected,282 the true issue is usually who gets the property and 
278 Goldberg v. McCord, 251 N.Y. 28, 166 N.E. 793 (1929) (deed). See Green, "The 
Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills,'' 21 TEX. L. REv. 
554 at 567 (1943). This principle is not applicable if the remote grantee knew of the 
defect in his title; e.g., Brokaw v. Duffy, 165 N.Y. 391, 59 N.E. 196 (1901) (deed). See 
subdivision E, infra, for circumstances in which the ill party could not avoid. 
279 Odom v. Riddick, 104 N.C. 515, 10 S.E. 609 (1890) (deed-actually involving a 
remote grantee); Christian v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 33 Hawaii 34 (1934), revd. (9th 
Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 603, reinstated 305 U.S. 91 (1938) (deed); Brown v. Khoury, 346 
Mich. 97, 77 N.W. (2d) 336 (1956) (deed); Chestnut v. Weekes, 180 Ga. 701, 180 S.E. 611 
(1935) (deed); Begley v. Holliday's Committee, 248 Ky. 453, 58 S.W. (2d) 654 (1933) (deed). 
280 The bona fides of the purchaser is some assurance that the transaction will be 
a fair one, and is discussed in relation to avoidance and return to status quo in sub-
division F, infra. 
281 Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 451 (1866) (deed), involving a remote grantee; Jones 
v. Lind, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 211 S.W. (2d) 587 (deed); Atkinson v. McCulloh, 149 Md. 
662, 132 A. 148 (1926) (contract and deed); Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14, 126 N.E. 
271 (1920) (deed); McKenzie v. Donnell, 151 Mo. 461, 52 S.W. 222 (1899) (deed); Dewey 
v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276 (1893) (deed); Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 10 N.E. 270 
(1887) (deed). 
282 The mentally ill party has an action against X for the proceeds of his sale to the 
bona fide purchaser: Sprinkle v. Wellborn, 140 N.C. 163, 52 S.E. 666 (1905) (deed). The 
bona fide purchaser may also recover from X the price paid: DeVries v. Crofoot, 148 
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who must be satisfied with a money judgment. In many cases 
restoration of the property to the mentally ill party will mean its 
subsequent sale to supply funds for his support. If the mentally ill 
party has since died and his heirs are suing, the purchaser can often 
show more reliance on title to the specific property than can the 
heirs. Under these circumstances it may often make sense to re-
fuse avoidance if the other remedies of the mentally ill party ap-
pear adequate for the protection of him and his heirs. 
What has been said thus far applies to "voidable" contracts. 
If the contract is "void," it could be casually concluded that no 
subsequent purchaser can take free of the power of avoidance.283 
In the case of the mentally ill party who has not been adjudicated 
incompetent, however, the conflicting policies discussed above 
continue to exist, and the solution should be the sam~, absent legis-
lative command that absolute protection be given.284 If the men-
tally ill party was adjudicated incompetent before he entered into 
the contract, additional reasons ( constructive notice and the de-
sire to make guardianship effective) appear for allowing avoidance 
against subsequent purchasers.285 
Statutes have been adopted in many jurisdictions protecting 
the subsequent bona fide purchaser in certain types of transac-
tions. The Uniform Sales Act protects him if the contract is 
"voidable" only,286 and the Uniform Commercial Code contains 
similar provisions.287 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law 
does not protect a holder in due course from the right of avoid-
ance of a prior mentally ill party288 but remits him to his rights at 
Mich. 183, 111 N.W. 775 (1907) (deed); Lack v. Brecht, 166 'Mo. 242, 65 S.W. 976 (1901) 
(deed). See 2 BLACK, REscISSION AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., §258 {1929). 
283 E.g., German Savings & Loan Society v. DeLashmutt, (C.C. Ore. 1895) 67 F. 399 
(deed), holding the contract void under the outmoded rule of Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 
(82 U.S.) 9 (1872). 
284 A few jurisdictions have such statutes (see appendix for list): e.g., Mattos v. 
Kirby, 133 Cal. App. (2d) 649, 285 P. (2d) 56 (1955) (deed "void" by statute); Hood v. 
Holligan, 229 Ala. 539, 158 S. 759 (1935) (deed not within statute protecting original 
bona fide purchaser and therefore "void" even as to subsequent bona fide purchaser 
under a second statute). 
28J; E.g., Gibson v. Westoby, 115 Cal. App. (2d) 273, 251 P. (2d) 1003 (1953) (deed), 
permitting avoidance of a "void" contract against a bona fide purchaser. These additional 
reasons are discussed in subdivision A-2, supra. 
2861 U.L.A. §24 (1950). Cases dealing with infancy have construed this section of 
the act to have this effect: e.g., Jones v. Caldwell, 216 Ark. 260, 225 S.W. (2d) 323 (1949). 
See 16 A.L.R. (2d) 1420 at 1425 (1951). See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §252 (1936); 
Green, "The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills," 21 
Tmc. L. REv. 554 at 575 (1943). 
287 Uniform Commercial Code §2-403(1) (1952). 
288 See BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 7th ed., 756-758 (1948); 
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common law.289 The provisions on negotiable instruments in the 
Uniform Commercial Code follow the Sales Act in permitting a 
holder in due course to take free of the power of avoidance if the 
contract of the mentally ill party is "voidable" only.290 These 
typical statutes are indicative of a modern trend toward preferring 
the need for security of commercial transactions over the desire for 
protection of the mentally ill party. They reduce the power of 
avoidance on the ground of mental illness to the size of a power 
of avoidance on other grounds, such as fraud and undue influence. 
D. Procedural Methods of Avoidance 
In addition to the self-help methods of avoidance ( e.g., volun-
tary rescission, provided that the parties then have capacity291), 
there are several methods of avoidance through court action. The 
most modern is the declaratory judgment proceeding.292 Other 
actions can be classified as positive actions to avoid or as defenses 
to actions on the contract by the healthy party or his successors in 
interest.293 Common questions are the type of action required 
(legal or equitable), whether the formalities of disaflirmance and 
tender must precede the action or defense, and what must be con-
tained in the pleadings. 
BRITroN, BILLS AND NoTF.s §126 (1943). Section 22 does provide for tracing of title to the 
instrument through infants and corporations exceeding their powers, and it has been 
argued that it should be applied by analogy to mentally ill parties: BEUTEL's BRANNAN, 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 7th ed., 436 (1948); BRITION, BILLS AND NOTF.5 §160 (1943). 
289 E.g., Hillsdale Nat. Bank v. Sansone, II N.J. Super. 390, 78 A. (2d) 441 (1951) 
(note of a mentally ill party not a negotiable instrument); Beale v. Gibaud, (W.D. N.Y. 
1936) 15 F. Supp. 1020. Most cases ignore the N.I.L. and follow the law applicable to 
all contracts, e.g., Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314 (1927) (following the 
rule of Odom v. Riddick, note 279 supra, a deed case); Hellman Commercial Trust & 
Savings Bank v. Alden, (Cal. App. 1928) 268 P. 688, affd. 206 Cal. 592, 275 P. 794 (1929) 
(following the local statutes applicable to all contracts of adjudicated incompetents). 
290 Uniform Commercial Code §3-305 (1952). See comment (5) under that section. 
A subsequent holder who is not a holder in due course is remitted to his common law 
rights by §3-306(b). Title may be traced through the mentally ill person, even though 
his contract is "void," by the provisions of §3-207; see comments {I) and (2) under that 
section. 
291 Local law varies as to whether the guardian and others representing the mental-
ly ill party can rescind the contract without court action. See I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 
rev. ed., §253 (1936); comment, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 606 (1948). 
292 See 2 ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., c. 12 (1951); BORCHARD, DECLAR-
ATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., part 3, c. 2 (1941). These authors set forth various circumstances 
under which declaratory judgment proceedings will enable the parties to determine 
whether a power of avoidance exists for fraud, mistake, or undue influence, before a 
"legal structure" has been built upon the contract, and the proceeding should also be 
available when the power of avoidance will be based on mental illness. E.g., Sperry v. 
Saul, 14 Misc. (2d) 161, 178 N.Y.S. (2d) 421 (1958) (power of attorney and trust deed). 
293 The types of actions available are discussed infra. 
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I. Positive Action at Law. The logical rule is that only a court 
of equity can rescind a "voidable" contract, and only a "void" 
contract can be avoided at law.294 The possible legal actions in-
clude ejectment or replevin for specific property passing under 
the contract, or trover or assumpsit ( quasi contract) for its value.295 
Avoidance of a "voidable" contract can be had at law, however, 
if the plaintiff first attempts rescission out of court by giving no-
tice of his disaffirmance to the healthy party and tendering back 
benefits received under the contract.296 Thus, disaffirmance and 
tender have become jurisdictional prerequisites to the avoidance 
at law of a "voidable" contract. The awkward results of these for-
malistic requirements have caused courts to excuse disaffirmance 
and tender by finding the contract to be "void,"297 and by delineat-
ing numerous exceptions to the requirements.298 These exceptions 
have become so broad that they almost swallow the rule,299 but 
they still present hurdles for the plaintiff unable to bring his case 
within an exception.800 
294 See 2 CoNTRAcrs REsTATEMENT §481, comment a (1932). The circumstances render-
ing the contract "void" or "voidable," and the effects of each type of contract, are out-
lined in section A-2, supra. 
295 Many courts refused ,to permit avoidance for mental illness in the strictly legal 
actions of ejectment and replevin: e.g., Walton v. Malcolm, 264 Ill. 389, 106 N.E. 211 
(1914) (deed); Moran v. Moran, 106 Mich. 8, 63 N.W. 989 (1895) (deed). See Virtue, 
"Restitution from the 'Mentally Infirm," 26 iN.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 132 at 144 (1951). The 
codes have been construed to permit the actions, e.g., Smith v. Ryan, 191 N.Y. 452, 84 
N.E. 402 (1908) (deed). See 20 HARv. L. REV. 419 (1907). 
296 E.g., Paulen v. Springfield Consolidated Ry. Co., 166 Ill. App. 382 (1911) (avoid-
ance of •tort release refused for lack of tender before verdict although mentally ill party 
was in mental hospital at time of release). See 2 CoNTRAcrs REsTATEMENT §480 (1932); 3 
BLACK, ,R.EsCISSION AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., §§573, 574 (1929). 
297 This may explain •why many courts at one time held all contracts of mentally 
ill persons to be "void." See Green, "The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on 
Agreements and Wills," 21 TEX. L. REV. 554 at 574 (1943). The courts also look for fraud 
in the factum to render ,the contract "void;" e.g., Rubenstein v. Dr. Pepper Co., (8th 
Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 528 (executed sale); comment, 32 COL. L. REV. 504 at 510 (1932). 
See also 134 A.L.R. 6 at 68 (1941). 
298 Excusing disaffirmance: Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind. 236, 150 N.E. 361 (1926) (deed, 
notice of the mental illness); Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 10 N.E. 270 (1866) (deed, in-
competency continued with no guardian appointed, so •that no one was competent to 
disaffirm); as ·to waiver and other facts excusing disaffirmance, see 3 BLACK, R.Ese1ss10N 
AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., §571 (1929). Tender is required when plaintiff is not entitled 
under law to retain benefits received by him: see 2 CoNTRAcrs REsrATEMENT §480 (1932); 
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev, ed., §1530 (1937); comment, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 606 at 610 
(1948); 134 A.L.R. 6 at 68 (1941); see subdivision F as to circumstances under which the 
contract may ,be avoided without return of consideration. 
299See comment, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 606 at 610 (1948); 26 VA. L. REV. 222 (1939). 
aoo E.g., Fields v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 170 Ga. 239, 152 S.'E. 237 (1930), where 
avoidance of a deed was sought on the ground that the contract was void, the court hold-
ing it voidable and dismissing the action because of lack of prior disaffirmance and tender. 
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Aside from their historical background, these requirements 
have been supported by two arguments: they seek to promote 
out-of-court settlements by requiring those seeking avoidance first 
to notify the other parties and attempt a reconciliation; and they 
permit simple money judgments in courts of law. The parties 
seeking avoidance must keep open throughout the action their 
tender of benefits received, avoiding the necessity for conditional 
judgments resembling equity decrees.301 However, the first argu-
ment is diluted by the exceptions that arose,302 while the second 
argument (logically consistent with the exceptions) is overcome by 
the power of the modern court, sitting in law and equity, to 
render conditional judgments and decrees.303 
Although the codes had as their purpose the merging of law 
and equity, they have been held to incorporate these jurisdictional 
prerequisites into civil actions legal in nature, so that in some 
jurisdictions the plaintiff is still faced with the necessity of disaf-
firming and tendering if he fails to bring his action as an equitable 
one.sot 
2. Positive Action in Equity. A "voidable" contract can be 
avoided through equitable rescission, supplemented by the can-
cellation of deeds or negotiable instruments and the quieting of 
title to realty.305 In equity prior disaffi.rmance and tender of bene-
fits received are not prerequisites to avoidance as the chancellor 
can mould his decree to do justice to all parties.306 
Modern courts, with merged law and equity jurisdiction, fre-
quently overlook the equitable nature of an action for avoidance. 
Thus, disaffi.rmance and tender prior to the action or in the plead-
301 Barkley v. Barkley, 182 Ind. 322, 106 N.E. 609 (1914) (deed). See generally 3 
BLACK, REsCISSION AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., §569 (1929); comment, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 
606 at 611 (1948). 
302 See comment, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 606 at 6ll (1948). 
303 See Green, "The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and 
Wills," 21 Tmc. L. REv. 554 at 574 (1943); comment, 31 CoL. L. R.Ev. 124 (1931). 
304Smith v. Ryan, 191 N.Y. 452, 84 N.E. 402 (1908) (deed-ejectment), following 
Gould v. Cayuga County Nat. Bank, 86 N.Y. 75 (1881) (tort release-avoided for fraud), 
which is strongly criticized in 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §II03, n. 2 (1951), as failing to "bridge 
the gulf" between law and equity; Georgia Power Co. v. 'Moody, 55 Ga. App. 621, 190 S.E. 
926 (1937) (tort release); Morris v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 74, 69 N.W. 628 
(tort release). In Fields v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 170 Ga. 239, 152 S.E. 237 (1930), a 
basically equitable action for cancellation of a deed was dismissed for lack of tender. 
305 2 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §481, comments a and b (1932). It is arguable that 
the adequacy of the legal remedy under a "void" contract precludes equitable jurisdiction; 
e.g., Scott v. Leigeber, 245 Ala. 583, 18 S. (2d) 275 (1944) (deed-plaintiff out of possession). 
306 2 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §481 (1932). See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., 
§1529 (1937). 
1074 M1cHIGAN LAw REVIEW [Vol. 57 
ings have still been required in actions to cancel deeds. 807 There 
are, however, decisions to the effect that the requirements are ex-
cused when the action is labeled as an equitable one.308 Other cases 
have dismissed an action for lack of allegations of disaffirmance 
and tender, where the action was not labeled as equitable or for 
rescission.809 If modern courts possess merged legal and equitable 
powers, it would seem that they need not deny equitable remedies 
for failure to request them by name. Furthermore, it will often 
be difficult to ascertain, before trial, whether the power of avoid-
ance is legal or equitable, that is, whether the contract is "void" 
or "voidable," and thus it may be difficult to label the pleadings.310 
The ultimate solution is that of permitting avoidance in either 
case, without formalities (including tender in the pleadings and 
request for an equitable remedy), when warranted by the facts of 
the case.811 By abolishing these formalities, more actions for avoid-
ance would likely be tried on their merits. 
3. Defense to Contract Action. The rules for asserting the de-
fense of mental illness are much the same as those for affirmative 
actions of avoidance, discussed above. If the contract is "void," 
avoidance can be a simple defense, and no disaffirmance or tender 
is necessary to avoid the contract. If the contract is only "void-
able," avoidance can be by defense at law or by affirmative equi-
table relief, such as a counterclaim for rescission (and cancellation 
of deeds or negotiable instruments), and the rules for affirmative 
807 Ortman v. Kane, 389 Ill. 613, 60 N.E. (2d) 93 (1945), where specific performance 
of the contract was refused the competent party ,because he made no tender of the pur-
chase price in his pleadings, while avoidance was granted the mentally ill party because 
he tendered return of the down payment in his pleadings. In Mullins v. Barrett, 204 
Ga. 11, 48 S.E. (2d) 842 (1948) (deed-action for cancellation) lack of tender in the 
pleadings was excused -because no consideration was received, thus suggesting that the 
exceptions to tender before suit apply to tender in the pleadings. 
S0B'Morris v. Ratliff, (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) 291 S.W. (2d) 418 (deed); Cole v. Waite, 
151 Tex. 175, 246 S.W. (2d) 849 (1952) (deed); Mullins v. Barrett, 204 Ga. 11, 48 S.E. (2d) 
842 (1948) (deed-court also referring to lack of consideration as excusing tender in the 
pleadings). 
809 Rubenstein v. Dr. Pepper Co., (8th Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 528 (executed sale); 
Wilhite v. Davis, (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) 298 S.W. (2d) 928 (deed). 
810 The effect of a prior adjudication may be uncertain (see part III, supra); or 
uncertainty may exist as to the extent of the mental illness, i.e., whether it is sufficient 
to render the contract "voidable," or whether the contract is "void" under statutes void-
ing contracts of persons "entirely without understanding" (see Appendix for list of 
statutes). 
SU. This was done in Ipok v. Atlantic &: N.C. Ry. Co., 158 N.C. 445, 74 S.E. 352 
(1912) (tort release), although the case fell into one of the above exceptions. See forceful 
argument in 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§1103, 1116 (1951). 
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actions of avoidance at law and in equity apply.812 The effect of 
modern codes and equitable defense statutes should be to permit 
the equitable counterclaim even when the original action is of a 
legal nature. This would permit avoidance without disaffirmance 
and tender, as is true with a "void" contract.818 
E. Loss of the Power of Avoidance 
Although the incapacity of a party to a contract during the 
agreement stage may give to him or his successors a power of 
avoidance, there are several ways in which this power can be lost. 
A loss of the power of avoidance may be explained by one or more 
of several theories, viz., ratification, affirmance, estoppel, laches or 
running of the statute of limitations. These theories are not ap-
plied with technical precision,814 and the same kind of behavior, 
e.g., acceptance of consideration by a restored incompetent, may 
be labeled ratification, ratification by estoppel, or simply estoppel. 
For this reason the following discussion is organized to emphasize 
factual circumstances rather than legal categories. But it should 
be kept in mind that more than one of the above-mentioned 
theories may be relevant in a single factual setting. 
I. Ratification or Affirmance. Ratification, if by a competent 
person, destroys the power of avoidance.815 The clearest case of 
ratification is an express promise made by the incompetent after 
he has regained his capacity.816 The consideration for this may be 
supplied by the earlier transaction817 and it is probably legally 
possible to ratify any contract of an incompetent in this manner.818 
The ill person cannot ratify if he does not have mental capacity. 
812 E.g., Ortman v. Kane, 389 Ill. 613, 60 N.'E. (2d) 93 (1945) (defense to bill for 
specific performance, requiring tender in the pleadings); Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 
10 N.E. 270 (1866) (cross-complaint to cancel deed and quiet title, with disaffirmance 
excused by one of the exceptions above). 
818 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., §§98, 101 (1947) (dealing with fraud and 
mistake). 
814 Matter of Kroll, 8 Misc. (2d) 133, 169 N.Y.S. (2d) 497 (1957). 
8151 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §6 (1950); Lawrence v. Morris, 167 App. Div. 186, 152 N.Y.S. 
777 (1915) (by former mentally ill person after having been adjudged competent); Bunn 
v. Postell, 107 Ga. 490, 33 S.E. 707 (1899) (by administrator). The obligation is based on 
both the ratification and the prior -transaction, 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §227 (1950) (ratifica-
tion of infants' contracts). 
8161 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §6 (1950); Lawrence v. Morris, 167 App. Div. 186, 152 N.Y.S. 
777 (1915). 
817 l CORBIN, CONTRACTS §228 (1950). 
818 Even those held to -be "void" rather than "voidable." Lawrence v. Morris, 167 
App. Div. 186 at 193, 152 N.Y.S. 777 (1915). Matter of Kroll, 8 Misc. (2d) 133 at 135, 169 
N.Y.S. (2d) 495 (1957) (to -the effect that the former incompetent actually makes a new 
contract embodying the terms of "void" transaction). 
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Strictly speaking, the problem of what capacity is required to 
ratify involves a question of mental illness occurring at a later 
stage of the contract than agreement, as discussed in Part VI, but 
since it is so closely connected with the problems of avoidance due 
to mental illness during agreement, it must be considered here. 
Courts do not mention any specific tests for capacity to ratify, but 
the tests seem to be the same as those used to determine con-
tractual capacity.319 It should be noted, however, that some of the 
circumstances present may be less complex, and therefore require 
less capacity to understand than negotiating a contract in the first 
instance. 
A guardian generally cannot himself ratify the contract,320 for 
the reason that such a decision involves discretion321 and his job is 
limited to conserving his ward's property.322 He may usually peti-
tion a court to ratify, 323 but even the court may be without power 
in the absence of express statutory authority.324 Statutes authoriz-
ing a court to ratify an incompetent's transaction are strictly 
applied.325 A statute authorizing judicial sale of an incompetent's 
property may be construed to operate in rem so as to transfer title, 
but not to authorize ratification of the incompetent's transaction.826 
Another problem pertains to the sort of conduct that amounts 
to ratification. The term "ratification" is used without great pre-
cision in this area and should be understood to mean not only 
ratification in the technical sense, but any facts which indicate an 
assent to the transaction so as to defeat the power of avoidance. 
319 See, for example, Perper v. Edell, 160 Fla. 477 at 483, 35 S. (2d) 387 (1948) 
(dictum-contract may be ratified by mentally ill person in lucid interval or upon recov-
ering his mental capacity); note, 47 MICH. L. R.Ev. 269 (1948). Cf. Brandon v. Bryeans, 
203 Ark. 1117 at 1120, 160 S.W. (2d) 205 (1942) (deed-can ratify when restored to sanity). 
320 Gingrich v. Rogers, 69 Neb. 527, 96 N.W. 156 (1903) (deed); Rannells v. Gerner, 
80 Mo. 474 (1883) (deed); King v. Sipley, 166 Mich. 258, 131 N.W. 572 (1911) (deed); in 
Fixico v. Fixico, 186 Okla. 656, 100 P. (2d) 260 (1940), the mentally ill person was not 
bound by the acquiescence of her guardian in receiving the benefits to which the mentally 
ill person -was entitled under the agreement. But some jurisdictions permit this under 
certain conditions, e.g., Finch v. Goldstein, 245 N.Y. 300, 157 N.E. 146 (1927) (deed); 
Hermanson v. Seppala, 272 Mass. 197, 172 N.E. 87 (1930) (deed) (dictum). 
321 See In re Reeves, 10 Del. Ch. 324, 92 A. 246 (1914), affd. 10 Del. Ch. 483, 94 A. 
511 (1915) (deed). 
322 See Matter of Hills, 264 N.Y. 349, 191 N.E. 12 (1934) (will). 
323 King v. Sipley, 166 ,Mich. 258, 131 N.W. 572 (1911) (deed). 
824 Gingrich v. Rogers, 69 Neb. 527, 96 N.W. 156 (1903) (deed); Rannells v. Gerner, 
80 Mo. 474 (1883) (deed); Neal v. Holt, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 69 S.W. (2d) 603 (deed) 
(court lacked power except as conferred by statute). 
825 Neal v. Holt, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 69 S.W. (2d) 603 (deed). 
326 Rannells v. Gerner, 80 Mo. 474 (1883) (deed). 
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Types of conduct other than express promise827 may amount to a 
ratification, and it is not necessary that the person ratifying have 
knowledge of his right to avoid or the effect of his action in 
ratifying.828 
Ratification can result from an intent to be bound that is mani-
fested by rendering performance under the contract, either in 
whole329 or in part.330 A unilateral declaration by the restored 
individual will also suffice,331 but an offer to repurchase property 
conveyed by a challenged deed has been held not to constitute a 
ratification.332 
Ratification will also be implied from a demand for and re-
ceipt of the consideration owing to the incompetent, as under a 
contract for the sale of realty333 or personalty.334 There does not 
have to be an express demand, as long as an intent to appropriate 
the benefit is shown.335 Even where the acceptance of benefits did 
not constitute a ratification, it has been held to constitute an estop-
pel in pais, thus barring disaffirmance.336 
If the restored incompetent brings suit on the contract against 
the other party to the transaction, there is clearly an election of 
remedies preventing later exercise of the power of avoidance. This 
doctrine of election of remedies has also been applied where the 
former incompetent sued a third party on a theory which implies 
acceptance of the challenged transaction, e.g., a suit for an account-
ing against an agent who sold the incompetent's property, in which 
the proceeds of the sale are claimed.337 Such a suit is not necessarily 
a ratification, however, as the issue of ratification is one of fact.338 
2. Loss Through Delay. The power of avoidance may also be 
lost through inaction of a mentally ill person restored to health or 
his successors in interest. The most obvious illustration of loss of 
327 See note 316 supra. 
328 l WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §253 (1936). 
329Schaps v. Lehner, 54 Minn. 208, 55 N.W. 9ll (1893) (deed). 
330 Rosenfeld v. Erhart, 202 Ill. App. 617 (1916) (intoxicated person); but see l 
WILI.IsroN, CONTRACTS, 3d ed., §152 (1957). 
881 Cathcart v. Stewart, 144 S.C. 252, 142 S.E. 498 (1927) (deed). 
832 Hermanson v. Seppala, 272 Mass. 197, 172 N.E. 87 (1930) (deed). 
333 Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 434 (1854) (deed). 
834 Bunn v. Postell, 107 Ga. 490, 33 S.E. 707 (1899). 
835 Matter of Kroll, 8 Misc. (2d) 133, 169 N.Y.S. (2d) 497 (1957); Watkins v. Stulb 8c 
Vorhauer, 23 Ga. App. 181, 98 S.E. 94 (1919). 
836 Dool v. First Nat. Bank of Calexico, 209 Cal. 717, 290 P. 15 (1930) (mortgage). 
337 Blinn v. Schwarz, 177 N.Y. 252, 69 N.E. 542 (1904) (deed). Compare Jefferson v. 
Rust, 149 Iowa 594, 128 N.W. 954 (1910) (deed). 
338Ibid. 
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the right of disaffirmance by delay is through operation of the 
statute of limitations, which starts running against the incom-
petent if and when he regains his capacity,339 though the running 
of the statute is arrested by subsequent periods of incapacity. It 
begins to run against the heirs of the incompetent upon his 
death.340 
Aside from the statute of limitations, delay may furnish a basis 
for estoppel or laches. It has been said that mere delay, without 
more, should prevent avoidance.341 In cases where delay results 
in loss of the power, however, there is almost always some ele-
ment of actual harm to the other party,342 a factor which is essen-
tial to the operation of laches. A delay of less than two months 
may be too long if the sane party has acted innocently and is ex-
posed to substantial injury,343 but a lapse of five years between re-
covery and avoidance was not a bar where the good faith of the 
other party was doubtful.344 
Laches will not operate against the incompetent as long as his 
disability continues.345 If the incompetent has acquiesced in the 
transaction and had subsequent lucid intervals, it may be neces-
sary to demonstrate that the acquiescence was his intelligent act 
during a lucid interval.346 
The heirs of the incompetent must act promptly,347 however, 
and are subject to an additional hazard in that they may be es-
topped from avoiding if they are present at the execution of a con-
tract or deed and, knowing of their ancestor's incapacity, do noth-
ing to put the other party on notice of this fact.348 
3. Conclusion. It should be emphasized, particularly with ref-
erence to the delay cases, that the question of ratification or affirm-
339 Cathcart v. Stewart, 144 S.C. 252, 142 S.E. 498 (1927) (deed); Jefferson v. Rust, 
149 Iowa 594, 128 N.W. 954 (1910) (deed). 
840 Reaves v. Davidson, 129 Ark. 88 at 93, 195 S.W. 19 (1917) (deed). 
341 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §253 (1936). 
842,Murphy v. Johnson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S.W. (2d) 158; Wood v. Newell, 
149 Minn. 137, 182 N.W. 965 (1921); Reaves v. Davidson, 129 Ark. 88, 195 S.W. 19 (1917) 
(deed); Brandt v. Phipps, 398 Ill. 296, 75 N.E. (2d) 757 (1947) (deed). 
843 Rusk v. Fenton, 77 Ky. 490 (1879) (deed). 
844 Brandt v. Phipps, 398 Ill. 296, 75 N .E. (2d) 757 (1947) (deed). 
345 Jefferson v. Rust, 149 Iowa 594, 128 N.W. 954 (1910) (deed). 
846Cf. Beasley v. Beasley, 180 Ill. 163, 54 N.E. 187 (1899) (deed). Cf. Hardenbrook 
v. Sherwood, 72 Ind. 403 (1880). 
347 Murphy v. Johnson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S.W. (2d) 158; Lexington and 
Eastern Ry. Co. v. Napier's Heirs, 160 Ky. 579, 169 S.W. 1017 (1914) (deed). 
848 See Lexington and Eastern Ry. Co. v. Napier's Heirs, 160 Ky. 579 at 586, 169 
S.W. 1017 (1914) (deed) (dictum). 
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ance is frequently just one factor in balancing the equities of the 
incompetent against those of the party against whom the disaf-
firmance is asserted. If the other party has acted in complete good 
faith, paid an adequate consideration and is exposed to substantial 
loss if avoidance is permitted,349 or if the incompetent is seeking 
to gain an unfair advantage,350 a ratification will be readily found. 
On the other hand, circumstances such as delay and acceptance of 
benefits which would ordinarily constitute ratification will not 
have that effect where the other party appears to be taking ad-
vantage of the incompetent's unequal position.351 
F. Unraveling the Contract Prior to Avoidance: 
The Status Quo Problem 
If the court decides to protect a person who was mentally ill 
during agreement by allowing him to avoid the contract, and if 
the contract has been partly or wholly executed, there are still 
difficult problems of how to unravel the relationship in light of 
benefits or losses that may have been incurred by either party. The 
unraveling can be viewed from two perspectives. First, it can be 
approached through an inquiry into what the end result will be, 
that is, after the "dust has settled on the battlefield," where will 
the parties stand? This approach includes the ultimate questions 
of loss and benefit involved. The second approach is to ask how 
much of this "unraveling" must occur prior to the actual 
avoidance, that is, before the contract is formally ended. 
Putting aside, temporarily, the question of what portion of the 
unraveling must be done prior to avoidance, the ultimate question 
of loss or benefit involved will be viewed briefly in the abstract. 
In the two-party contract situation ( considered with respect 
to the total assets of both parties to the contract), there can be an 
overall or total net gain in assets, an overall net loss, or no overall 
net change. Each of these situations may involve varying distribu-
tions of the assets between the two parties. 
Where there has been no overall change in net assets, it could 
be that neither party has gained or lost, or that one party has 
349 Watkins v. Stulb &: Vorhauer, 23 Ga. App. 181, 98 S.E. 94 (1919); Rusk v. Fenton, 
77 Ky. 490 (1879) (deed). 
350 This element was present, inter alia, in Wood v. Newell, 149 Minn. 137, 182 
N.W. 965 (1921). 
351 Brandt v. Phipps, 398 Ill. 296, 75 N.E. (2d) 757 (1947) (deed); Jefferson v. Rust, 
149 Iowa 594, 128 N.W. 954 (1910) (deed). 
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gained· the equivalent amount that the other has lost. In the 
former case there would seem to be no problem to halting the 
contract and leaving the parties as they are, and the cases support 
this result.352 In the latter case, fairness would seem to call for 
restoration of the equilibrium, whether by a prerequisite of 
placing the other in statu quo or on a quantum meruit recovery.3153 
Where there is an overall net gain, problems of readjustment 
can seemingly be solved by reference to the rules regarding un-
just enrichment if the distribution is unequal. If the distribution 
is equal, there will probably be no lawsuit, as both parties will 
generally be satisfied with their position. 
The difficult problem arises when there is an overall net loss, 
caused by external economic conditions, dissipation of goods by 
the ill person, or some other reason. 
Although fault might in some instances be the basis for distrib-
uting the net loss,354 it is difficult to rely on any policy of fault 
in the mental illness contract situation because the parties are 
often equally innocent, the ill party being unable to understand 
what he is doing, and the healthy party being unable (as a layman 
without knowledge of psychology) to detect the ill person's sick-
ness. Some courts nevertheless seem to feel that, all other things 
being equal, the mentally ill person is the one who caused the 
loss since friends or relatives could have protected him by warning 
or formal adjudication of incompetency.355 A few cases have held, 
however, that any loss should fall on the healthy party because 
he could have ascertained the illness of the other (whereas the 
ill person could do nothing to protect himself)856 or because 
healthy parties seldom unwittingly enter into contracts with men-
tally ill persons.857 This position can be criticized in light of 
modern developments of science which indicate the difficulty of 
detecting mental illness in many instances. 
852 Most courts allow the mentally ill person to avoid an executory contract. See 
note 373 infra. 
858 See Sjulin v. Clifton Furniture Co., 241 Iowa 761, 41 N.W. (2d) 721 (1950), where 
it was not important whether ,the healthy party had knowledge of the mentally ill 
person's incapacity, which would make placing the healthy party in statu quo unneces-
sary, since the mentally ill person had retained all ,the goods passing to him under the 
contract. 
854 See Part IV-F-2-c, infra. 
855 E.g., Edward v. Miller, 102 Okla. 189, 228 P. 1105 (1924). 
856E.g., Jordon v. Kirkpatrick, 251 Ill. 116, 95 N.E. 1079 (1911). 
857 Gibson v. Soper, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 279 (1856) (deed). Compare Fay v. Burditt, 
81 Ind. 433 at 440 (1882). 
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Turning from the broader perspective, the remainder of this 
subdivision concerns the question how much restoration must 
occur prior to actual avoidance. This discussion can be viewed as 
an analysis of further prerequisites for avoidance. The proof of 
mental incapacity is one such prerequisite, and the ways of losing 
the power of avoidance discussed previously can be called negative 
prerequisites to the power of avoidance-circumstances that must 
not have happened for the power to be available. The next 
subdivision will complete the picture of unraveling by discussing 
the readjustment of assets that may occur after the avoidance, 
through such remedies as restitution. The close relationship be-
tween these two subdivisions should be recognized, since together 
they develop the final position of the parties. Except for the 
overall loss situation, the distinction between the two general 
problems considered is primarily procedural. 
Restoration of benefits from the contract as a prerequisite to 
avoidance of that contract is usually discussed by the courts as 
the "status quo" requirement. In any case where the mentally ill 
person is allowed to avoid, he will be relieved of further obligation 
under the contract and the healthy party will be required to 
return any property that he received under the contract, or their 
value, to the mentally ill person.858 The majority of American 
courts feel that, subject to certain exceptions, it would be inequi-
table to allow the mentally ill person to avoid without placing the 
healthy party in statu quo.859 There are, however, two minority 
views on this subject, thus providing a slight three-way split of 
authority which can be designated as the English view, the Ameri-
can majority view, and the American minority view. 
I. English View. The current English view is that as long as 
the contract is fair and there was no knowledge of the incom-
petency by the healthy party, the contract cannot be avoided 
858 If the suit is in equity, provision for the return of property can be made in the 
decree. Anderson v. Nelson, Olson, Nelson, 248 Mich. 160, 226 N.W. 830 (1929); Hudson 
v. Union and Mercantile Trust Co., 148 Ark. 249, 230 S.W. 281 (1921); Pritchett v. Plater 
and Co., 144 Tenn. 406, 232 S.W. 961 (1920). If the suit is in law, legal actions for return 
of property can be used. Poole v. Newark Trust Co., 40 Del. 163, 8 A. (2d) 10 (1939) 
(assumpsit); Warner v. Warner, 104 Ind. App. 252, 10 N.E. (2d) 773 (1937) (replevin); 
.Matthieson and Weichers Refining Co. v. ,McMahon's Administrator, 38 N.J.L. 536 (1876) 
(trover). 
8159 I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §254 (1936); 2 BLACK, REsCISSION AND CANCELLA-
TION, 2d ed., §276 (1929); Green, "The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on 
Agreements and Wills," 21 TEX. L. R.Ev. 554 at 569 (1943); 95 AL:R. 1442 (1935); 46 
AL.R. 416 (1927). 
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even if executory.360 This view favors protection of the security 
of transactions at the expense of protecting the mentally ill person. 
Since a healthy party who knew of the incapacity of the other is 
said to be guilty of fraud,361 English courts seem to treat the con-
tracts of mentally ill persons no differently from fraudulent con-
tracts generally. 
The current English view was adhered to in some jurisdictions 
of the United States in a few cases, 362 but no longer seems to be 
the law in any states,363 except possibly Michigan, Kentucky, and 
Louisiana. 
Michigan seems to adopt the approach that the court should 
weigh the equities of both parties and then decide whether to 
enforce the contract in accordance with what the court feels should 
be the equitable result.364 It is difficult to say whether the Michi-
gan court will feel that a return which places the healthy party 
in statu quo will be enough to allow the mentally ill party to 
avoid.365 
In Kentucky it is not clear whether the contract can be avoided 
if the healthy party could be placed in statu quo,366 or whether the 
the contract can be avoided only when there exists unfairness or 
knowledge of the incapacity by the healthy party.367 
360 York Glass Co. v. Jubb, 134 L.T.R. 36 (1925), note, 25 CoL. L. REv. 230 (1925); 
Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, [1892] 1 Q.B. 599; Brown, "Can ,the Insane Contract?" 11 
CAN. B. REv. 600 (1933); Cook, "Mental Deficiency and the Law of Contract," 21 CoL. 
L. REv. 424 (1921). 
361 See Price v. Berrington, 7 Hare 394 at 402, 68 Eng. Rep. 163 (1849); Gore v. 
Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623 at 626, 627, 153 Eng. Rep. 260 (1845); Brown, "Can the Insane 
Contract?" 11 CAN. B. REv. 600 at 607 (1933). 
362~.g., Farmers Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Ryg, 209 Iowa 330, 228 N.W. 63 (1929), note, 
14 MINN. L. REv. 679 (1930); Clay v. Clay's Committee, 179 Ky. 494, 200 S.W. 934 (1918) 
(deed); Shoulters v. Allen, 51 Mich. 529, 16 N.W. 888 (1883); Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 
179, 40 S.W. 760 (1897) (deed); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N.Y. 541 (1880); Loman 
v. Paullin, 51 Okla. 294, 152 P. 73 (1915) (deed); Beals v. See, 10 Barr. (Pa.) 56 (1848). 
363 E.g., Sjulin v. Clifton Furniture Co., 241 Iowa 761, 41 N.W. (2d) 721 (1950); 
Doty v. Mumma, 305 -Mo. 188, 264 S.W. 656 (1924); Verstandig v. Schlaffer, 296 N.Y. 62, 
70 N.E. (2d) 15 (1946) (deed), note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 675 (1947); Duroderigo v. Culwell, 
52 Okla. 6, 152 P. 605 (1915) (deed); First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. Fidelity Title and 
Trust Co., Administrator, 251 Pa. 529, 97 A. 75 (1916). See Chew & Goldsborough v. Bank 
of Baltimore, 14 Md. 299 at 318 (1859), where the court criticizes the English view. 
364 Brown v. Khoury, 346 Mich. 97, 77 N.W. (2d) 336 (1956) (deed). 
365 Compare Aninos v. Petrouleas, 314 Mich. 536, 22 N.W. (2d) 879 (1946) (deed), 
with Anderson v. Nelson, Olson, and Nelson, 248 Mich. 160, 226 N.W. 830 (1929). 
366 Fitzpatrick's Administrator v. Citizens' Bank and Trust Co., 231 Ky. 202, 21 S.W. 
(2d) 254 (1929). 
367 Everett v. Downing, 298 Ky. 195, 182 S.W. (2d) 232 (1944). Cf. Casebier v. Casebier, 
Committee, 193 Ky. 490, 236 S.W. 966 (1921) (deed). 
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Louisiana law, because of its roots in the Napoleonic Code, 
treats this subject somewhat uniquely, although the mentally ill 
person is usually held to the contract unless there had been "inter-
diction" (i.e., adjudication) or knowledge of his incapacity by the 
healthy party.368 
2. American Majority View. The great majority of American 
jurisdictions currently adopt the view that, except in a few specific 
instances, placing the healthy party in statu quo (the position he 
originally occupied before the contract was entered into )369 is a 
condition precedent to the exercise of the mentally ill person's 
power of avoidance. If this condition is not met, the contract will 
be upheld.370 Some cases which contain language apparently 
committing the court to the English view also contain language 
which seems to indicate that, had restoration of the healthy party 
to his status quo been possible, the contract could have been 
avoided.371 
The main policy reason underlying the return to the status 
quo requirement was a feeling that the mentally ill person should 
not be allowed to benefit from the contract at the expense of the 
equally innocent healthy party. If the healthy party is placed in 
statu quo, his only loss is his expectation that the contract would 
be performed. Another reason for the adoption of the status quo 
requirement was that before the mergers of law and equity, a 
368 See comment, 22 TULANE L. REv. 598 (1948). 
3611 The problems of determining what constitutes "the status quo" are ,the same in 
the mental illness field as in other areas of ,the law and are consequently considered out-
side the scope of this study. For a discussion of these problems generally, see 3 BLACK, 
iREsCISSION AND CANCELLAnON, 2d ed,, §§616-637 (1929); 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§1114-1115 
(1951); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrS, rev. ed., §§1460, 1460A, 1478 (1937); REsrrrunoN R.EsrATE-
MENT §§65-66(1937). 
370 Carr v. Sparks, 213 Ga. 606, 100 S.E. (2d) 583 (1957); State Bank of Downs v. Cris-
well, 155 Kan. 314, 124 P. (2d) 500 (1942) (mortgage); Cash v. Ryan, Sr., 5 Tenn. 
App. 575 (1927); Young v. Stevens, 48 N.H. 133 (1868). Cf. Riggan v. Green, 80 N.C. 237 
(1879) (deed). 
371 See, e.g., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Podvin, IO N.J. 199, 89 A. (2d) 672 (1952). 
At 207, the court says it is the "settled rule of law" tha:t contracts made in good faith, 
for full consideration, and without knowledge of the insanity will be upheld; at 210, 
the court allowed recovery of a deposit made ·before ,the sane party had knowledge on 
the grounds tha:t the mentally ill person's execution of the purchase contract was a 
"wholly void act," and that the consideration received did not benefit him. See note, 38 
VA. L. '.REv. 1082 (1952). Cf. Dominick v. Rhodes, 202 S.C. 139 at 152, 24 S.E. (2d) 168 
(1943) (deed): " .•. ,the law is well settled that a contract entered into with an incom-
petent person in good faith without fraud or imposition, upon a fair consideration, 
will be supported as valid. And certainly an executed transaction of that kind would not 
be set aside unless the parties could be restored to their original position." 
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court of law could not issue conditional decrees or balance 
equities.372 
The courts adopting the American majority view have for-
mulated certain specific instances where the ability to restore the 
healthy party to his status quo is no longer a condition precedent 
to avoidance, and they will allow the mentally ill person to avoid 
and recover back his consideration regardless of whether the com-
petent party can be restored to his status quo. These situations 
occur where the performance by the healthy party is still execu-
tory, or where there is a "void" contract, knowledge by the healthy 
party of the incapacity of the mentally ill person, an unfair con-
tract, or no benefit to the mentally ill person. 
(a) Executory contracts. If no performance has been rendered 
by the healthy party, the mentally ill person can always avoid, 
since the healthy party is clearly in statu quo.373 
(b) "Void" contracts. If the contract is one described by the 
jurisdiction as "void," for example, where the mentally ill person 
had been adjudicated incompetent prior to attempting to con-
tract,374 courts hold (at least in the older decisions) that no formal 
rescission is necessary. Avoidance by the mentally ill person is thus 
not conditioned on his placing the healthy party in statu quo. Al-
though courts have permitted such avoidance without either a 
tender back of benefits received by the mentally ill party or a 
provision in the judgment requiring their restoration,375 the 
healthy party may still be able to recover these benefits under resti-
tutionary remedies, not dependent on the existence of a contract.376 
372 See Green, "The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and 
Wills," 21 TEX. L. REv. 554 at 574 (1943); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1103 (1950). See part 
IV-D, supra. 
. 373 Cundall v. Haswell, 23 R.I. 508, 51 A. 426 (1902); Corbit v. Smith, 7 Iowa 60 
(1858); Green, "The Operative ·Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills," 
21 TEX. L. REv. 554 at 568 (1943); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §254 (1936). 
374 See Part IV-A-2, supra. 
375 See, e.g., Baird v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 39 Cal. App. 512, 179 P. 449 (1919) 
(avoidance of release in tort action); :Oozier v. Schuermann, 175 Okla. 298, 52 P. (2d) 
1063 (1935) (defense to note); Georgia Power Co. v. Roper, 201 Ga. 760, 41 S.E. (2d) 226 
(1947) (dictum, as court found contract only voidable). Cf. Channell v. Jones, 184 Okla. 
644, 89 P. (2d) 769 (1939) (deed), and Kiley v. Danahey, 61 Mont. 608, 202 P. 1110 (1921) 
(deed). Compare Ivey v. May, 231 Ala. 339, 164 S. 732 (1935), where the mentally ill 
party, having offered to do· equity, was required to restore the portion of the considera-
tion received that had not been dissipated. 
376In Nielson v. Witter, 111 Cal. App. 742, 296 P. 121 (1931), the mentally ill person 
recovered payments made to the healthy party under a void contract; in the companion 
case, Estate of Nielson, lll Cal. App. 742, 296 P. 122 (1931), the healthy party recovered 
back the reasonable value of services rendered to the mentally ill person, which value 
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(c) Actual or constructive knowledge by the healthy party of 
the incapacity of the mentally ill person. All jurisdictions adopt 
the view that if the healthy party to the contract had notice of the 
mentally ill person's incapacity, the mentally ill person can avoid 
without placing the healthy party in statu quo.377 Such a situation 
is viewed as fraud and lack of good faith.878 But this explanation is 
not entirely satisfactory, since a defrauded party to a contract must 
usually restore the other party to the status quo as a condition 
precedent to avoidance.879 
The reason for this difference in treatment between mentally 
ill persons and defrauded persons can be explained if one keeps 
in mind the fact that the mentally ill person may still be liable 
to the healthy party under restitutionary principles. The problem 
really becomes one of who is to bear the loss caused by any goods 
dissipated by, or services not beneficial to, the mentally ill person. 
The courts follow the policy that if the healthy party had notice 
of the mentally ill person's incapacity and thus knew that the 
mentally ill person was incapable of appreciating the consequences 
of his acts, this should shift to the healthy party the risk of what-
ever loss arises from the transaction.88° Consequently, in the 
healthy party's restitution action, he will be unable to recover 
this loss. This is justified because a mentally ill person is probably 
more likely to dissipate goods or contract for non-beneficial services 
than a healthy person who has been defrauded. 
A question then arises with regard to when the healthy party 
had, or should have had, actual knowledge. This has not caused 
the courts as much trouble as would seem likely, largely for three 
reasons. First, knowledge is usually a jury question and depends 
on the facts of each case.381 Second, the initial determination of 
was fixed by the court at less than the contract price. See REsnTUTION REsrATEMENT 
§139, comment a (1937). Recovery in quasi-contract may be had in the same action in 
which avoidance is sought by the mentally ill person. Cf. First Nat. Bank v. Headrick, 
190 Okla. 164, 121 P. (2d) 566 (1941) (deed). 
877 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §254 (1936); 2 BLACK, R.EsCISSION AND CANCELLA-
TION, 2d ed., §257 (1929). 
878 Tubbs v. Hilliard, 104 Colo. 164, 89 P. (2d) 535 (1939); Warner v. Warner, 104 
Ind. App. 252, 10 N.E. (2d) 773 (1937); Litchfield & Madison Ry. Co. v. Shuler, 134 Ill. 
App. 615 (1907). Cf. Schindler v. Parzoo, 52 Ore. 452, 97 P. 755 (1908). 
379 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACIS, rev. ed., §1528 (1936); 3 BLACK, R.EsCISSION AND CANCELLA-
TION, 2d ed., §§617, 618 (1929). 
880 Ivey v. May, 231 Ala. 339, 164 S. 732 (1935) (deed); Creekmore v. Baxter, 121 N.C. 
31, 27 S.E. 994 (1897) (deed). 
881 State ex rel. United Mutual Ins. Assn. v. Shain, 349 Mo. 460, 162 S.W. (2d) 255 
(1942); Warner v. Warner, 104 Ind. App. 252, 10 N.E. (2d) 773 (1937). 
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the mentally ill person's incapacity rests, to a great extent, upon 
factors observable by the healthy party tending to show that the 
mentally ill person did not understand the transaction into which 
he was entering.882 And third, in many cases where the healthy 
party is charged with knowledge of the incapacity, the contract was 
unfair to the mentally ill person. This tends to show that the 
healthy party not only had knowledge of the incapacity, but 
actually took advantage of it.888 In the absence of any proof 
tending to show a personal subjective knowledge of the incapacity, 
courts will not say that the healthy party should have known of 
the incapacity unless they feel that prudent-minded people, know-
ing the facts the healthy party did, would have considered the 
mentally ill person incapable of handling his estate.884 Mere eccen-
tricity or weak-mindedness will not be enough.885 
In some jurisdictions, an adjudication of incompetency is judi-
cially treated as constructive notice to the world of the mentally ill 
person's incapacity.886 Like statutes explicitly providing that con-
tracts made by an adjudicated mentally ill person are "void," 
this view allows the mentally ill person to avoid without placing 
the healthy party in statu quo.887 
(d) Unfairness of the contract. Many courts which follow the 
American majority view state that as long as the contract is "fair," 
in addition to there being a benefit to the mentally ill person 
and no knowledge of his incapacity by the healthy party, it will 
not be avoided unless the competent party is restored to his status 
quo. This might lead one to assume that if the contract resulted 
in any amount of unfairness to the mentally ill person, he could 
avoid without making the appropriate restoration. There seems to 
be little authority for this latter position, however,888 as most 
882 See Part III-B-1, supra. 
8B8See, e.g., Tubbs v. Hilliard, 104 Colo. 164, 89 P. (2d) 535 (1939); Peter v. Englert, 
118 N:J. Eq. 456, 180 A. 228 (1935); Fecht v. Freeman, 251 Ill. 84, 95 N.E. 1043 (1911). 
Cf. Reed, Administrator v. Brown, 215 Ind. 417, 19 N:E. (2d) 1015 (1939) (deed). 
884 E.g., Cummins's Administrator v. Walker's Committee, 252 Ky. 5, 66 S.W. (2d) 
48 (1933). 
885 See, e.g., Evans v. York, (Mo. App. 1946) 195 S.W. (2d) 902; Poole v. Newark 
Trust Co., 40 Del. 163, 8 A. (2d) 10 (1939); Norelius v. Home Savings Bank of Kiron, 
200 Iowa 613, 203 N.W. 809 (1925). See also 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1159 (1911). 
386 See Part IV-A-2, supra. 
88'1' See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. for Banking and Trusts v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 
372 Pa. 259, 93 A. (2d) 679 (1953) (mortgage); Gurnett and Co. v. Poiner, (1st Cir. 1934) 
69 F. (2d) 733; Reeves v. Hunter, 185 Iowa 958, 171 N.W. 567 (1919). 
888See Carawan v. Clark, 219 N.C. 214, 1!1 S.E. (2d) 237 (1941), holding that the 
healthy party did not meet his burden of showing no unfair advantage was taken when 
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cases hold that restoration to the status quo is excused only if 
the consideration given by the healthy party is so grossly inade-
quate as to show bad faith.889 
( e) No benefit to the mentally ill person. Since one of the 
policies behind the American majority view is that the mentally ill 
person should not enjoy the benefits of a contract without comply-
ing with its terms, it might seem to follow that if the mentally 
ill person received no benefit from the transaction, he should 
always be able to avoid. Even if the mentally ill person did not 
benefit, however, the healthy party may still have suffered a det-
riment. Three different situations arise in this area: first, where 
the consideration passing to the mentally ill person turned out to 
be worthless to both parties; second, where the mentally ill person 
never expected to receive a tangible benefit; and third, where 
the mentally ill person expected to receive a tangible benefit but 
the consideration was either diverted from him or dissipated by 
him. 
In the first situation, where the consideration was deemed 
"worthless" ( e.g., "worthless" stock), there seems to be no difficulty 
in holding that the mentally ill person can avoid without restora-
tion since the healthy party is still essentially in statu quo.890 
The second situation is that in which the mentally ill person 
did not expect to receive a tangible benefit from the contract, 
for instance where he is an accommodation maker, endorser, 
or a surety on a promissory note. Even though the healthy party 
cannot be placed in statu quo, except by payment, the courts are 
likely to hold that the mentally ill person can avoid.391 This is 
probably a good result in these cases, since although there is legal 
consideration running to the mentally ill person from the healthy 
the facts showed that the mentally ill person gave $500 plus a boat worth $250 in 
exchange for a boat worth $400. 
889 See, e.g., Tubbs v. Hilliard, 104 Colo. 164, 89 P. (2d) 535 (1939). Cf. Clay v. Clay's 
Committee, 179 Ky. 494, 200 S.W. 934 (1918) (deed); Fecht v. Freeman, 251 Ill. 84, 95 
N.E. 1043 (1911) (deed); Eldredge v. Palmer, 185 Ill. 618, 57 N.E. 770 (1900) (deed); 
Seerley, Guardian v. Sater, 68 Iowa 375, 27 N.W. 262 (1886) (deed). 
890 Ohio Valley Fire and Marine Ins. Co.'s Receiver v. Newman, 232 Ky. 363, 23 
S.W. (2d) 548 (1930). 
891 Hughes v. Crean, 178 iMinn. 545, 227 N.W. 654 (1929); Doty v. Mumma, 305 Mo. 
188, 264 S.W. 656 (1924); North-Western Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Blankenship, 94 Ind. 
535 (1883); Wirebach v. First Nat. Bank, 97 Pa. 543 (1881). See 34 AL.R. 1403 (1925). 
But see Searcy v. Hammett, 202 N.C. 42, 161 S.E. 733 (1932), where the court talks in 
terms of "legal consideration" rather than "•benefit" and holds a mentally ill endorser 
liable. 
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party, it is based on the idea of reliance by the healthy party, 
and in any other case where the contract is avoided, the healthy 
party's reliance interests in the contract being performed have 
also been defeated. 
Where, in the third situation, the mentally ill person ex-
pected to receive a benefit but the consideration was either 
diverted from him ( e.g., contracting mentally ill person derived 
no benefit because another person absconded with his proceeds 
from the contract) or dissipated by him, this is not considered 
sufficient to excuse the mentally ill person from restoring the 
healthy party to the status quo.892 The courts reason that in 
the case of two innocent parties the loss should not be shifted 
from one party to another equally innocent,893 and the benefit 
from the exercise of the power of avoidance runs generally to the 
mentally ill person's relatives and heirs, who have at least a moral 
duty to watch over the mentally ill person's transactions.894 It is 
precisely at this point that the courts adopting the American 
minority view split from those following the American majority 
view, by making the healthy party absorb any loss resulting from 
dissipation or diversion. 
3. American Minority View. A few American jurisdictions 
adopt the view that the mentally ill person can always avoid 
the contract, regardless of whether the healthy party can be placed 
in statu quo.895 Courts adopting this view lean heavily on an in-
fancy analogy and stress the idea that mentally ill persons should be 
protected to the same extent as infants.896 
892 Georgia Power Co. v. Roper, 201 Ga. 760, 41 S.E. (2d) 226 (1947); Atlanta Banking 
and Savings Co. v. Johnson, 179 Ga. 313, 175 S.E. 904 (1934); Sparrowhawk v. Erwin, 30 
Ariz. 238, 246 P. 541 (1926); Edwards v. Miller, 102 Okla. 189, 228 P. 1105 (1924); Morris 
v. Great Northern Railway Co., 67 Minn. 74, 69 N.W. 628 (1896). Contra, Jordon v. 
Kirkpatrick, 251 m. 116, 95 N:E. 1079 (1911) (mortgage). 
893 Georgia Power Co. v. Roper, 201 Ga. 760, 41 S.E. (2d) 226 (1947); Atlanta Banking 
and Savings Co. v. Johnson, 179 Ga. 313, 175 S.E. 904 (1934). 
894 Edwards v. Miller, 102 Okla. 189, 228 P. 1105 (1924). In Virtue, "Restitution from 
the Mentally Infirm," 26 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 132 at 149, 150 (1951), the author reports 
that out of 831 cases brought to avoid a mentally ill person's contract, heirs or devisees 
were a party in 135 cases. There is no way of knowing in how many cases the heirs were 
the ones ultimately benefited. 
895 First Nat. Bank of Rogers v. Tribble, 155 Ark. 264, 244 S.W. 33 (1922); Hovey 
v. Hobson, 53 Me. 451 (1866) (deed); Hermanson v. Seppala, 272 'Mass. 197, 172 N.E. 87 
(1930) (deed); Woolbert v. Lee Lumber Co., 151 Miss. 56, 117 S. 354 (1928) (deed). Texas 
had followed the minority view [see Houston Land and Trust Co. v. Sheldon, (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1934) 69 S.W. (2d) 796], but now :has adopted the majority view by statute. Tex. 
Civ. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1958) art. 5561a, §7. 
8911 See Woolbert v. Lee Lumber Co., 151 Miss. 56, 117 S. 354 (1928) (deed); Reaves 
v. Davidson, 129 Ark. 88, 195 S.W. 19 (1917) (deed). 
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The results under the American minority view do not deviate 
from those under the American majority view as much as might 
initially appear. Even though any loss arising from the transaction 
is borne by the healthy party, he may under this view recover for 
goods and services benefiting the mentally ill person.397 Thus if 
the amount of goods and services benefiting the mentally ill person 
equals the amount furnished him by the healthy part, the healthy 
party is placed in statu quo. 
G. Unraveling the Contract Subsequent to Avoidance: 
Restitutionary Remedies 
If a restoration to the status quo has not been required by the 
court prior to avoidance, or if other benefits or losses remain to 
be adjusted after avoidance, some further unraveling of the con-
tract may be necessary. This final process complements the status 
quo requirement so that even though restoration to status quo 
is not required for avoidance, the net position of the parties will 
often be the same as if it had been required. 
As long as the contract has not been fully performed, the 
avoidance action voids any executory promises and the parties 
are relieved from any further performance under the contract. 
Since the mentally ill person has by his exercise of the avoidance 
power been placed in the position he occupied prior to the con-
tract (including the return to him of property, or its value, fur-
nished under the contract), the only problems arise when the 
contract has been partly or wholly executed by the healthy party. 
Since the concept of unjust enrichment does not depend on 
assent to contractual obligations, the healthy party may recover 
from the mentally ill person under this theory.898 The recovery 
is usually provided for in the avoidance judgment or decree 
itself,899 although there seems to be no reason why a subsequent 
restitution action could not be maintained. The quantum of the 
897 Cf. Jackson v. Banks, 144 Miss. 392 at 397, 109 S. 905 (1926) (deed); Brewster v. 
Weston, 235 Mass. 14 at 16, 126 N.E. 271 (1920) (deed). 
898 General Pulaski Building and Loan Assn. v. Provident Trust Co., 338 Pa. 198, 
12 A. (2d) 336 (1940); R.EsnnmoN RllsTATEMENT §139 (1937). 
899 E.g., General Pulaski Building and Loan Association v. Provident Trust Co., 338 
Pa. 198, 12 A. (2d) 336 (1940); Hudson v. Union and Mercantile Trust Co., 148 Ark. 249, 
230 S.W. 281 (1921). Cf. Oullette v. Ledoux, 92 N.H. 302, 30 A. (2d) 13 (1943) (deed); 
Woolbert v. Lee Lumber Co., 151 Miss. 56, 117 S. 354 (1928) (deed); Creekmore v. Baxter, 
121 N.C. 31, 27 S.E. 994 (1897) (deed). 
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recovery will be determined by whether any property furnished 
under the contract is returnable by the mentally ill person or 
whether the mentally ill person derived a benefit from the property 
or from any services furnished under the contract. 
I. Property Returnable by the Mentally Ill Person. I£ the 
mentally ill person still has property given him by the healthy 
party under the contract, he is required to return it.400 Otherwise 
his act of avoidance would result in a windfall to him and a cor-
responding detriment to the healthy party. 
2. Property or Services Benefiting the Mentally Ill Person. 
If the mentally ill person received services or property which he 
can no longer return, it is important to determine whether such 
items were of benefit to him. The mentally ill person is uniformly 
held liable for the value of necessaries furnished him.401 In addi-
tion, he is liable to make restitution to the healthy party for 
any property or services which, although not necessaries, were not 
dissipated by him nor valueless to him, to the extent that he 
derived a benefit from them. 402 
3. Property or Services Not Benefiting the Mentally Ill Person. 
It may be that the mentally ill person derived no benefit from 
the property or services because they were worthless to him or 
because, in the case of property, he dissipated it. Thus, although 
the healthy party gave up valuable consideration, the mentally 
ill person derived no actual benefit from it, and the question pre-
sented is which party will bear this net loss. 
If the mentally ill person is required to place the healthy 
party in statu quo before being allowed to avoid (under the rules 
developed in subdivision F supra), any net loss is absorbed by 
the mentally ill person. Whether or not he benefited from the 
transaction should have no effect on determining the exact status 
400 Pennsylvania Co. for Banking and Trusts v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 372 Pa. 
259, 93 A. (2d) 679 (1953) (mortgage); Norelius v. Home Savings Bank, 200 Iowa 613, 203 
N.W. 809 (1925); cf. Ivey v. May, 231 Ala. 339, 164 S. 732 (1935) (deed). Compare Buddy 
v. Buddie, 2 N.J. Super 424, 64 A. (2d) 377 (1949). 
401 See 1 WII.LISToN, SALES, rev. ed., §34 (1948); 1 W1u.1sroN, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., 
§255 (1936); 2 BLACK, REsCISSION AND CANCELLATION, 2d ed., §256 (1929); WOODWARD, QUASI 
CONTRACTS §202 (1913). The Uniform Sales Act, I U.L.A. §2 (1950), permits restitution 
for sales of goods within the act, and several states have statutes permitting it for all 
necessaries, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §38. See Appendix for list of similar 
statutes. See 121 AL.R. 1501 (1939); 143 AL.R. 672 at 747 (1943); 22 AL.R. (2d) 1438 
(1952); 56 A.L.R. (2d) 13 (1957) (attorney fees); 7 A.L.R. (2d) 8 (1949) (support). See 
REsTrrurION REsTATE!IIENT §113, comment d (1937), defining necessaries in another context. 
402 See cases cited in notes 399 and 400 supra. 
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quo of the healthy party.403 But if the mentally ill person is re-
quired only to compensate for property or services that actually 
benefited him, m then the status quo of the healthy party is 
irrelevant and this party absorbs any loss arising from the trans-
action. This result protects the mentally ill person from his own 
illness-any loss is felt to have been the result of his mental ill-
ness.405 A third possibility is to have each party bear a portion of 
the resulting loss. Although not explicit in the decisions, some 
courts may accomplish this result by speaking in terms of "adjust-
ing the equities" rather than in terms of benefit to the mentally 
ill person, 406 or by their determination of the quantum of the 
"benefit" or "status quo" in any particular case.407 
V. MENTAL ILLNESS OCCURRING AFTER AGREEMENT: AT THE 
TIME OF PERFORMANCE 
The effects on a contract of one party's mental illness at the 
time of agreement have been discussed in the preceding pages of 
this study. Attention will now be directed to the effects on a 
contract of mental illness that does not occur until after agreement. 
There are many effects of this nature, but the most important 
relate directly to performance. For example, if a scientist contracts 
to give his services for a designated period of time and becomes 
mentally ill before the period ends, contract rules of impossibility 
and failure of consideration obviously are involved. In such a case, 
should either party be excused? Should the measure of recovery 
or of performance be changed? This part will consider these 
questions. Part VI will conclude the study by treating the re-
maining effects of supervening mental illness. 
A. The Bilateral Contract 
Mental illness occurring after mutual promises are exchanged 
can affect performance of a contract in two ways. First, mental 
403 This is exemplified in the cases holding that the fact ,that the mentally ill person 
-dissipated the goods will not excuse him from placing the healthy party in statu quo. 
See IV-F-2-(e), supra. -
404 This measure is applied by those states following the American majority view 
where restoration of the healthy party to his status quo is excused. Cf. Morris v. Hall, 
89 W. Va. 460, 109 S.E. 493 (1921) (deed); Creekmore v. Baxter, 121 N.C. 31, 27 S.E. 994 
(1897) (deed), and those cases following the American minority view, note 395 supra. 
405 See Gibson v. Soper, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 279 at 281-282 (1856) (deed). 
406 Weseman v. Latham, 153 Cal. App. (2d) 841, 315 P. (2d) 364 (1957). Cf. Brown 
v. Khoury, 346 Mich. 97, 77 N.W. (2d) 336 (1956) (deed). 
407 See Virtue, "Restitution from ,the Mentally Infirm," 26 N.Y. UNIV. L. REY. 291 
(1951). 
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illness of a promisor can impair his ability to perform. Second, 
mental illness of a promisee can alter his desire for the perform-
ance, his ability to supervise or approve the performance, or his 
capacity to enjoy the results. 
I. Mental Illness of a Promisor. Courts generally examine the 
promisor's supervening inability to perform in the context of 
"impossibility." Mental illness may affect a promisor's ability to 
remember a date for payment or to convey a deed, but since these 
acts are readily delegable they are not considered as rendered truly 
impossible by supervening mental illness.408 Performance of the 
non-personal bilateral contract is thus unaffected by subsequent 
mental illness. But where there is some personal flavor to the 
contract, 409 where the required acts can be properly rendered only 
by the particular promisor, supervening mental disability can 
excuse both obligations: the promisor's because of impossibility,"'10 
the promisee's because of failure of consideration.411 Four salient 
questions then arise. (a) What is a personal service contract? (b) 
What mental disability is sufficient to excuse performance? (c) 
How should foreseeability influence placement of the risk of men-
tal illness? ( d) What effects on performance and what judicial 
means of implementing these effects arise from the promisor's 
supervening mental illness? 
(a) What is a personal service contract? The answer to this 
question lies in normal contract law and is not unique to mental 
illness situations. The crucial test is whether performance by a 
408 See Penny v. Spencer Business College, (La. 1956) 85 S. (2d) 365; Guardianship of 
Gomaz, 8 Cal. (2d) 347, 65 P. (2d) 784 (1937). Cf. -Foster v. Warner, 42 Idaho 729, 249 P. 
771 (1926) (physical disability of third person). See 2 CoNTRAcrs R.EsTATEMENT §455, 
comment a, illus. 3 (1932): 6 CORBIN, CoN1"RAcrs §1334 and cases in n. 6 (1951); 6 WILLISTON, 
CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1940 (1938). The underlying validity of ,the contract is not affected 
by later mental illness; Baroudi v. Hales, (Fla. 1957) 98 S. (2d) 515. 
409 Once beyond a simple promise to pay a sum certain, almost any performance 
requiring some prolonged activity •by promisor may conceivably be deemed personal, 
and ,the contract labeled a personal service contract. Compare 2 CONTRACTS R.EsTATEMENT 
§459, illus. 2 (1932), with Green v. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 395 (1867). Cf. Graves v. Cohen, 46 
T.L.R. 121 (1929) (relation of horse-owner to jockey). See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1334 (1951); 
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1940 (1938). 
410 2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT §459 (1932). The impossibility excuse applies whether 
promised performance was that of -the promisor himself, Hathaway v. Cronin, 301 Mass. 
419, 17 N.E. (2d) 312 (1938), or that of a third person whose performance was to be 
obtained -by promisor, Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N.Y. 40 (1877). See generally 6 CORBIN, CON• 
TRACTS §1334 (1951); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1940 (1938). Suits for breach of 
promise to marry, though not actually personal service contracts, involve personal promises 
so that disability can also excuse. Sanders v. Coleman, 97 Va. 690, 34 S.E. 621 (1899). 
4111 CONTRACTS R.EsTATEMENT §282 (1932). 
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particular person was understood by the parties to be a vital part 
of the consideration. The following factors must be analyzed: 
(I) whether a special skill of some type was involved; (2) the in-
tent of the parties as revealed in their language; (3) the custom 
with regard to the relations involved; and (4) the circumstances of 
the agreement.412 Skillful presentation of the equities can often 
help persuade the court to a personal rather than non-personal 
interpretation of a given contract. Action subsequent to the agree-
ment may also influence the court to view the contract as non-
personal; thus acceptance of performance by a promisee from an 
agent of a mentally ill promisor may provide evidence of a belief 
that the obligation was non-personal.413 
(b) Mental disability to perform. This topic roughly parallels 
the question of the test for incapacity in mental illness during 
the formation of a contract, discussed in Part II. Here, however, 
the focus changes to the issue of what quantity or quality of mental 
illness, occurring after agreement, can legally affect performance 
of the contract. This question is unique to mental illness situa-
tions and falls in an area where no accurate tests or criteria have 
yet been formulated. 
The black-letter proposition is that a duty of personal per-
formance is discharged by any illness which makes the promisor's 
action "impossible or seriously injurious to his health."414 Two 
levels of illness are initially discernible. First, the relatively trivial 
illness-such as a fainting spell-that merely excuses the mentally 
ill promisor from liability for a less-than-perfect performance. 
Second, there is illness that so substantially impairs the promised 
performance that the promisee is justified in terminating the 
contract and obtaining someone else to complete the task.416 In 
412 The contract can spell out the parties' intent to have performance be personal. 
6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1334, n. 5 (1951); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1941 (1938). 
It can likewise evince an intent to have performance readily delegable. See 6 CORBIN, 
CoNTRAcrs §1334, and cases in n. 4 (1951); 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §1941, n. 14 
(1938). Compare Penny v. Spencer Business College, (La. 1956) 85 S. (2d) 365, with Stewart 
v. Loring, 5 Allen (87 Mass.) 306 (1862). Promisor may undertake the risk of mental 
illness, but this must ,be clearly manifested, 2 CoNTRAcrs RESTATEMENT §459, coment e 
(1932). 
413See Husheon v. Kelley, 162 Cal. 656, 124 P. 231 (1912) (lease). 
414 2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT §459 (1932). 
415 Compare Rubin v. International Film Co., 122 Misc. 413, 204 N.Y.S. 81 (1924) 
(physical disability, l¼ hour delay) with Johnson v. Walker, 155 Mass. 253, 29 N.E. 522 
(1892) (typhoid, 7 week absence). See Carver v. Fitzsimmons, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 320, 42 P. 
(2d) 1066 (1935) and Dickey v. Linscott, 20 Me. 453 (1841). 
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support of this dichotomy it may be argued that in the event of 
an unforeseen mental illness (for which he did not assume the 
risk) the promisor should be generally excused to the exact extent 
that his performance is actually affected, but that the dissatisfied 
promisee should not, in every such case, be able to treat the entire 
contract as discharged for failure of consideration. Recognition 
of the foregoing dichotomy also results in a judicial buffer-zone in 
which the promisee must accept something less than he bargained 
for. As long as the zone is narrow, it has practical justification. 
With respect to proof, it is hard to distinguish a mental illness 
from one or a few isolated symptoms impairing performance _(such 
as a headache or fainting spell). If an employee faints for the 
second time in a week, he ought to be excused if he is not feigning; 
while before the employer should be able to fire him, there should 
be a further showing that the spells relate to some material dis-
ability. 416 
In addition, no realistic promisee actually anticipates 100 per-
cent maximum performance by the promisor at all times, but 
rather realizes the possibility of ordinary and trivial impairment. 
The disabled promisor should not, however, escape any greater 
portion of his obligation than that exactly warranted by his diffi-
culty. Mental exhaustion that could excuse failure to perform on 
Monday will not excuse malingering the rest of the week.417 
In determining the degree of mental illness which will let the 
disappointed promisee terminate a contract, the following factors 
bear: (1) the particular quality and type of performance promised; 
(2) the severity of the illness involved; and (3) the current duration 
of the illness and its prospects for cure. The first factor, quality 
and type of performance, can be readily seen in the different effect 
that a mild mental illness could have on employment for scientific 
research as opposed to employment for plowing fields. As for the 
second factor, severity of the illness, some medically recognized 
disturbances may not be significant enough to excuse poor per-
formance. For example, psychoneuroses, which can manifest them-
selves in sloppy, erratic, or unreliable behavior, will probably 
continue to be treated under traditional contract theories of mate-
rial or trivial breach, while doctrines of supervening mental illness 
416 Somatic disturbances may have at their bases psychological disturbances, but can 
also be the result of essentially physiological or other somatic factors. HUIT AND GmBY, 
PATTERNS OF .ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 234 (1957). 
417 See Fisher v. Monroe, 16 Daly 461, 12 N.Y.S. 273 (1891). 
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are reserved for cases of organic disorder and other more serious 
affiictive disorders.418 
It is on the third-named factor, duration of illness, that the 
courts have primarily focused, rather than on qualitative differ-
ences. Courts have avoided rigid duration tests, substantially agree-
ing with the Virginia view that "no fixed or certain formula" 
is available.419 The issue is ordinarily a jury question. But the 
Virginia court was able to rule as a matter of law that if illness 
was "wholly incapacitating and so protracted as to render it im-
possible for the employee substantially to perform his duties in 
compliance with the terms of the agreement, and the employer's 
interest be thereby materially affected, he will be afforded an 
election to regard and treat the contract as broken."420 An attack 
of mental illness may conceivably last several weeks before the 
employer becomes entitled to cancel the contract.421 
When the alleged mental illness does not excuse the failure 
of the promisor to perform ( e.g., if the illness is trivial but the 
breach is substantial, or if the illness is sham), a case of unilateral 
breach results. Here the promisee has an action for damages against 
the promisor if he elects to recognize the breach, although he may 
elect to waive the breach and continue waiting for full per-
formance.422 In this latter course the promisee runs the risk that 
what was initially too brief or trivial to be recognized as mental 
illness discharging the promisor's duty (and thus could arguably 
418 See 1 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §§274, 275 (1932) on material versus trivial breach. 
Psychoneuroses may often manifest themselves in poor work. Coon, "Psychiatry for the 
Lawyer: The Principal Psychoses," 31 CORN. L.Q. 327 at 329 (1946); LANDIS AND BoLI.ES, 
TEXTBOOK OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 72-89, 113-114 (1947); Malamud, "The Psycho-
neuroses," in 2 PERSONALITY AND THE BEHAVIOR DISORDERS, Hunt ed., 833 at 857 (1944). 
Some mental disturbances initially manifest themselves by hyperefliciency. LANDIS AND 
BoLI.ES, this note supra, at 76. See analysis of tests and proofs of mental illness, parts 
II-A and III-B, supra, in this study. 
419 Citizens Home Ins. Co. v. Glisson, 191 Va. 582 at 589, 61 S.E. (2d) 859 (1950). 
420 Id. at 590. Compare Fahey v. Kennedy, 230 App. Div. 156 at 159, 243 N.Y.S. 396 
(1930): "Just when in the course of a temporary illness this election [to treat the contract 
as breached] may •be exercised is difficult to determine, depending largely on the nature 
of the employment and -the necessities of the employer." Compare Gaynor v. Jonas, 104 
App. Div. 35, 93 N.Y.S. 287 (1905) (1½ days, dismissal not justified); Rubin v. International 
Film Co., 122 Misc. 413, 204 N.Y.S. 81 (1924) (1½ hours); Spindel v. Cooper, 46 Misc. 
569, 92 N.Y.S. 822 (1905) (2 weeks); West Chicago Park Commissioners v. Carmody, 139 
Ill. App. 635 (1908) (sham illness will not justify nonperformance-six months absence 
may not necessarily discharge the contract); Rench v. Watsonville Meat Co., 138 Cal. App. 
(2d) 482, 292 P. (2d) 85 (1956). 
421 See Gaynor v. Jonas, 104 App. Div. 35, 93 N.Y.S. 287 (1905). 
4221 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §317 (1932). See Rubin v. International Film Co., 122 
Misc. 413 at 416, 204 N.Y.S. 81 (1924). 
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have been malingering) may gradually develop into substantial 
disability until it excuses the promisor' s performance altogether 
and ends any possible claim for breach of contract. 
(c) Foreseeability of mental illness. Although apparently no 
case has raised the issue of foreseeability of supervening mental 
illness, analogy from the physical disability cases indicates that no · 
promisor who had good reason to anticipate his subsequent dis-
ability at the time he contracted should be able to use that dis-
ability as an excuse.423 Similar reasoning would prescribe a differ-
ent rule when both parties are aware of the chance of later dis-
ability; in this case, the promisee might even be held to have 
assumed the risk of the promisor's illness.424 
Foreseeability is difficult to apply in the mental illness area. 
Admittedly, in some types of illness it would not be unreasonable 
to expect a temporarily recovered person to foresee a possible 
relapse. Examples of this predictable type are alcoholism425 and 
organic disorders such as brain tumors or general paresis.426 But 
what about the emotional, or afflictive, disorders? A schizophrenic 
patient may apparently recover, learn at the hospital that he is 
considered well, and be discharged. When this person later takes 
employment, he knows of his prior difficulty but has no sound 
medical means to predict chances for relapse. He may be normal 
for the rest of his life.427 
Indeed, the person's rehabilitation may be distinctly impaired 
if he is required to inform prospective employers of any prior 
mental illnesses. Great reluctance to hire such persons may result 
in further discouragement and maladjustment. If hired, special 
423 See Jennings v. Lyons, 39 Wis. 553 at 558 (1876), plaintiff denied even quantum 
meruit recovery where •he and his wife executed a joint personal service contract as farm. 
helper and domestic, and she had •to cease working four months later because of pregnancy 
known at time contract was made: "For when the performance becomes impossible by 
reason of contingencies which should have been foreseen and provided against in the 
contract, -the promisor is held amm1erable." See also Gem Knitting Mills v. Empire 
Printing and Box Co., 3 Ga. App. 709 (1907) (dictum). 
424 See Ptacek v. Pisa, 231 Ill. 522, 83 N.E. 221 (1907). 
425 See Coon, "Psychiatry for the Lawyer: Common Psychiatric States Not Due to 
Psychosis," 31 CORN. L.Q. 466 at 484-487 (1946); I.ANDIS AND BOLLES, TEXTBOOK OF 
.ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 181-195 (1947). 
, 426 See Coon, "Psychiatry for the Lawyer: The Principal Psychoses," 31 CoRN. L.Q. 
327 at 356-362 (1946); LANDIS AND BoLLF.S, TEXfBOOK OF .ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 196-206 
(1947). 
427 See NOYES AND KoLB, 'MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., pp. 416-419 (1958). 
Cf. Shackleford v. Hamilton, 93 Ky. 80, 19 S.W. 5 (1892), where no duty was imposed on 
defendant in ·breach of promise suit to disclose previous syphilis to plaintiff when he 
proposed, since he believed he was cured though in fact he was not. 
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stigma may be attached to their performance. On the other 
hand, rigid enforcement of the bargain and of the parties' expec-
tations would require that a released patient or previously dis-
turbed person fully disclose any known facts which might later 
affect his performance. The courts have yet to come to grips with 
the disclosure problem in mental illness cases. Somewhere a 
balance must be struck between the foregoing divergent policies. 
It would seem unreasonable to require the promisor to disclose 
an isolated nervous breakdown, just as it would seem unreasonable 
to require disclosure of minor physical ailments such as strep-
throat. Before imposing a duty of disclosure, a pattern of disability 
(mental or physical) might reasonably be required. Of course, the 
promisee could make it clear that he bargains for a promisor who 
is free of any mental or physical defects by specifically questioning 
him. This, apparently, is the modern trend in employment ques-
tionnaires; the employer wants the opportunity to reject an appli-
cant on the basis of past medical history, even though he may 
not use this opportunity. 
Beyond the agreement stage, difficulties of proof rather than 
considerations of policy become paramount. Trying to re-
construct the earlier foreseeability of a present mental illness 
is thorny. Here, more than in any other phase of supervening 
mental illness, the expert plays a critical role.428 The expert alone 
can advance qualified opinions as to the probabilities of recurrence 
in any particular kind of mental illness. Then the jury can deter-
mine the extent to which the afflicted party had, or ought to have, 
foreseen these probabilities. Properly guided by the court, the 
jury could then decide whether a duty of disclosure existed in 
the particular case. When the issue arises the court should ap-
praise the peculiar facts involved, including: (1) the nature of the 
mental illness (organic, functional, progressive, recurrent); (2) 
the extent of arms' length bargaining; (3) the type of work 
(whether the sort that would reasonably be expected to put strain 
on the mind); and (4) surrounding facts such as the actual length 
of time the promisor was able to perform effectively before in-
curring the disabling mental illness. 
428 E.g., even predicting subsequent psychiatric disorder from direct traumatic 
injury to the brain is extremely difficult; Siegal, "Cerebral Traumata-Concept and 
Valuation of Psychophysiologic Aftermaths," 14 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 163-171 
(1953). Even in syphilitic brain infections (paresis) psychotic reactions are not universal; 
Hurr AND GmBY, PATIERNS OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 313 (1957). 
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(d) Effects and results. Loose and imprecise as the foregoing 
principles may be, in the context of particular litigation they may 
assume various definable limits. Who is suing whom, and for 
what type of recovery, may influence judicial analysis. For in-
stance, though illness readily relieves the stricken promisor from 
liability for breach of contract, it should hardly assist him to 
recover his lost expectations.429 The legal remedies and effects 
of mental illness of the promisor should be contrasted with similar 
issues involving promisee's mental illness, which are treated in a 
later subdivision. 
In cases where the promisee is suing, the foregoing discussion 
makes it clear that he has no right to damages against the truly 
disabled promisor of a personal contract. Where an advance pay-
ment was made, however, the promisee should be allowed to obtain 
restitution, less the value of any part performance he has 
received.430 
On the other hand, when the promisor sues, conflicting policies 
come into play. When he becomes mentally disabled through no 
fault of his own, and cannot fulfill the exact specifications of the 
personal contract, the promisor should certainly escape total 
forfeiture of all past efforts if the efforts have benefited the other 
party.431 Conversely, courts have never been anxious to enforce 
a contract other than the one the parties actually executed. To 
treat any disability as "minor," thus depriving the promisee of a 
chance to elect discharge and seek performance elsewhere, neces-
sarily enforces a judicially-altered contract against him. Recon-
ciliation of these conflicting policies underlies almost all decisions 
in mental illness cases. 
The mentally ill promisor may sue on the contract or in 
quantum meruit for services rendered. When he sues on the con-
tract, he runs the risk of setting up an all-or-nothing situation. 
Should he be found to have been mentally disabled, the court 
in its reluctance to "rewrite" the contract will not excuse full 
429 Davidson v. Gaskill, 32 Okla. 40, 121 P. 649 (1912): Patrick v. Putnam, 27 Vt. 759 
(1855); Jeter v. Penn, 28 La. Ann. 230 (1876): all of which involved a plaintiff who sought 
contract recovery but obtained only quantum meruit when disability made full perform-
ance impossible. 
430 Hudson v. Hudson, 87 Ga. 678, 13 S.E. 583 (1891) (supervening insanity prevented 
performance). But see Williams v. Butler, 58 Ind. App. 47 (1914) (money merely paid as 
inducement to take job, not recoverable). 
4312 CONTRACTS R.EsrATEMENT §468, comment a, illus. 2 (1932). See cases collected 
in note 429 supra. 
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performance and also compensate him for it.432 In a strict plead-
ing jurisdiction, pleadings based on contract damages may then 
result in nonsuit.433 If the trier of fact finds that the promisor 
was not mentally disabled, then either (1) he was willing and able 
to perform but promisee wrongfully rejected further performance, 
in which case promisor recovers all (damages on the contract),434 
or (2) promisor himself was at fault (having used mental illness as 
an alibi for neglect or laziness) and recovers nothing.435 
When the mentally ill promisor makes a quantum meruit 
claim, he will sometimes find the courts measuring recovery with 
reference to the contract terms.436 It might be questioned whether 
pro rata measurement of the value of services is realistic. When 
the promisor's illness stems from organic brain disorder which has 
gradually reduced the quality of his performance until the day 
the contract is discharged, it can be argued that the promisee who 
continues to accept performance should be bound by the agreed 
terms right up to the time he finally notifies the promisor that the 
contract is terminated.437 But an objective appraisal of the benefit 
conferred upon promisee would consider the effects of progressive 
debilitation. In any event, the contract price ( or its pro rata por-
tion) is generally invoked as a limit on the quantum meruit re-
covery.438 Some authority would let the disappointed promisee 
deduct from the promisor's compensation the damages sustained 
432 See note 429 supra. 
433 See Johnston v. Board of Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 12 N.M. 237 at 
244-245, 78 P. 43 (1904) (dictum). 
484 Spindel v. Cooper, 46 Misc. 569, 92 N.Y.S. 822 (1905); Lambert v. Laing & Thomp-
son Iron Works, 124 Ore. 197, 264 P. 362 (1928). The contract language may specially 
reject deductions for time lost for sickness. Red Cross Mfg. Co. v. Stroop, 79 Ind. App. 
532, 135 N.E. 351 (1922). 
435 West Chicago Park Commissioners v. Carmody, 139 Ill. App. 635 (1908) (feigned 
illness, $500 deposit on construction contract forfeited). See Lyon v. Pollard, 20 Wall. 
(87 U.S.) 403 (1874), and Hetkowski v. Dickson City Borough School District, 141 Pa. 
Super. 526, 15 A. (2d) 470 (1940); no recovery in cases where disability was real but 
resulted from immoral and willful acts. 
436 E.g., Fenton v. Clark, 11 Vt. 557 (1839). Rigid pro rata measurement was applied 
in Jeter v. Penn, 28 La. Ann. 230, 26 Am. Rep. 98 (1876), dividing the number of days 
in the year by the number of days worked. 
437 See Rubin v. International Film Co., 122 Misc. 413, 204 N.Y.S. 81 (1924) (dictum); 
Fahey v. Kennedy, 230 App. Div. 156,243 N.Y.S. 396 (1930). See 21 A.L.R. (2d) 1241 (1952). 
438 See Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79 (1853); Johnston v. Board of Commissioners of 
Bernalillo County, 12 N.M. 237, 78 P. 43 (1904) (dictum). If only the full performance 
would have had any value, quantum meruit recovery could conceivably be denied. See 
American Publishing House v. Wilson, 63 Ill. App. 413 (1896); Dorsey v. Clarke, 223 
Ky. 619, 4 S.W. (2d) 748 (1928) (dictum). 
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by termination of the contract.439 Such a deduction is unusual in 
cases of impossibility, and it can be strongly contended that the 
approach is inconsistent with the notion that the promisor's dis-
ability is excused for the very reason that he is blameless. 
2. Mental Illness of the Promisee. Mental illness of the prom-
isee as it relates to performance may cause either the promisee or 
the promisor to desire discharge of the contract obligation. The 
promisor wants discharge in those situations where promisee's 
supervening mental illness has made performance more difficult. 
This problem arises when aged grandparents agree to and do con-
vey property to their grandchildren in return for a promise to 
support the grandparents for the rest of their lives. It would be 
unfair to let the promisors keep the property without perform-
ance, even if the promisees later sustain mental illness which 
makes performance much more difficult than the promisors had 
hoped. It is generally held that the promisors in such arrangements 
undertook the risk of the promisees' disabilities, and that mere 
increased difficulty is not the equivalent of impossibility.440 Should 
there be any distinction drawn between types of mental illness, 
a continuing obligation to perform would be most logically im-
posed in cases involving reasonably anticipated illnesses such as 
senile psychosis,441 and less often imposed in the case of sudden 
disorder such as traumatic epilepsy.442 
In other instances the promisee himself may want discharge. 
Since he cannot argue impossibility because the promisor stands 
ready to perform, another rationale must be found. If the prom-
isee's mental illness has made the promisor's performance com-
pletely useless, the promisee might argue frustration of purpose.443 
439 See Davidson v. Gaskill, 32 Okla. 40, 121 P. 649 (1912) (dictum). Compare Patrick 
v. Putnam, 27 Vt. 759 (1855) (damages measured by loss incurred in hiring substitute). 
Cf. Stolle v. Stuart, 21 S.D. 643, 114 N.W. 1007 (1908). 
440 Ptacek v. Pisa, 231 Ill. 522, 83 N.E. 221 (1907). Good faith may be a factor. Com-
pare Rexford v. Scholfield, 101 Mich. 480, 59 N.W. 837 (1894), with Penas v. Cherveny, 
135 Minn. 427, 161 N.W. 150 (1917). Note that in all cases the promisees had fully 
performed. 
441 NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 287-296 (1958); Rothschild, 
"Senile Psychoses and Psychoses with Cerebral Arteriosclerosis," Kaplan ed., MENTAL 
DISORDERS IN LATER LIFE, 2d ed., 289, 294-307 (1956). 
442NOYES, -MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 3d ed.,211 (1948). See JELLIFFE AND WHITE, 
DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SY5rEM 667-681 (1915). 
443 l CONTRACTS REsrATEMENT §288 (1932); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1353 (1951). See 
dissenting opinion of Thacher, J., in Mohrmann v. Koh, 291 N.Y. 181 at 191-197, 51 
N.E. (2d) 921 (1943), to the effect that husband's duty to pay monthly allowances to 
wife under separation agreement, contingent on wife's future chastity and on his own 
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The frustration rationale would require a showing that promisee's 
continued mental ability was essential to the ultimate purpose of 
the contract, and that both parties recognized this purpose, as 
where promisee orders promisor to make ceramic figurines which 
both parties understand have value to promisee only as objects 
which promisee can artistically decorate for sale. 
The frustration rationale has apparently not yet been advanced 
in the supervening mental illness situation. However, frustration 
may be implicit in personal contract cases where courts have talked 
in terms of impossibility,444 mutuality,445 or an implied condition 
precedent of continued supervision and control by the promisee.446 
It was pointed out above that true impossibility does not exist. 
Mutuality, which would discharge the mentally ill promisee in 
the personal service contract merely because the promisor could 
have been relieved because of mental illness, is neither well sup-
ported nor logically convincing.447 As for the notion of an implied 
condition precedent of promisee's continued health and sanity, it 
might be better understood as frustration of a mutually under-
stood purpose that the promisee be able to oversee and enjoy the 
fruits of the performance. If frustration were accepted as the doc-
trine relieving promisees of subsequently useless contracts, it 
might not be as difficult to find elements of personal supervision 
or oversight as conditions precedent.448 Until now, cases where a 
promisor has been able to enforce obligations against a mentally 
ill promisee have involved full performance by the former, with 
nothing left save payment of compensation.449 Perhaps if those 
voluntary election to procure a divorce, should be terminated when husband becomes 
insane, thereby frustrating the purpose of the contract which was his continuing ability 
to obtain a divorce. Frustration is on the whole not yet widely used by the courts. 
Anderson, "Frustration of a Contract-A Rejected Doctrine," 3 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1953); 
Smit, "Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation," 58 CoL. L. 
REv. 287 at 307-315 (1958). 
444 See Harrison v. Conlan, 92 Mass. 85 (1865) (death). 
445 O'Bryon's Estate, 2 Fay. L.F. 16, 87 P.L.J. 121, 9 Som. 191 (1939) (no recovery by 
promisor against mentally ill promisee though promisor rendered performance after 
disability arose). See Babcock v. Goodroch, 3 How. Pr. (n.s.) 52 (1879) (death); Lacey v. 
Getman, 119 N.Y. 109 at 116, 23 N.E. 452 (1890) (death); Homan v. Redick, 97 Neb. 299, 
149 N.W. 782 (1914). 
446 Graves v. Cohen, 46 TL.R. 121 (1929). See Lacey v. Getman, 119 N.Y. 109, 23 
N.E. 452 (1890). 
447 See O'Bryon's Estate, 2 Fay. L.F. 16, 87 P.L.J. 121, 9 Som. 191 (1939). Note that 
Homan v. Redick, 97 Neb. 299, 149 N.W. 782 (1914), relied on by O'Bryon's Estate, is 
weak authority for the mutuality argument. 
448 E.g., Graves v. Cohen, 46 T L.R. 121 (1929) (horse-owner and jockey). 
449 Sands v. Potter, 165 Ill. 397, 46 N.E. 282 (1896) (promisee adjudged insane after 
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same contracts had still been at the executory stage, the courts 
could have found promisee's supervision or oversight to be im-
portant and could have denied recovery. But analogy from cases 
involving the promisee's death indicates that even in executory 
situations the promisee's duty can be so clearly delegable and 
non-personal that subsequent mental illness will not discharge 
liability.450 A careful attorney for a promisee in such predicaments 
will therefore always try to emphasize whatever elements in the 
contract suggest desirability of personal oversight by his client. 
Another perplexing difficulty that arises in instances of prom-
isee's mental disability is to determine at what point the perform-
ing party will be legally obliged to take notice of the disability 
and regard the contract as discharged. A guardian appointed for 
the promisee presumably could notify the promisor of the con-
tract's cancellation. But the ill promisee who is not yet adjudged 
incompetent may be incapable of giving notice himself. The 
promisor, in an action to recover for his performance, may well 
be legally charged with notice of the time when the contract is 
terminated, so that any performance he had rendered subsequent 
to that time will not be covered by the contract terms.451 
B. The Unilateral Contract 
I. Generally. Although none of the mental illness cases appears 
to fall within a simple unilateral contract analysis, a conceivable 
situation would include the following elements: an offer looking 
toward acceptance by performance of specified acts; part perform-
ance by the offeree, binding the offeror to a conditional contract;452 
then completion by the offeree of all but a trivial part of the de-
sired performance; and finally, supervening mental illness, thwart-
ing perfect performance. Thus assume A offers $1000 to B for a 
complete compilation of slander cases within a given time. B be-
gins his research and binds A. After completing 50 out of 51 
promisor's full performance). See Kelley v. Thompson Land Co., 112 W. Va. 454, 64 S.E. 
667 (1932) (dictum cites Williston approvingly). 
450 Majority holds that in the event of death of the promisee, the promisor can 
finish performance. 6 W1LL1sroN, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §1941, n. 5 (1938). See Dumont v. 
Heighton, 14 Ariz. 25, 123 P. 306 (1912). 
451 Cf. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Jack.son, 12 Tenn. App. 305 at 309 (1930); Kowalski 
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 266 Mass. 255, 165 N.E. 476 (1929); Rollinger v. Dairyland Creamery 
Co., 66 S.D. 592, 287 N.W. 333 (1939). The promisor might also argue that the contract 
involves a power coupled with an interest which is not terminated by the insanity of the 
promisee. See Levy v. Wilmes, 239 Ill. App. 229 (1926). 
452 1 CONTRACTS RilsrA'IEMENT §45 (1932). 
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jurisdictions, B is stricken with traumatic illness. General con-
tract principles would seem to indicate that B may recover on the 
contract terms, less an offset for the uncompleted portion.453 On 
the other hand, it might be argued that since the end product is 
the important thing in unilateral contracts, performance would 
generally have to be considered as delegable and therefore not 
excusable for subjective impossibility. Here the rejoinder could 
be that if A makes his offer directly to B it must be because B has 
certain talents, so that destruction of those talents ends hope of 
full performance. Consequently, the use of impossibility concepts 
in unilateral contract situations may be guided by whether the 
offer is made to a specified person or just made known generally. 
But as a practical matter (possibly explaining the absence of 
pertinent cases), would not the courts reach for a bilateral inter-
pretation in any instance where the offer is directed at an iden-
tifiable offeree?454 
Even if recovery on the contract is not obtainable, the dis-
abled offeree in a unilateral contract should obtain quasi-contract 
recovery for any benefits he may already have conferred upon the 
offeror.455 Certainly, if in doubt whether he has "substantially" 
performed, the offeree in a strict pleading jurisdiction should 
make his claim in quasi-contract. 
2. The Insurance Policy Contract. Although conventional 
unilateral contracts must be analyzed by conjecture rather than 
on the basis of case law, one type of unilateral arrangement has 
provided a substantial amount of relevant legal precedent: the 
insurance policy contract. The insurance policy typically has a 
unique inception; here the offeror (the insured) offers an act in 
return for a promise. The act is his payment of the first premium, 
and the promise received is the insurer's promise to pay the con-
tract sum upon the occurrence of certain stipulated events.456 By 
accepting the premium, the insurer becomes bound as the prom-
isor of a unilateral contract.457 The insured promisee can with-
453 I CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §§301(b), 275-276 (1932); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1362 
(1951); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §808 (1936). 
454 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §635 (1951); I CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §31 (1932). 
455 2 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §468, comment a, illus. 2 (1932); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 
§1371 (1951); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1977 (1938). 
456 PATTERSON, EssENTIAIS OF INSURANCE LAW, 2d ed., 72 (1957); 5 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS, rev. ed., §1330 (1937). 
457 VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, 3d ed., Anderson ed., §12 (1951); 
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1330 (1937). 
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draw at any time although the insurer cannot, and the promisee 
may even control the occurrence of conditions on which the in-
surer's liability hinges.458 Through an evaluation of the mat-
eriality of these conditions, courts have distinguished between 
those that are excused by impossibility (such as mental illness) and 
those that are not.459 Thus, timely payment of premiums has never 
been excused (since vital to promisee's performance),460 prompt 
notice and proofs of loss or disability have sometimes been excused 
(as less material),461 and bringing suit within a specified time has 
been most often excused.462 
Because the strict rule against excusing non-payment of pre-
miums could cause forfeiture of entire policies to those whose 
earning powers had been impaired by physical or mental dis-
ability, the insurance companies introduced "disability clauses" 
which initially sought to provide both monetary benefits and 
waiver of premiums during the period of disability of the in-
sured.463 Although payment of benefits clauses are rarely included 
in policies today, premium-waiver clauses are still commonly 
found. Operation of the waiver is made dependent on the furnish-
ing of timely notice and proof of the insured's disability to the 
458 KRUEGER AND WAGGONER, THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CoNTRAcr 17-19 (1953); 
3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §633 (1951). 
459VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, 3d ed., Anderson ed., §27 (1951); 
6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1362 (1951); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §808 (1937); I CON-
TRACTS REsTATEMENT §301, comment a, illus. 4 (1932). See generally Corbin, "Supervening 
Impossibility of Performing Conditions Precedent," 22 CoL. L. REv. 421 (1922); Patterson, 
"Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions in Insurance Policies," 22 CoL. L. 
REv. 613 (1922). 
460 VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE, 3d ed., Anderson ed., §54 (1951); 
15 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRAcrICE §8232 (1944); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1364 
(1951); 3 WILLISroN, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §808, n. 5 (1937). See 15 A.L.R. 318 (1921). 
461 VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE, 3d ed., Anderson ed., §27, p. 152, and 
cases in n. 6 (1951); 3 A~PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§1416, 1417 (1944); 6 
CORBIN, CONTRAcrs §1362 (1951); 3 WILLISroN, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §808, n. 10 (1937). 
See 142 A.L.R. 852 (1943). 
46220 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrICE §11632 (1947); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 
§1366 (1951); 3 Wn.usroN, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §809, n. 4 (1937). Only two cases involving 
supervening mental illness were found, in both of which timely suit was excused: Order 
of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Etchen, 27 Ohio App. 422, 16 N.E. 636 
(1928); Powell v. Liberty Industrial Life Ins. Co., (La. 1941) I S. (2d) 834, annulled on 
other grounds, 197 La. 894, 2 S. (2d) 638 (1941). 
463 HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE, 4th ed., 362 (1950). Clauses providing payment of dis-
ability benefits proved economically disastrous in the 1930's because of miscalculated costs 
and broad judicial interpretations of the disability covered. KRUEGER AND WAGGONER, THE 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CoNTRAcr 268-272 (1953). See broad judicial criteria in 1 APPLEMAN, 
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§641-645 (1944). 
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insurer. Most courts will now excuse the conditions of notice on 
grounds of impossibility.464 
Mental illness thus raises two distinct problems in the excuse 
of insurance policy conditions. First, what test should determine 
when an insured has become "permanently and totally disabled" 
within the meaning of the insurance policy language? Second, 
what test should determine as a matter of law and not language, 
whether mental illness will excuse the required notice and proofs 
of the disability mentioned? 
(a) Disability within the contract language. Since the thrust 
of disability benefit and premium waiver clauses is relief of the 
burden imposed by decreased earning power, judicial tests have 
generally been phrased in terms of inability, on the basis of past 
training and experience, to perform a gainful occupation. Com-
plete mental collapse has not been necessary.465 If the insured has 
been adjudged incompetent and hospitalized or institutionalized, 
dispute over applicability of a disability clause would seem un-
likely. But when the insured can engage in some normal activity 
or has periods of buoyancy and depression, or when a functional 
disorder is still in its progressive stages, dispute over his disability 
is probable. The courts do not require continuous mental dis-
order.466 They may be reluctant to recognize as a qualifying dis-
464 Braunfeld, "Impossibility of Notice ,by the Disabled: A Problem in the Law of 
Contracts," 1950 INs. L.J. 555, summarizes the development of the doctrine excusing 
notice and proofs. On the split of authority, see 3 .APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRAC-
TICE §1365 (1944) (notice and proof of loss); 15 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 
§8317 (1944) (notice and proof of disability); VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSUR-
ANCE, 3d ed., Anderson ed., §54 (1951). See 142 A.L.R. 852 (1943). The majority position 
is endorsed by 1 CoNT¥CTS R.EsTATEMENT §301, comment a, illus. 4 (1932). Three reasons 
justifying excuse of conditions of notice and proof have been advanced: (1) giving notice 
is merely a condition subsequent, therefore excusable as are all conditions subsequent 
[Pfeiffer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783, 297 S.W. 847 (1927)]; (2) giving 
notice is not a material part of the consideration [Schlintz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 
226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336 (1938)]; (3) forfeitures should be avoided [Rhyne v. Jefferson 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 196 N.C. 717, 147 S.E. 6 (1929)]. 
465 See Rosenthal v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 118 N.J. Eq. 182, 178 A. 
202 (1935). Total disability does not mean complete helplessness, New York Life Ins. Co. 
v. Razzook, 178 Okla. 57, 61 P. (2d) 686 (1936), nor does "permanent" mean that the 
insured will never recover, <Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, (8th Cir. 1928) 
29 F. (2d) 977. Thus ,the insured may ,be deemed permanently and totally disabled even 
though able to practice law sporadically, !Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Holt, 186 Ark. 
672, 55 S.W. (2d) 788 (1932), or act as night watchman occasionally, Illinois Bankers' 
Life Assur. Co. v. Lane, 189 Ark. 261, 71 S.W. (2d) 189 (1934). For the more lenient test 
laid down in war risk insurance, see Dean v. United States, (W.D. Okla. 1957) 150 F_-
Supp. 541 (mental "normalcy" rather than earning-power). 
466 E.g., Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Holt, 186 Ark. 672, 55 S.W. (2d) 788 (1932); 
Atlantic Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Worley, 161 Va. 951, 172 S.E. 168 (1934). But see Gowe 
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ability a disease such as alcoholism, despite the fact that it may 
medically be recognized as an uncontrollable mental illness.467 
Yet once the insured has adequately shown his permanent and 
total disability, absent contrary language in the policy, the burden 
of showing later improvement and recovery shifts to the insurer.468 
(b) Disability to excuse notice and proof. A different standard 
must apply to a determination of what mental illness can excuse 
timely notice and proof (whether of disability or of loss). Two 
sound reasons support this difference. First, although disability 
that can waive premiums is contemplated and provided against 
at the time of contracting, theoretically neither party ever con-
sidered that the insured might incur a mental disability so severe 
that notification might be prevented. 469 Second, the fact that no 
contract language provides for the excuse means that a judicially-
created standard will be imposed, which must be a standard that 
recognizes the fact that one can be unable to earn a living and yet 
be able to give notice.470 
Courts recognize the differences, both conceptual and practi-
cal, between the foregoing degrees of mental illness.471 As one 
court notes, "insanity which would constitute permanent and 
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 139 Neb. I, 296 N.W. 163 (1941), where insured suffering 
from depressive psychosis with paranoid features was able to lease property, collect rents, 
and attend to other business matters. 
467 Compare Gaines v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 306 Mich. 192, 10 N.W. (2d) 
823 (1943), with New England Life Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 174 Md. 596, 199 A. 822 (1938). 
Psychiatry recognizes alcoholism as an emotional and physical illness: NOYES AND KoLB, 
MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th ed., 191-212 (1958); Ewalt, "Mental Health Problems 
Affecting Social Relations," 286 ANN. AM. ACAD. 74, 77-79 (1953). Alcoholism may be 
mistaken for other underlying mental illnesses, JELLIFFE AND WHITE, DISEASES OF THE 
NERVOUS SYSTEM 719-727 (1915). See generally Selzer, "Alcoholism and the Law," 56 MICH. 
L. REv. 237 (1957). 
468 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Johnson's Administrator, 257 Ky. 306, 77 S.W. (2d) 
943 (1934). 
469 Braunfeld, "Impossibility of Notice by •the Disabled: A Problem of the Law of 
Contracts," 1950 INS. L.J. 555 at 565. Cf. Bean v. Philadelphia Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
88 N.H. 415, 190 A. 131 (1937), excusing notice of loss. 
470 E.g., in paranoid-schizophrenia, one may be unable to pursue a gainful occupation, 
yet •be able to give notice. Hurr AND GIBBY, PATTERNS OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 274 (1957). 
See also Coon, "Psychiatry for the Lawyer: The Principal Psychoses," 31 CORN. L.Q. 327 
at 360 (1946) (organic brain disease); NOYES AND KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, 5th 
ed., 268-287 (1958) (convulsive disorders), 191-212 (alcoholism). But one may appear alert 
and yet be mentally disturbed. Rothschild, "Senile Psychoses and Psychoses with Cerebral 
Arteriosclerosis,'' Kaplan ed., MENTAL DISORDERS IN LATER LIFE, 2d ed., 300-301 (1956) 
(presbyophrenic senile psychotic); JELLIFFE AND WHITE, DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 
635-642 (1915) (manic-depressive). 
471 E.g., American United Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 201 Ark. 634 at 639, 642, 146 S.W. 
(2d) 907 (1941). 
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total disability within the meaning of the policy would not neces-
sarily render an insured incapable of complying with the terms of 
the policy relative to furnishing due proof of disability."472 The 
standard for excusing notice should be more stringent than that 
allowing waiver of premiums.473 Some courts favor a vague test, 
asking whether the insured was "mentally incapable of exercising 
such normal, reasoned judgment as was essential to the conduct 
of business transactions. "474 Others seek more explicit criteria. 
They might excuse the condition of notice under any one of 
three circumstances: (I) insured is mentally incapable of know-
ing he had the policy; (2) insured is mentally incapable of know-
ing that he is mentally ill (and entitled to the waiver); (3) in-
sured is incapable of knowing that he is required to furnish proof 
of his disability.475 
Yet the definitiveness of the legal test does not truly measure 
its medical validity. In mental illness, concise or rigid patterns 
are unworkable. Each mentally ill person presents a peculiar prob-
lem. Some persons committed to asylums are still able to carry 
on contractual affairs with reasonable awareness of the legal im-
plications. 476 Conversely, some who are apparently normal in 
everyday affairs may actually have a mental illness.477 The struggle 
is made case by case. Wide latitude is accorded the opinions of 
medical experts who have attended the insured, and their opinions 
can overcome other evidence that might disprove mental dis-
472 McGill v. Travelers Ins. Co., (8th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 709 at 713, reh. den. 134 
F. (2d) 612 (1943). 
473 See Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Swann, 160 Va. 125, 168 S.E. 423 (1933), where court 
held that the standard of reasonableness could apply to ability to earn a living but not 
to ability to give notice. 
474 Schlintz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 226 Wis. 255 at 262, 276 N.W. 336 (1937). 
T:he Oklahoma court simply asks if the insured was "incapable of furnishing proof," 
Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Zammer, 178 Okla. 207, 62 P. (2d) 63 (1936). 
475 The three alternative tests restated here were enunciated in Magill v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., (8th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 709, reh. den. 134 F. (2d) 612 (1943). In Pfeiffer v. 
Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783 at 798, 297 S.W. 847 (1927), the court said the 
insured must have been "able to carry on the ordinary affairs of life, and this meant 
that his mind must be capable of sustained effort so that he would comprehend such 
affairs as needed his attention, and not merely that he might talk with seeming intel-
ligence upon a subject brought directly to :his attention by some one.'' Compare the early 
test of Insurance Companies v. Boykin, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 433 (1870), which asks only 
if the insured can make "an intelligent statement." 
476 See notes 58, 89, 179, and 180 supra. 
477 Compare authorities cited in last part of note 470 supra. Certain manic states 
can be mistaken for mere buoyant confidence. JELLIFFE AND WHITE, DISEASES OF THE 
NERVOUS SYSTEM 634-637 (1915). 
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ability.478 Opinions of laymen based on contemporaneous observa-
tion are also admissible to help the jury reconstruct the insured's 
mental condition at an earlier time.479 
Courts agree that no single or isolated instances of normal 
behavior should overcome evidence of general inability to give 
notice. Thus, the insured cannot be found mentally capable of 
giving notice merely because he endorsed some checks,480 wrote 
a letter concerning the premium,481 or the surrender value of his 
policy,482 inquired about his discharge in a letter,483 taught sten-
ography at intervals,484 or was released from an institution on 
parole.485 Nor should it matter whether the insured's illness was 
organic (and thus more easily diagnosed) or functional.486 The 
overriding practical consideration in notice-excuse cases is the 
difficulty of reconstructing an earlier mental state. It is highly 
difficult to ascertain this earlier state merely on the basis of present 
medical observation.487 Opinions and reports of laymen who ob-
served the mentally ill person at the prior time are therefore 
valuable and necessary.488 Occasionally, a previous course of con-
duct may suggest that deviation from that conduct resulted from 
supervening mental illness, as where the insured had not missed 
payment of premiums for fifteen years.489 But as a rule courts will 
avoid any fixed method of determining mental illness and attempt 
to apply the particular facts of each situation to the peculiar ill-
ness at hand. 
478See Schlintz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336 (1937). 
A general practitioner rendered an expert opinion based on contemporaneous observation 
of ,the insured at time of collapse in State Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 
58 S.W. (2d) 189. Compare evidentiary rules in part III-B of this study. 
479 Hilmer v. Western Travelers Accident Assn., 86 Neb. 285, 125 N.W. 535 (1910); 
Jefferson v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 199 N.C. 443, 154 S.E. 752 (1930). 
480 Bennett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 386, 145 P. (2d) 815 (1944). 
481 Whetstone v. New York Life Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 150, 188 S.E. 793 (1935). 
482 Schlintz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336 (1937). 
483 Bean v. Philadelphia Fire &: Marine Ins. Co., 88 N.H. 415, 190 A. 131 (1937). 
484American United Life Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 201 Ark. 634, 146 S.W. (2d) 907 (1941). 
485 Hickman v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 186 La. 997, 173 S. 742 (1937). 
486See Bean v. Philadelphia Fire &: Marine Ins. Co., 88 N.H. 415, 190 A. 131 (1937). 
487 See Part III-B, supra. ,Mere retroactive diagnosis not enough to show mental 
illness equal to permanent and total disability 8 years before, Galloway v. United States, 
319 U.S. 372 (1942). But such later diagnosis has some relevance, Halliday v. United States, 
315 U.S. 94 (1942). Cf. note 199, supra. 
488 Indeed the facts concerning a mentally ill person's previous experience and 
habits are important parts of diagnosis. See generally, NOYES, MODERN CLINICAL PSY-
CHIATRY, 3d ed., 100-122 (1948). 
489 See Hickman v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 186 La. 997, 173 S. 742 (1937). 
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C. Statutory Developments 
Twenty-two jurisdictions have enacted statutory prov151ons 
concerning incomplete contracts in which one party incurs super-
vening mental illness.490 The statutes have had only limited ob-
jectives, and have not tried to clarify or modify any of the prob-
lems raised in the foregoing discussion, although they have formal-
ized procedures. Thirteen of the statutes relate only to real estate 
contracts,491 of which only one (Iowa) deals with both purchase 
and sale by the mentally ill person. The primary purpose of such 
statutes is to provide for completion of the conveyance. Nine 
other jurisdictions have statutes covering contracts involving per-
sonal as well as real property,492 but only five of these cover both 
purchase and sale.493 
VI. MENTAL ILLNESS OCCURRING AFTER AGREEMENT: 
THE REMAINDER 
Even if mental illness is absent or insignificant at the agree-
ment stage, and even if supervening mental illness does not affect 
performance, mental illness occurring after agreement may affect 
other aspects of the contractual relationship. These remaining 
problems of supervening mental illness and contract law will be 
explored in this part. 
A. Formalities of the Contract: Statute of Frauds 
When an individual has contractual capacity at the time he 
490 Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947; Supp. 1957) §57-628; California: Cal. Code Ann. 
(Deering, 1953) §1537; Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §152-13-33; Florida: Fla. 
Stat. (1957) §745.16; Hawaii: Hawaii Rev. Laws (1955) §338-12; Idaho: Idaho Code (1948) 
§15-1837; Illinois: Ill. iR.ev. Stat. (1957) c. 3, §275, and c. 29, §2 (deeds); Indiana: Ind. 
Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953) §8-142; Iowa: Iowa Code (1958) §668.13; Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. 
(1954) c. 158, §18; Maryland: Md. Ann. Code (1957) art. 16, §112; Massachusetts: Mass. 
Laws Ann. (1955) c. 204, §1; Michigan: 'Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§707.19, 709.49; Min-
nesota: Minn. Stat. (1957) §525.69; Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §38-701; New 
Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. (1953) §3A:22-3; Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §2111.19; 
Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §126.340; Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954; Supp. 
1958) tit. 50, §3512; South Dakota: S.D. Code (1939; Supp. 1952) §35-2021; Washington: 
Wash. Rev. Code §11.92.130; Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. (1957) §§296.02 to 296.05. 
491 California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, •Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington. 
492Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin. 
493 Maryland's statute applies only to purchases by the incompetent or insane party; 
those of Florida, Idaho and Indiana apply only to a sale or conveyance. Arkansas, lliinois, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have the broadest statutes, generally providing 
for judicial enforcement of "valid," "legally subsisting," or "specifically enforceable" 
contracts. For the status of the law in the absence of special statutes, see generally 2 
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., Symons, §368 (1941); 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE, 5th ed., Symons, §§1402, 1405(b) (1941). 
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makes an oral agreement which falls within the statute of frauds, 
but later becomes mentally ill to the point of incapacity prior to 
the execution of a written memorandum which would validate 
the oral agreement, or prior to part or full performance of the 
obligations which would remove the contract from the statute, 
the basic question presented is what constitutes the "contract." 
Is it (I) the oral agreement, or (2) the subsequent conduct? If the 
contract is considered to be (I) the oral agreement, with the sub-
sequent conduct being regarded merely as a condition precedent 
to enforcement, then on the one hand it can be argued that the 
mentally ill person should be held to the contract because he 
entered into it at a time when he needed no protection. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that the subsequent conduct is similar 
to ratification or affirmance, and a certain capacity should be re-
quired for it to be effective.494 If (2), the subsequent conduct, is 
said to constitute the contract, however, then the party did not 
have capacity to contract at that time and consequently has a 
power of avoidance as discussed in Parts II, III, and IV. 
Applicability of these alternative viewpoints turns on normal 
contract law. The approach used may be influenced by the stat-
utory language of the statutes of frauds, which may read either 
that an unwritten contract is "void" or "invalid," or that "no 
action shall be brought" on it.495 In the situation of a subsequent 
memorandum, the courts seem to agree that whether the statute 
says "void" or merely "no action," the subsequent memorandum 
relates back to validate the prior oral agreement.496 Consequently 
the first two arguments apply. Likewise, where an equity court 
gives relief to a part-performing vendee in a land contract,497 the 
courts also indicate that it is the oral contract being enforced, 498 
and the first two arguments would be applicable. 
At law, courts generally hold that full performance of an oral 
contract also validates the oral contract itself, and this would 
494 See Part IV-E, supra. 
495 See statutory list in 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §284 (1950). 
496 See, e.g., Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., 32 Wyo. 313, 232 P. 511 (1925); Sadler Machinery 
Co. v. Ohio Nat. Inc., (6th Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 887, applying the Ohio statute; 2 Wu.-
LISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §590 (1936). 
497 Pound, "The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, Equity,'' 33 HAR.v. L. REv. 929 at 
936 (1920); Kepner, "Part Performance in Relation to Parol Contract for the Sale of 
Lands," 35 MINN. L. REv. 1, 431 at 432 (1950-1951). What constitutes part or full per-
formance of the contract falls outside the scope of ,this study. 
4982 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §421 (1950); Pound, "The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, 
Equity,'' 33 HARV. L. REv. 929 at 936 (1920). 
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certainly seem to be the case where the statute read "no action 
shall be brought."499 Thus again the first two arguments apply. 
But in an old case in which the statute made an oral contract 
"void," the plaintiff (in a trover action seeking the value of goods 
delivered under the oral contract) was competent at the time of 
the oral contract but subsequently became incompetent prior 
to and during the period of performance.500 It was held that the 
"agreement" arose from the full performance conduct rather than 
the prior oral contract, and thus the contract was voidable for 
lack of capacity. This may have been due to a recognition of the 
policy which protects mental incompetents from their later valid-
ating actions although they had entered into an oral agreement 
while competent. 
B. Assignment 
An assignment of contractual rights requires contractual ca-
pacity by the assignor, and this capacity is probably measured by 
the same test as that required for the original contract.501 While 
this is a simple proposition, an additional problem of assignment 
could arise under the following circumstances. A and B contract 
at a time when B has sufficient contractual capacity. Subsequently 
B becomes mentally ill and then assigns his interest in the contract 
to C. If B lacks the ability to understand this transaction, he may 
set the assignment aside. If C desires to enforce a claim against A, 
however, the question is whether A may raise the defense of B's 
contractual incapacity. Analogizing from the law of negotiable 
instruments, it might be said that A may use B's defense if B has 
given C a "void" title ( e.g., B being under an active guardianship 
at the time of the assignment),502 but cannot if B has given C a 
voidable title.503 One possible solution in the latter situation would 
be to have A implead B, to prevent double liability, and if B elects 
499 I CoNTRACfS RllsTATEMENT §219 (1932); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §528 
(1936). 
500 Matthiessen & Weichers Refining Co. v. McMahon's Administrator, 38 N.JL. 536 
(1876). 
501See, e.g., Wolcott v. Connecticut General Life-Ins. Co., 137 Mich. 309, 100 N.W. 
569 (1904); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Stubbs, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 166 S.W. 699, both 
cases discussing the void-voidable distinction of assignments made with incompetent 
persons but not mentioning any difference from the contractual capacity test. 
502 See Parts 111-B, and IV-A, D, and E, supra. 
503 See 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §432 (1936), although all cases there cited 
as authority for the general law of contract involve negotiable instruments. For cases 
concerning the jus tertii defense in negotiable instruments as to titles voidable for fraud, 
see 66 AL.R. 797, 800 (1930). 
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to exercise his power of avoidence against C, A would be under 
no duty to C.504 If this is not done, however, or if A is unaware of 
B's mental illness and performs for C, then upon a suit by B 
against A, A might defend on the ground of performance. If A's 
defense were successful, B would have to set aside the assignment 
to C and seek restitution of the money paid by A to C. 
C. Discharges by Subsequent Consent 
A number of methods for discharging a contract which was 
validly executed involve the later consent of both parties. The 
more common include accord and satisfaction, novation, mutual 
rescission, and alteration. These typically require the same requi-
sites as the formation of a contract.505 Consequently, when a per-
son, competent at the time of agreement, later becomes mentally 
ill and during this illness executes one of these consensual dis-
charges or modifications, it seems that courts will probably apply 
the same capacity test to determine the validity of the discharge as 
it would to determine the validity of the initial agreement. 
D. Subsequent Illegality 
The subsequent illegality of a contract generally terminates 
the parties' obligations.506 If, due to mental illness developing 
after execution of the valid contract, however, the mentally ill 
party is unaware of the subsequent illegality and continues to per-
form, it would seem that he should receive the protection of the 
court by way of an action in unjust enrichment for benefits con-
ferred upon the healthy party.507 
E. Law Suits on the Contract 
Although not strictly a matter of contract law, mental illness 
can affect the actual bringing of a lawsuit on a contract. Included 
among the effects of mental illness in this category are the prob-
504 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §432 (1936); 1 CoNTRAcrS RESTATEMENT §169 
(1932). 
505 There are some 19 ,topics on methods of discharging contracts listed in 2 CoN-
TRACTS RESTATEMENT §§385-453 (1932), with §410, comment a, stating that the same req-
uisites are necessary for discharge as for the formation of a contract, except for renuncia-
tion or an executed gift. 
506 But a party is responsible for a breach occurring while the contract was legal. 
See 2 CONTRAcrs RESTATEMENT §§608 and 468 (1932). 
507 The plaintiff would not be regarded as in pari delicto with •the defendant. 6 
CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1534-1537 (1951). But see American 1Mercantile Exchange v. Blunt, 
102 Me. 128 at 133, 66 A. 212 (1906) (dictum). 
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!ems of the tolling of the statute of limitations,508 and the prob-
lem of capacity to sue and be sued.509 The attorney should remem-
ber that the tests for the quantity of mental illness required either 
to toll the statute of limitations510 or to require a guardian for 
suit,511 may differ from those which result in a power of avoid-
ance512 or an impossibility defense.513 
SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS 
Although a number of specific conclusions or recommendations 
have been mentioned throughout this study, three very broad con-
clusions may be appropriately reviewed. First, although the 
sciences of psychology and psychiatry have developed mainly in 
the last half century, the test for incapacity to contract has re-
mained the same since 1895 and basically the same for centuries. 
In fact, it can be generalized that the new mental sciences have 
influenced the law of mental illness and contracts very little. 
This suggests that attorneys and courts may be overlooking argu-
ments based on the findings of these sciences. One such argument 
may be the need for a broader test of incapacity to protect under-
stood but uncontrolled actions by mentally ill persons. 
A second conclusion is that the courts have intertwined and 
perhaps confused principles based on policies of protecting the 
mentally ill with principles surrounding fraud, undue influence, 
and similar factors. Since this approach makes it very difficult 
508 The statutes generally state that mental illness cannot suspend the statute once 
it has commenced running but must exist when the cause of action accrues. The statutes 
usually either extend the period for a stated number of years after the removal of dis-
ability, or allow a period after the recovery equivalent to the original limit. See Blume 
and George, "Limitations and the Federal Courts," 49 MICH. L. REv. 937 at 974-975 
(1951); Littell, "A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitation," 21 IND. L.J. 23 at 34-36 
(1945). 
509 E.g., Wiesmann v. Donald, 125 Wis. 600, 104 N.W. 916 (1905) (quasi-contract suit); 
Maloney v. Dewey, 127 Ill. 395, 19 N.E. 848 (1889) (collateral attack on foreclosure of 
trust deed). 
510 Some courts indicate that an adjudication of incompetency is not necessarily the 
requisite "insanity" for statute of limitations exceptions. See Thlocco v. Magnolia Petro• 
leum Co., (5th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 934, cert. den. 323 U.S. 785 (1944). However, other 
courts regard an inability to manage personal affairs as "insanity." Cases are cited in 
9 AL.R. (2d) 964 at 965 (1950). See also the discussion in "Developments in the Law-
Statutes of Limitations," 63 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. II77 at 1231 (1950), advocating ,tolling if the 
mental illness prevents the person from bringing suit in his own name. 
511 See cases cited in note 509 supra and Sengstack v. Sengstack, 4 N.Y. (2d) 502, 151 
N.E. (2d) 887 (1958) (separation suit), note, 27 FoRD. L. REv. 629 (1959). 
512 See text at note 88 supra. 
513 Cf. Part V•A. 
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either to evaluate the court's rationale, or accurately to predict 
a decision in a given situation, it would seem desirable to dis-
tinguish carefully between rules concerning granting and en-
forcing a power of avoidance based on mental incapacity, and 
rules concerning relief from fraud, undue influence, and similar 
activities of the other party. 
Finally, it appears that a body of discernible mental illness 
law in the area of supervening mental illness as it affects perform-
ance of a contract has yet to develop. Courts initially approached 
the performance problems in terms of traditional impossibility 
concepts, and have not ranged far from those basic concepts. As 
the law evolves, it is natural to expect problems of supervening 
mental illness to fall generally into a pattern with physical dis-
ability problems, and more broadly, into impossibility concepts. 
At the same time, the many problems uniquely posed by mental 
illness would be expected to produce sophisticated doctrines that 
advance beyond well-established generalities. Foreseeability of the 
illness, frustration of the contract's basic purpose, and qualitative 
differences between mental diseases are some issues that still remain 
relatively unexplored. 
Robert M. Brucken, S. Ed. 
David L. Genger, S. Ed. 
Denis T. Rice, S. Ed. 
Mark Shaevsky, S. Ed. 
William R. Slye, S. Ed. 
Robert P. Volpe, S. Ed. 
APPENDIX A 
l. OUTLINE CHECKLIST OF EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST INCAPACITY 
Because of the wide range of evidence considered relevant in the proof of a condition 
of mental capacity or incapacity, this checklist is offered to the attorney as a guide to 
collecting the various types of facts which should be considered in the evaluation or 
preparation of a given contract transaction. 
A. Mentally Ill Person's Activities and Condition 
1. Other business dealings 
a. use of agent for those dealings 
b. degree of complexity of those dealings (as compared with transaction in 
question) 
c. time of dealings (in relation to instant ,transaction) 
d. nature of those dealings (in comparison with instant transaction) 
(1) another similar contract, deed, etc. 
e. prudence of prior or subsequent transactions 
f. opinion of prior or subsequent business associates 
2. Age 
(1) degree of business carried on with ,the ill person 
(2) time 
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3. Physical condition 
a. recent illness 
(nature, seriousness, and duration) 
b. operations 
(number and nature) 
c. hospitalizations 
(number and duration) 
d. physical disabilities 
(1) infirmities and their duration 
(2) deaf, dumb, or blind 
a. length of time 
b. severity 
(3) invalid 
(length of time) 
(4) severe pain 
4. Intelligence and education 
5. Record of mental illness in family 
a. specific mental disease 
b. hospitalizations 
(number and duration) 
c. commitments 
(voluntary and involuntary, number and duration) 
d. adjudications 
(insanity, incompetency, incapacity in other transactions) 
e. guardianships 
(nature of proceeding) 
f. suicide attempts 
6. Adjudications, prior and subsequent 
a. incompetency 
b. insanity 
c. incapacity in other transactions 
d. restoration 
7. Guardianship 
a. under incompetency or insanity proceeding 
b. under other proceeding 
c practical termination 
d. official termination 
8. Commitment or hospitalization 
a. voluntary or involuntary 
b. length 
c. nature and severi·ty of illness 
d. nature of -treatment 
e. continued control of business affairs 
f. discharge as cured, improved, or otherwise 
9. Mental illness without adjudication or :hospitalization 
a. visits to psychiatrists, etc. 
b. delusions, obsessions, eccentricities, etc. 
(length, severity, recurrence, permanence) 
1115 
10. Opinion of family, friends, neighbors as to mental stability and business 
judgment 
a. observation of "peculiar" behavior 
11. Use of excessive alcohol and drugs 
B. Facts of the Transaction 
1. Active participation in the contract 
a. advertising, correspondence 
b. definition of terms, payments, dates, etc. 
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3. Explanation of the transaction to the mentally ill person 
a. by his attorney 
b. by other attorney 
c. by other party to transaction 
d. by his friends, family 
e. by disinterested third person 
4. Statements of ill person at time of transaction 
a. indicating awareness of practical consequence of transaction 
b. indicating satisfaction 
c. requesting or :rejecting provisions 
d. questions concerning significance of certain provisions 
5. Opinions of observers 
a. physical appearance 
b. mental condition 
(1) "normal" 
(2) satisfaction with transaction 
c. clarity of communication 
6. Correspondence of •transaction with long-standing plan 
[Vol. 57 
a. complementary to testamentary or another inter vivos transaction 
b. consideration for past services 
c. past statements of intention 
7. Ability to recall transaction when questioned at a distant time 
a. -the occurrence of the transaction 
-b. basic elements of transaction 
8. Fairness and naturalness of transaction 
a. difference between "value" given and received 
b. with whom made 
(1) children, distant relatives, etc. 
C. Expert Testimony 
1. Analysis of case history 
2. Interpretation of personal mental and physical exam 
a. whether remote or proximate to the transaction 
Caveat: factors -tending to show presence of undue influence, confidential relations, 
or fraud (e.g., other •party to contract is a friend or close relative, lived with 
and cared for ,the mentally ill person, or the use of persuasion and the 
absence of an arms length transaction), •while affording a separate basis for 
avoiding the transaction, may also influence the decision of -the court on the 
issue of capacity. 
II. PLANNING LEGALLY EFFECTIVE TRANSACTION WITH A PERSON SUSPECTED To BE 
MENTALLY ILL 
To achieve the optimum probability of upholding the validity of a contract executed 
by a person believed to be mentally ill, the attorney should strive to satisfy as many of 
-the following factors as possible. 
I. Be certain that the party J:J.as been adjudged competent again if he had at any time 
been adjudicated incompetent or committed to an asylum. 
2. Have the mentally ill person actively participate in the determination of the terms 
and conditions of the contract. 
3. Execute the contract in the attorney's office. 
4. Explain the meaning of the contract in nonlegal terms to the mentally ill party. 
5. Have a disinterested third person experienced in handling similar dealings explain 
the meaning to the party. 
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6. Have the mentally ill person note on the contract itself or an attached paper that he 
recognizes the legal consequences of his action (e.g., a notation that grantor intends to 
move after conveying his residence). 
7. Have the witnesses at the execution of the contract ask the mentally ill person if 
he is satisfied with the results of the contract. 
8. Above all else-be certain the contract is fair and just. 
APPENDIX B 
STATUTES DEALING WITH CoNTRAcrs OF THE MENTALLY ILL 
The following is a list of statutory provisions determining the effect of mental illness 
on contractual capacity in certain situations. Where no provision is listed for a jurisdic-
tion, reference must be made to case law, which may reach the same result as under a 
statute (e.g., "voidness''). The nature and effect of the presumptions of incapacity or 
of restoration to capacity are discussed in part III; the distinctions between "void" and 
"voidable" contracts, and the effects of each (in many cases, identical), are discussed in 
part IV. The types of statutes listed are designated within the table as follows: 
A. Statutes declaring contracts "void" 
1. Before any adjudication of incompetency (see part II for the tests of incom-
petency under these statutes) 
2. After guardianship proceedings ("voidness" may be conditioned on the filing of 
proper notices, and in some jurisdictions attaches only to contracts involving 
realty) 
3. After final commitment to a mental hospital 
B. Statutes declaring contracts "voidable" 
1. Before guardianship -proceedings (see part II for the -tests of incompetency under 
these statutes) 
2. After guardianship proceedings 
C. Statutes creating presumptions 
1. Presumption of incapacity, after adjudication of incompetency 
2. Presumption of restoration to capacity, after release from mental hospital or 
lapse of guardianship 
D. Statutes declaring that commitment will have no effect on contractual capacity 
1. All commitments to mental hospitals 
2. Temporary commitments 
3. Voluntary commitments 
A. Vom 8. VOIDABLE C. PRESUMPTION D. NoEFFECT 
Ala. Code (1940) (1) tit. 9, §§41, 
42,43 
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1) §51-4-20h(j) 
(1949) (Supp. 1958) 
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. (1) §38 (1) §39 (2) §40 
(Deering, 1949) (2) §40 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2) §71-1-21 (1) §71-1-23 
(1953) (Supp. 1957) 
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958) (2) §§45-73, 
45-74 
Del. Code Ann. (1953) (2) tit. 12, (1) tit. 16, §5126 
§3914(f) 
(Supp. 1956) 
D.C. Code Ann. (1951) (2) §21-507 
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A. VOID B. VOIDABLE C. PRESUMPTION D. NoEFFEcr 
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) (I) §394.22(10) (2) §394.22(12) 
(Supp. 1958) (Supp. 1958) 
Ga. Code Ann. (1936) (2) §20-206 (1) §20-206 
Hawaii Rev. Laws (1955) (3) §81-34 
Idaho Code Ann. (1) §32-106 (1) §32-107 (2) §32-108 (1) §66-346 
(1948) (2) §32-108 (Supp. 1957) 
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) (2) c. 3, §278 (1) c. 3, §278 (1) c. 91½, §5-11 
(3) c. 91½, §4-8 
Ind. Stat. Ann. (2) §8-411 (2) §22-4713 
(Burns, 1953) (Supp. 1957) 
Iowa Code (1958) (1) §670.10 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) (1) §59-2260 
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1958) (2) §202.145 (2) §202.310 
La. Civ. Code Ann. (I) art. 402, 
(Dart, 1945) 1788, 1789 
(2) art. 401, 
1784, 1788, 
1791 
Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) (2) c.158, 
§§6, 29 
Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) (2) §525.453 
Mo. Ann. Stat. (2) §475.135, (1) §202.847(1) 
(Vernon, 1956) §475.345 (Supp. 1958) 
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (I) §64-110 (1) §64-lll (2) §64-112 
(1947) (2) §64-112 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2) §41.300 (2) §41.300 
(1957) 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2) §§462:27, 
(1955) 464:9 
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) (1) §34-2-15 
N.Y. Civ. Pract. Act (2) §1361 
(Cahill-Parsons, 1955) 
N.C. Gen. Stat. (1958) (1) §122-46 
NJD. Rev. Code (1943) (I) §14-0101 (1) §14-0102 (1) §25-0320 
(2) §14-0103 (Supp. 1957) 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (2) §2111.04 (3) §5123.57 
(Baldwin, 1958) (3) §5123.57 
Okla. Stat. (1951) (I) tit. 15, §22 (1) tit. 15, §23 (2) tit. 58, §855 (3) tit. 43A, §64 
(2) tit. 15, §24 (Supp. 1958) (Supp. 1957) 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (2) tit. 50, 
(Purdon, 1954) §3511 
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (2) §33-15-33 
(1956) 
S.D. Code Ann. (1939) (I) §30.0801 (1) §30.0802 (2) §30.0IA07 
(2) §30.0803 (Supp. 1952) 
Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) (2) §34-1014 (3) §33-1207 
(Supp. 1958) (Supp. 1958) 
Tex. Stat. Ann. (1) art. 5547, §83 (1) art. 5547, §83 
(Vernon, 1958) (3) art. 5547, §24 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) (I) §64-7-48 
Vt. Stat. Ann. (1947) (2) §§3316, 3317 
Va. Code Ann. (1950) (2) §37-99 
(Supp. 1958) 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. (2) §71.02.650 (2) and (3) 
§71.02.650 
W. Va. Code Ann. (1955) (3) §2661 
Wis. Stat. Ann. (1958) (2) §319.215 (1) §51.005 
